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vAbstract
This is a thesis by publication comprising four published research papers and an 
overarching statement which examine the language and discourse of the climate 
change debate in Australia since 2007. Published over the period of my candidacy, 
the papers individually explore a range of questions about the broader underpinning 
drivers of a unique period of political disruption in Australia – the so-called ‘climate 
wars’. Thematically, this thesis considers how the scientific urgency and moral 
imperative for climate change policy action, so powerful in 2007, degenerated into a 
rancorous political wedge that provided the catalyst for the removal of three sitting 
prime ministers. 
The thesis addresses a number of pertinent questions. What is it about climate 
change as a scientific, environmental, economic, psychological, social, cultural and 
ethical and ideological phenomenon that offers insight into this remarkable period 
of Australian political history? What does the political narrative of this period tell 
us about the taxonomy of public and political debate broadly, the changing political 
economy of media and its resultant impact on the relationship between governments 
and its citizens specifically? Given that scientific evidence of trend-breaking global 
temperatures is being reported in increasingly strident language, how can the 
discursive practices that have underpinned the Australian debate shed light on this 
political impasse and policy gridlock?
The papers in this thesis have employed both a ‘close’ and ‘distant reading’ (Moretti, 
2013) mixed methods approach to critical discourse and frame analysis. Two of the 
studies use the innovative computer-assisted content analysis software Leximancer 
(Smith & Humphries, 2006) to develop and analyse large corpuses of media data 
from a different perspective and from a unique place in the political timeline. Each 
paper employs one of these key discursive frames as a focal prism for what might 
be  discovered about different ways of ‘knowing’ climate via the role of the language 
and considering the social and political function of the texts.
The research ultimately highlights the power of language and the way that the 
framing  of climate change via the media has worked to shape the political narrative, 
impact the public debate and direct the political action. Ultimately, understanding 
frames, and how they shape the communication of a contentious issue, is important 
for the development of effective strategic communication of significant public issues. 
Climate change is arguably, THE defining issue of our era. 
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Preface
This thesis takes the form of a series of previously published, peer-reviewed journal 
articles and one book chapter presented here in Chapters 2-5. It is introduced by an 
overarching statement presented in Chapter 1. The overarching statement sets out the 
intellectual and historical context of the research project as well as its methodological 
and epistemological foundations. In addition, it overviews and contextualizes each of 
the  papers as they form part of the whole project and ultimately provides a conclusion 
to the thesis.  
I need to make a note regarding the choice of journals in which these papers were 
published. Two of the papers were published in special themed editions of Global Media 
Journal (Australia): Volume 8, Issue 2 (2014) titled ‘Media, Politics, Politics and the 
2013 Australian Federal Election’ and Volume 11, Issue 2  (2017) titled ‘Perspectives 
on the “climate wars”’. Global Media Journal (Australia) is an academic publication 
housed within Western Sydney University and upon which I serve as a member of the 
editorial committee. The choice of this journal was strategic as the special edition 
themes in question suited the temporal and timely themes of the research. The 
specialised Australian political focus of the research also means that there are limited 
opportunities to publish in broader more generic journals. Both papers were subject to 
GMJ-Au’s standard double-blind peer review process. To avoid a conflict of interest, the 
organisation of the review process was handled independently of me by senior members 
of the editorial committee. In the case of ‘Missing in action’, the co-editors of the themed 
edition were Dr Antonio Castillo (RMIT University), Dr Roumen Dimitrov (UNSW) 
and Associate Professor Tim Dwyer (USyd). Dr Dimitrov and Dr Castillo organised 
referees and then collated the reports before they were sent to me with the outcome. 
In the case of  ‘Andrew Bolt and the discourse of scepticism’, Professor Hart Cohen 
(WSU) and Associate Professor Juan Salazar (WSU) were responsible for organising 
referees. Affadavits confirming the independence of this process have been provided by 
Dr Dimitrov and Professor Cohen and can be found in Appendix 1. 
The second article, ‘The Choice Between Progress and the Planet’, was published 
in the Journal of Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies. This paper addresses the 
intersection of ethical and economic considerations in climate change policy debate as 
evidenced through a case study of the Australian political landscape via the strategic 
choice of specific linguistic frames. The interdisciplinary remit of this journal offered an 
appropriate vehicle in which to more broadly explore this aspect of the topic. 
For the sake of consistency and readability, the individual papers have been restyled. 
The  text of each paper remains as it was originally published. The layout of this 
thesis  reflects the requirements of the Western Sydney University (formerly UWS) 
Doctorate Policy (2012). 
1CHAPTER 1
Overarching statement
2Introduction: From ‘great moral challenge’ to ‘climate 
change is absolute crap’ – how did we get here?
Climate change is the great moral challenge of our generation.
Climate change is not just an environmental challenge.
Climate change is an economic challenge, a social challenge, and actually 
represents a deep challenge on the overall issue of national security. …
It’s for those sorts of reasons that people like Schwarzenegger in 
California are now describing climate change as the first ‘post-partisan 
political issue’. And so it should be. 
Federal Labor leader Kevin Rudd: Opening remarks to the National Climate Change 
Summit, Parliament House, Canberra (31 March, 2007) 
For almost 40 years I had the naïve view that if we simply obtain more 
physical understanding of the issue, we could provide ‘the’ answers 
and responses would be rational. I now see that there is absolutely no 
guarantee of this. It is ourselves that we do not understand. 
Former CSIRO atmospheric scientist Dr Graeme Pearman (17 February, 2009)
Kevin Rudd’s ‘call to arms’ on climate change in the lead-up to the 2007 Australian 
Federal election, captured the national imagination and reinvigorated engagement 
in the political debate. After 12 years of conservative government under John 
Howard, the country was ready for both a change in style and a change in policy 
direction. In the midst of a severe drought, climate change became the ‘issue du 
jour’ that highlighted the differences, both in approach and ideology, of the two 
major Australian political parties. Rudd’s impassioned advocacy promised the sort of 
forward-thinking environmental and economic reform that the country was craving 
– the promise of policy over politics that resonated with those who hankered for 
the kind of vision reminiscent of the glory days of Hawke and Keating and for the 
inspirational leadership of Ben Chifley and his ‘light on the hill’. Described as ‘the first 
climate change election’ (Glover, 2007; Rootes, 2008), an ANU exit poll study (Davis, 
2008) confirmed majority electoral support for both ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
and of binding international emission targets. The same report also noted the extent 
to which the public was more than usually politically engaged and the importance 
of global warming as a vote changer, particularly for the so-called ‘Howard battlers’ 
(Curtis, 2008). 
3Looking back from the rhetorical high point of 2007, many of the questions raised by 
the papers that comprise this thesis, remain compelling. How did the scientific urgency 
and moral imperative for policy action on climate change, so palpable and popularly 
powerful in 2007, devolve into a politically expedient wedge that has underpinned 
a unique period of political disruption in Australia and provided the catalyst for the 
removal of three sitting prime ministers? Why has Malcolm Turnbull, once a strong 
and principled advocate of decisive climate change action, seemingly traded his ‘climate 
soul’ to garner the support from strident anti-climate change, right-wing members 
of his party in order to assume and maintain the position of prime minister? What 
is it about climate change as a scientific, environmental, economic, social, ethical and 
ideological issue that offers insight into this remarkable period of Australian political 
history? What does the political narrative of this period tell us about the taxonomy 
of public and political debate broadly, the changing political economy of media and 
its resultant effect on the relationship between governments and its citizens, more 
specifically? Given that scientific evidence of trend-breaking global temperatures 
is being reported in increasingly strident language (CSIRO, 2016; NASA, 2016), how 
can the discursive practices that have underpinned the political debate in Australia 
shed light on this political impasse and policy gridlock? To explore these questions, 
the papers in this thesis have employed these key discursive frames as a prism 
through which to examine the underlying drivers of the political debate during the 
past 10  years. Each in its own way, has focused on an aspect of the complex political 
narratives around climate policy  that have evolved during this extraordinary period. 
The ‘moveable feast’ of Australian politics during the period 2007-2017 has 
provided  both challenges and opportunities for my research. During the early 
stages,  the Rudd government’s difficulties in enacting its promised emissions trading 
scheme afforded a  singular, significant and dynamic issue through which to explore 
a range of intersecting themes at a local political, and broader theoretical, level 
specifically through the prism of language. However, the constantly shifting political 
‘sands’ made researching this in real or common time, challenging. To accommodate 
this dynamic political milieu, the research was structured using four published 
papers  and an overview as a way of both capturing the fluidity of the debate and of 
dealing with an evolving set of discourses. Methodologically, each paper has used 
some  variation of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and frame analysis. The analysis 
in each is underpinned by the assumption that language, the manner in which it 
is constituted in a text or corpus of texts, and the political and ideological context 
in which it has been used, can shed light on broader ways in which knowledge and 
4related  power structures are working with respect to the communication of that 
issue. As such, the project has highlighted the power of the countervailing forces of 
the economic and political status quo to mobilise, push back and reframe policy and 
debate around this issue so as to distract attention from the serious implications 
of climate change and the uncomfortable social, economic and political realities of 
having to deal with it. One of the standout observations of each paper, for example, 
is the extent to which the environment, as a key driver of argument, has been either 
absent or reframed, and subsequently relegated to a matter of secondary concern. 
In this overview, I will outline and critique the objectives, methods and outcomes 
of my research. To provide context, I will summarise a range of broader issues that 
inform the climate change debate, in general, and the Australian political situation 
in particular. It is important to note that because each paper was written as a stand 
alone publication, some degree of repetition of the historical and political context and 
of the theoretical assumptions underpinning the methodology was unavoidable. The 
background and context of each reflects the time in which it was written. 
This overview will also describe the theoretical constructs of CDA and the mixed 
methods approach that underpins the papers and give a rationale for their selection. 
Additionally, I will evaluate and critique the outcomes of each paper with a specific 
focus on the use of the Leximancer text analytics software and the broader use of 
computer-aided analysis to affect Moretti’s (2013) notion of ‘distant reading’.
Finally, I will describe the rationale and focus of the four papers and the extent 
to which they examine the broader intersection of climate change as an issue, its 
local political implications and how this has been prosecuted publicly. The research 
highlights the impact and power of language and way that the framing of climate 
change via the media has worked to shape the political narrative, public debate and 
direct political action. Ultimately, this is important for the construction of effective 
strategic communication of significant public issues such as climate change and the 
development of appropriate political responses to dealing with what is arguably the 
biggest environmental, political and social challenge of our time. 
5Why are we so conflicted about climate change?:  
An overview of the underlying issues
Climate change as the most significant scientific and 
environmental challenge of our time
Each of the first six months of 2016 set a record as the warmest 
respective month globally in the modern temperature record, which 
dates to 1880, according to scientists at NASA’s Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies (GISS) in New York. The six-month period from January to 
June was also the planet’s warmest half-year on record, with an average 
temperature 1.3 degrees Celsius (2.4 degrees Fahrenheit) warmer than the 
late nineteenth century. 
NASA (July 2016)
As Australia continues to politically dither over policies for serious climate 
abatement,  respected scientific organisations continue to publish increasingly dire 
findings of a rapidly warming climate (CSIRO, 2016; NASA, 2016; The Committee on 
Climate Change (UK), 2016). These concerns are not new, and since the late 1980s 
scientific warnings about the need for national governments to seriously consider 
strategies to regulate carbon emissions have become increasingly strident in tone. 
The  World Meteorological Organisation which uses data from NASA, has reported 
that  2016 was the hottest year on record (Hannam, 2017), the previous record 
having been reached in 2015. More broadly, scientific concern over the impact of 
the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere has been growing 
since  the 1950s, although the possibility that human activity might be impacting 
the climate has been discussed since the end of the 19th century (Weart, 2010). 
Environmental scientist, NASA’s Dr James Hansen, catapulted the issue into public 
consciousness in 1988 when he told the US Senate that his computer modelling 
indicated that the Earth’s atmosphere was now warmer than in any previous period 
since measurements began, and that this warming was increasing faster than had 
earlier been predicted. He also warned that the atmospheric buildup of carbon 
dioxide  and other greenhouse gases that work by trapping heat in the atmosphere, 
was likely to shift the self-regulating mechanisms of the climate – a system which 
has both enabled and nurtured the evolution of homo sapiens as a species and allowed 
it to flourish. The impacts of unrestrained global warming would include the shrinking 
of polar ice caps and the Himalayan glaciers and a rise in sea levels that  would 
inundate  many coastal communities and low-lying islands. It would also result in 
6losses to ecosystem diversity and to increasingly unpredictable, extreme weather 
patterns resulting in more severe droughts, floods, bushfires and storms. 
Paleoclimate studies show that the Earth’s climate has changed before, often 
abruptly  –  a point regularly raised by those who dispute the existence or extent 
of human agency in anthropogenic climate change. Each of these ‘events’ has 
radically shifted the status quo of life on Earth in different ways. However, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), set up in 1988 by the United 
Nations to assess scientific research into climate change and its political and social 
impacts, reported that while this is true, the warming trajectory has trended 
exponentially upwards since mass industrialization began in the mid 1700s (IPCC, 
2007). Their most recent report reiterated the conclusion that: 
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-
industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and 
are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at 
least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other 
anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system 
and are extremely likely (sic) to have been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-20th century (IPCC, 2014, p. 4). 
Moreover, the most recent research and modelling has revealed the complex, non-
linear nature of the climate system which makes predicting specific outcomes 
extremely difficult, made more so by the time lag between emissions and their 
effects. Scientists fear that continued unmitigated growth in levels of greenhouse 
gas emissions will reach a tipping point likely to set in train atmospheric feedback 
mechanisms beyond which remediation will be impossible. It is important to stress 
that climate and climatic stability is more than merely an environmental phenomena 
or physical externality, it has been pivotal in the development and cultural evolution of 
human civilisation. Equally, rapid and dramatic changes to local climate, biodiversity 
and habitat, will have significant and catastrophic implications for human and 
other life on Earth as we know it from a range of yet unanticipated consequences. 
Beyond the physical risks lie the geopolitical risks where disruptions caused by 
climate change result in scarce water, food and energy resources, mass migration and 
the human suffering and political instabilities that necessarily accompany these – 
consequences already identified as posing serious future national security risks by the 
US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2016). Stable societies have evolved 
7around implicit assumption of climate stability and the unpredictable nature of 
climate changes will potentially exacerbate existing problems in fragile nations with 
broader geo-political consequences. 
Climate change and the role of science
The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge 
faster than society gathers wisdom. 
Isaac Asimov (1988)
Climate science … is the science where one plus one can equal three 
one day and six the next – yet never may the layman question the 
expert … This must change, and I believe finally is. The tyranny of the 
experts is now crumbling. The commonsense view of the layman is at last 
being restored. 
Andrew Bolt (2014) ‘False Prophets Unveiled’ p. 274.
The role of scientific methods, knowledge, authority and expertise in the manner in 
which the political debate has evolved over climate change, has become ideologically 
and politically contested. Since the Industrial Revolution, science has been equated 
with notions of transformative human progress – mastery over the vagaries of nature 
and the environment, over the physical and frailties of the human species and over 
the transience of human life. As a discipline and a way of ‘knowing’, we have trusted 
science to seek out knowledge and to problem-solve in a systematic, disciplined, 
methodical and objective manner, unburdened by politics and ideology. It is this 
conception of science that has been the source of much of its authority and power.
However, as sociologists of science (e.g. Kuhn, 2012; Latour, 2009; Merton, 1973; 
Woolgar, 1988) have argued, science as a discipline is not inherently neutral, but is 
both a social institution and a cultural phenomenon. It is not conducted in a vacuum, 
and like all producers of knowledge, scientists are equally influenced, directed and 
constrained by the historical context, institutional structures, power hierarchies, 
personal and professional ideological positions and cultural norms in which they 
operate. For this reason, exploring climate change politics and discourse from 
multiple political and sociological perspectives, beyond merely the prism of scientific 
practice, is useful. These perspectives shed light on why, in face of overwhelming 
scientific consensus, climate change has become both politicised and epistemologically 
contested both in Australia and internationally. 
8While superficially climate change communication appears to be about the 
consensus  or otherwise of ‘science’ as a homogenous discipline, closer inspection of 
the language and rhetoric shows that the debate has evolved beyond this. From one 
perspective, the debate has become a battleground for the legitimacy of different 
branches of science and of peak scientific bodies and institutions, to speak as 
authorities on the veracity of measurement instruments, data interpretation and 
prediction of long-term impacts (e.g. Lahsen, 2013). The historical demarcation 
between different scientific disciplines has been seized upon by those for whom climate 
change is ‘an inconvenient truth’ in order to challenge the efficacy of so-called ‘experts’, 
the legitimacy of ‘expert opinion’ and the right of so-called ‘sceptics’ to express their 
views as a matter of freedom of speech (e.g. Collins & Evans, 2007; Delingpole, 2014) 
regardless of their scientific expertise or the extent to which their views are supported 
by peer-reviewed, published and verified evidence. In an era that has been labeled 
‘post-truth’ – defined as ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective 
facts  are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and 
personal belief’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2016) – this shift is also evident in the 
momentous and unanticipated international political events such as the UK Brexit 
vote and the US election of Donald Trump in 2016. The tide of anti-intellectualism, 
the challenge to the authority of traditional ‘experts’ and mounting distrust of, and 
contempt for, so-called ‘elites’, has now also moved beyond the realm of science. 
Research within this frame also explores the role of vested interests in shaping 
public  debate, public opinion and political action (e.g. Oreskes & Conway, 2010). The 
impact and power of news media in fomenting dissent and in the substance, direction 
and focus of the debate (e.g. Bacon, 2011, 2013; Boykoff, 2011; Painter, 2013) is also 
relevant here. From this starting point, my paper titled ‘Andrew Bolt and the discourse 
of ‘scepticism’ in the Australian climate change debate: A ‘distant reading’ approach 
using Leximancer’, analyses how the traditional notion of ‘scepticism’ has shifted 
and been appropriated by self-labelled climate ‘sceptics’. The columns of prominent 
Australian commentator Andrew Bolt were examined for the discursive construction 
of his so-called ‘scepticism’ via the innovative use of the computer-aided content 
analysis software Leximancer which provides the capacity for language analysis 
through the production of measurable, quantifiable data. The analysis concludes 
that while he affects a veneer of rationale debate and rhetorically appropriates the 
language of science, Bolt’s scepticism is more ideologically than scientifically founded. 
As Robert  Manne (2012, p. 23) observed, climate change ‘denialism’ has become a 
‘high profile political phenomenon’ across the West. 
9Climate change and the role of economics
Economic growth has become … the mark of vitality, the bearer of 
dynamism, the symbol of life itself. It is what vivifies a nation, gives reality 
to dreams of prosperity and confers cultural superiority. … Growth is 
the vehicle that delivers nations and peoples from backwardness into 
modernity. A nation whose economy is not growing is seen to be a 
moribund nation, a ‘basket case’. … [In the 21st century] growth provides 
the raw material from which we construct our sense of who we are … 
Clive Hamilton (2010). ‘Requiem for a species’. p. 64–65
‘It’s the economy, stupid!’
De facto campaign slogan of former US president Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential 
campaign
As a mantra, Clinton’s 1992 slogan has become political orthodoxy, and the papers 
that comprise this research have closely interrogated the discursive construction of 
this aspect of Australian political debate. The analysis has highlighted the manner 
and the extent to which economic considerations have come to dominate the political 
narrative and have driven decisions related to if, when, and how climate change should 
be tackled. These perspectives have provided a platform to interrogate the role and 
impact of the current economic paradigms on politics, policy and thinking. Through 
the role of the IPCC and in particular the influential Stern Review (2007), economic 
perspectives have become the primary frame through which debate, policy and politics 
have been filtered. Studies have highlighted its potential impacts as an indictment 
of the negative impact of ‘growth fetishism’ (Hamilton, 2010) or ‘carbon capitalism’ 
(Urry, 2011), of the neoliberal economic paradigm and the implications of globalisation 
(Klein, 2015). The argument ultimately becomes one of individual freedoms and self-
actualisation versus the collective rights and freedoms of both current and future 
generations. Others argue that climate change has become the ultimate ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ (Hardin, 1968) wherein the global atmosphere has become commodified 
and the rights to emit CO2 are allocated and auctioned by those with the most power 
in the market (MacLellan, 2015), usually to the detriment of those who will be most 
severely impacted yet will be less able to pay or adapt. 
As my research progressed, the pervading dominance of this frame became 
increasingly evident. While only one of my four papers specifically focused on the role 
of economics in the Australian debate and the extent to which economic rationalist 
arguments reflect or deflect ethical or moral considerations (‘The choice between 
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progress and the planet’), each paper to a greater or lesser degree, points to the strength 
of the economic imperative in the narrative. ‘Whither the moral imperative’ explored 
the extent to which Kevin Rudd’s much-quoted ‘great moral challenge of a generation’ 
speech substantively argued the case for ‘the moral imperative’. The paper details the 
moral and ethical dimensions of climate change and then compares the speeches of 
three of the Australian political protagonists, Rudd, Gillard and Abbott, for how these 
were articulated. It concludes that while Rudd’s speech identifies, and is most notably 
remembered for articulating this perspective, it substantively remains dominated by 
the economic frame. Abbott pays lip service to ethics but only on the condition that 
Australian economic interests are not compromised. Gillard’s ‘Clean Energy Future’ 
speech which introduced the so-called ‘carbon tax’, is almost entirely constructed to 
counter the opposition’s argument that pricing carbon would be economically ruinous 
for Australian families – the pervasive impact of Abbott’s attack and the Coalition’s 
frame is evident in the Labor strategy. 
‘Missing in action’ specifically explored the media reporting of climate change 
during  the important 2013 Australian federal election that marked the demise of 
the Rudd/Gillard/Rudd Labor governments and the election of climate sceptic Tony 
Abbott. This election was significant as it took place at the end of a particularly 
brutal and fractious period of Australian politics, the drama of which pivoted around 
debate over carbon pricing. Abbott’s campaign primarily revolved around his promise 
to ‘axe the tax’, a slogan that simplistically, but effectively, encapsulated his success 
in framing Gillard’s Clean Energy Bill as an economically destructive impost on the 
Australia and of the Gillard minority government as ‘illegitimate’ and ‘chaotic’. The 
paper concluded that not only was climate change as a major environmental and 
human rights issue effectively ignored by both major parties during the campaign, 
but  that the discussion and reporting that did occur was primarily framed through 
the  Coalition’s preferred parochial anti-tax frame. Tellingly, Abbott’s former chief 
of staff, Peta Credlin, has since admitted that the decision to fight the carbon price 
policy  by framing it as a ‘tax’ was an example of ‘brutal retail politics’ – in other 
words, it was not based on any genuine concern for the impact of a ‘tax’ on Australian 
household budgets but was merely a convenient political tool designed to wedge the 
Gillard government (AAP, 2017).
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Climate change and the role of human’s relationship with the 
environment
Unless we see the Earth as a planet that behaves as if it were alive, at 
least to the extent of regulating its climate and chemistry, we will lack the 
will to change our way of life and to understand that we have made it our 
greatest enemy. 
James Lovelock (2006) ‘The Revenge of Gaia’ p. 17
How does that ombudsman know what Mother Earth wants? Does she 
communicate her wishes through, say, the entrails of a chicken? How does 
he know that what Mother Earth really, really wants is not to sacrifice 
herself for the comfort of humans? 
Andrew Bolt Blog (13 April, 2011) ‘Mother Earth speaks to the UN through 
some Bolivian’
In the 21st century, we seem to be increasingly separate and disconnected from 
nature.  While we admire its power and glory through the medium of photography 
or film and pay lip service to ‘protecting’ endangered species and ecosystems, 
technologies and the individual imperatives which shape and govern our complex 
lives have worked to disconnect our collective Western consciousness from its natural 
origins. The way in which humans perceive the environment and nature in general, 
and climate in particular, is important to understanding why we seem resistant to the 
messages about the serious nature of climate change impacts (e.g. Chakrabarty, 2009; 
Lovelock, 2006; McKibben, 2006; Merchant, 1993). Hamilton (2009) and others have 
argued that the cognitive dissonance generated by the catastrophic possibilities of 
climate change stem from Western civilisation’s gradual disconnection from nature. 
Notions of progress, modernity and cultural superiority have become central to the 
human psyche and sense of self. Belief in human exceptionalism, separate, distinct and 
independent of nature, has elevated our collective consciousness beyond the influence 
of the vagaries of the external world that has spawned our species and nurtured the 
growth of our civilisations. This worldview is realised or articulated historically in the 
nature of economic systems that have evolved since the Industrial Revolution. More 
recently, it can be seen in the prioritised substance of ethical and moral arguments as 
emissions abatement policies are envisioned, debated and contested. 
Climate change and its potential impacts and imperatives, however, pose challenges 
not only to the future viability of our world as we know it, but also to culturally 
ingrained notions of morality, ethics and values. The ethical concepts of stewardship 
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of the environment, intergenerational responsibility and of the subsequent imperative 
for global action, should be vital determinants to the way political action is imagined 
and prosecuted, and to the way priorities are determined and policies are shaped. 
Further, understanding how our religious or cosmological belief systems filter and 
shape our attitudes to environmental issues and the extent to which these intersect 
with political ideologies, is an important perspective for determining how we engage 
political constituents in the challenge of climate change. Carolyn Merchant (1993) in 
her seminal work The Death of Nature, observed that: 
The image of the earth as a living organism and nurturing mother [which 
was displaced during the Renaissance by the mechanistic worldview 
of Descartes, Newton and others] had served as a cultural constraint 
restricting the actions of human beings [such as mining for minerals or 
pollution of air and rivers]. One does not readily slay a mother … (p. 29). 
These are large philosophical questions, but they are central to understanding 
why climate policies have been so difficult to implement. They are also central to 
understanding why public opinion has been so slow to mobilise and demand action. 
From an ethical perspective, climate change is about more than merely ‘weather’ – 
as climate shapes and impacts all societies and cultures, it is also about fundamental 
human rights. Who will decide who lives or dies and what cultures, nations, species 
or ecosystems survive and in what form, are all inherently ethical problems 
(Brown, 2011).
The question of ethics as it relates to the primacy of economic perspectives is explored 
in the papers ‘Whither the moral imperative?’ and ‘The choice between progress and 
the planet’. Both papers overview the environmental and ethical conundrums and 
contradictions underpinning this frame and question why moral and ethical appeals 
seem to lack substantive levels of political currency. ‘The choice between progress and 
the planet’ explores various notions of morality and ethics in the Australian debate. 
It also notes the historical shift that has taken place since the 1990s in terms of the 
impact of economic rationalism on attitudes to, and shaping of, environmental policy. 
Ethical perspectives are vital as they offer a broader, longer term perspective that 
encompass and clarify the philosophical question of the difference between what we 
can do and what we ought to do. 
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Climate change and the nature of power and political structures
Then, there is the politics. There are conservative and progressive moral 
systems (Lakoff, 2010a) …. The conservative moral system includes a 
number of ideas that work against environmentalism and against dealing 
with global warming. 
George Lakoff (2010b). ‘Why it matters how we frame the environment’ p. 74
Remember that every government service, every offer of government-
financed security, is paid for in the loss of personal freedom ... In the days 
to come, whenever a voice is raised telling you to let the government do 
it, analyze very carefully to see whether the suggested service is worth 
the personal freedom which you must forgo in return for such service. 
Former US president Ronald Reagan (1957)
A significant perspective informing my research has been the place of climate 
change as  a mechanism to interrogate and critique the nature of power and 
political structures.  The difficulties experienced by both national and international 
governments in negotiating and enacting binding agreements and targets is evidence 
of this, shaped and influenced largely by the power of vested industrial interests 
who fear loss of economic and political authority as demands for transition to a low 
carbon economy become louder. Their deliberate strategy to forestall this transition 
by proactively muddying the scientific and subsequent public debate, by the influence 
of lobby groups on governments and political parties of both persuasions, was 
documented most tellingly by Oreskes and Conway (2010) in Merchants of Doubt. 
The exercise of power, however, is a complex phenomenon, and for this reason 
language  and discourse study offer a prism through which to view the way that 
this is less obviously wielded. George Lakoff (2008; 2010a; 2010b) for example, 
contends that the issue of environmental concern goes beyond overt and consciously 
articulated political positions and priorities. He argues that how we conceptualise 
our  responsibility to, and subsequently act in the interests of ‘the environment’, is 
driven by the manner in which progressive and conservative ‘ways of thinking’ process 
and rationalise both ethical and moral appeals and the potential implications for the 
role of government and individuals in policy solutions. 
The role of media, and the professionalisation of political parties and their campaign 
machines, is also significant. The evolving structures of political parties since the 
end of World War 2 from ‘mass parties’ to ‘cartel parties’ (Blyth & Katz, 2005; Katz 
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& Mair, 1995), in what Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) have labeled the ‘third age of 
political communication’, has seen both a shift in the level of professionalism with 
which politics is enacted and a subsequent disconnection of party machines from 
the segments of society they claim to represent. This has been further manifested 
in an increasing level of cynicism and loss of confidence in democratic processes 
generally, and in the integrity of politicians specifically. The instability that has 
‘infected’ Australian politics since 2007 (Green, 2013; Latham, 2014; Megalogenis, 
2010; Tanner, 2011; Ward, 2006), the appeal of Australian populist parties such as 
Palmer United and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, not to mention the disruptions 
internationally as epitomised by the UK Brexit decision (Rundle, 2016) and the 
appeal of Donald Trump in the US (Watson, 2016), are all symptomatic of this shift. 
Each of the papers addresses this shift from both a specific and broader perspective, 
with particular focus on the Australian political experience and through the prism 
of climate change politics and policy. ‘Whither the moral imperative?’ discusses how 
Kevin Rudd failed to capitalise on the publically powerful ‘moral imperative’ mantra 
that resonated so strongly in the 2007 election, and how his failure to act on the issue 
contributed to his political downfall. The nature of the party system, the expectations 
of the Australian polity, the manner in which it was communicated and debated in the 
media and the complexity and idiosyncrasies of ‘a diabolical problem’ (Garnaut, 2008), 
all contributed to the strategic direction taken by the Rudd government in attempting 
to design and legislate its CPRS (Chubb, 2014). ‘The choice between progress and the 
planet’ discusses the primacy afforded economic considerations from an ideological 
and political viewpoint. ‘Andrew Bolt and the discourse of scepticism’ examines the 
discursive construction of so-called ‘climate scepticism’ in the Australian media 
context, its ideological roots and the extent to which it has been responsible for the 
inability of voters to distinguish good from poor scientific information. ‘Missing in 
action’ focuses specifically on the 2013 Australian federal election. Tony Abbott and 
the Liberal Party were hugely successful in narrowing and reframing climate change 
policy as one of potential economic vandalism, as an impediment to personal freedom 
and of a marker of political incompetence as encapsulated in the instability and 
political infighting that characterised the Rudd/Gillard/Rudd Labor governments. 
Since then, the Liberal Party has had its own share of instability in the Abbott/
Turnbull tussle and continues to struggle politically and ideologically with climate 
policy, even under the leadership of climate advocate Turnbull. Having won a narrow 
victory in the July 2016 election, Turnbull remains shackled by the right wing of the 
party to maintain the Abbott government’s climate policies, much to the dismay of 
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those for whom he appeared to offer hope for a more progressive approach. Tellingly, 
while business leaders, energy suppliers and consumers are calling for more certainty 
around energy policy (Chan, 2016; Pears, 2017), the 2017 Federal budget has quietly 
axed funding to several agencies and organisations set up to manage climate change 
research and adaptation (O’Donnell & Mummery, 2017), a move that is indicative of 
the narrow focus approach to the issue.
Climate change and the role of media in political debate
So, the contemporary cultural politics of climate change operate in a 
multitude of rapidly expanding spaces. Within these, the media serves 
a vital role in communication processes between science, policy and 
the public. 
Maxwell T. Boykoff (2011). ‘Who speaks for the climate? Making sense of media 
reporting on climate change’ p. 28
Whoever controls the media, controls the mind. 
Jim Morrison
News media have a pivotal role in both the way that the populace broadly, and 
governments specifically, engage with significant issues. News media report events 
and  provide a forum through which these are brought to public attention. They also 
act as conduits through which selected issues, voices and perspectives are heard. 
For  this  reason, my research has largely revolved around how various forms of print 
and online media have reported the political debate, and how this has impacted on 
the broader discourse around climate change and carbon abatement policy. 
The media, it is important to note, is not a neutral lens through which readers can 
view  specific issues, but through its traditions, culture, organizational structure, 
political economy and journalistic practices, is an active participant in the selection, 
filtering, focus and framing of news for our collective attention. It thus has a role 
in setting the agenda for what is discussed, the perspective from which issues 
are discussed, the manner in which they are discussed, and the prominence (or 
otherwise) of the discussion. It has been said that news media don’t tell people what 
to think, but  what to  think about (cited in Cox & Pezzulo, 2016, p. 26). Like many 
other important social  and political issues such as crime, immigration and so on, 
environmental issues  are framed and ‘constructed’ by virtue of the manner in which 
they are highlighted as areas of public and political concern. 
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In the case of climate change, the role of the media in shaping and influencing public 
attitudes has been the focus of much recent research (for example Boykoff, 2011; 
Hansen, 2010; Lester & Hutchins, 2013; Painter, 2013). The role of powerful elites in 
this process is also significant. Stuart Hall (1988) for one, has argued that ‘the practices 
of journalism take shape through the relationships of power, where knowledge and 
meaning arise through discursive struggle’ (cited in Boykoff, 2011, p. 76). 
According to Anabela Carvalho (2007), researching media representations is vital 
as it has a transformative function in relation to the reporting of science and in 
representations of risk in particular. Her study of British media coverage of climate 
change highlights the extent to which the values and ideologies underlying differing 
political orientations work ‘as a powerful selection device’ in deciding the emphasis 
given to scientific ‘facts’ and in identifying the ‘authorised agents of definition in 
science matters’ (p. 223). While earlier political decision-making on environmental 
and other scientific issues was more likely to have been based on expert scientific 
advice, today ‘such decision-making is increasingly influenced and governed by 
how environmental and related issues are presented to and perceived by the public’ 
(Hansen, 2010, p. 6). In other words, public opinion has become increasingly more 
important than expert advice in motivating political action on a range of issues, and 
it is this perspective that has become central in much reporting of climate science 
and of the politics of climate policy. From this perspective, Boykoff (2011) points to 
the weight given to media coverage by political actors that makes the study of media 
representations important. He says that:
… to the extent that elected officials, (climate) policy negotiators and rank-
and-file policy actors view amplified media attention to climate change 
(and pressure for action), these trends have the potential to catalyse 
climate mitigation and adaptation actions. Conversely, a diminished 
amount of coverage can be seen as detrimental to putting forward strong 
climate policies (p. 28).
This is further compounded by the impact of digital technologies on news media 
broadly  and on news gathering and reporting more specifically. Fewer specialist 
environmental journalists must increasingly deal with a ‘shrinking news hole 
while facing a growing need to tell longer, more complicated and in-depth stories’ 
(Friedman, 2004, p. 176). The inherent nature of climate change, which is both 
scientifically multifactorial and highly complex, but which is temporally slow and 
mostly invisible, makes sustained newsworthiness difficult to maintain, particularly 
in a media environment where short attention spans are increasingly the norm. 
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Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) have also argued that the norm of journalistic balance 
has created a misperception of the degree of consensus among climate scientists, 
giving unwarranted authority to those who, for various reasons, contest the consensus 
view. All opinions are not of equal value. For this reason, two of the papers focus 
specifically on the way climate change has been discursively constructed within a 
sample of media texts during a specific period (2013 Federal election) and from a 
specific viewpoint (how the notion of scepticism has been appropriated in a case 
study of tabloid media). Ultimately, it is important to note that while the active role 
of media in the performance and constitution of environmental issues, politics and 
policy is significant, the focus of these papers and this thesis is primarily on the 
operation of the discourse as opposed to the operation and of various forms of media.
Climate change as a significant ethical issue
How should we live? […] What are our obligations to the other creatures 
with whom we share this planet and to the generations of humans who 
will come after us? 
Peter Singer (1985). Ethics
We have a rendez-vous with humanity. 
International Trade Union Summit (2015). ‘No jobs on a dead planet’ Paris, France.
Finally, as noted in the previous sections, debating climate change action necessarily 
raises a range of ethical conundrums with regard to fundamental human rights, 
both present and future. While strategies related to communicating the science, 
envisioning the economic consequences and navigating the political, vested 
interests and ideological roadblocks have tended to occupy those advocating urgent 
action, advancing ethical concerns as an impetus to action has proven much more 
problematic. Despite the initial appeal of Kevin Rudd’s ‘great moral challenge’ trope, 
this research has confirmed the extent to which ethical frames have been largely 
sidelined in the intervening years in the political discourse by more politically 
expedient, short term economic concerns. The papers in this thesis have noted 
the privileging of the dominant neo-liberal frames through which political actors, 
mainstream media and many everyday Australians have considered this issue. 
However, a range of scholars have argued (Brown, 2013; Brown, Tuana, & et al, 
2006; Gardiner, 2011; Jamieson, 1992; Toman, 2006) that issues of justice and 
intergenerational equity underpin all other perspectives, including those of economics 
(Broome, 2006, 2008). 
18
The question of including ethical responsibility in strategies to deal with the impact 
of climate change is hugely complex. Ethical frames include broader philosophical 
questions such as those raised by Peter Singer (1985) in the quote above as well as 
the Christian notion of human ‘stewardship’ of the environment and of humans as 
protectors of ‘God’s gift’. These perspectives necessarily extend the debate beyond 
the rights of individual nation states, cultures or religions. They go beyond the 
rights to survival of any individual animal or plant species, any specific ecosystem 
or geographical region. The notion of ‘intergenerational equity’ further goes beyond 
current generations to question the extent to which future generations should be 
unreasonably burdened (in both environmental and economic terms), by the actions 
(or inactions) of the current generation’s failure to tackle the issue with sufficient 
urgency. 
As noted in my discussion of Kevin Rudd’s ‘great moral challenge’ speech (‘Whither 
the moral imperative?’), the nascence of Rudd’s interest in this perspective was first 
articulated in his essay ‘Faith in politics’, written before he became prime minister in 
2007. There he argued:
By definition, the planet cannot speak for itself. Nor can the working 
peoples of the developing world effectively speak for themselves, although 
they are likely to be the first victims of the environmental degradation 
brought about by climate change. Nor can those who come after us, 
although they are likely to be the greatest victims of this intergenerational 
injustice. It is the fundamental ethical challenge of our age to protect the 
planet – in the language of the Bible, to be proper stewards of creation 
(Rudd, 2006).
That paper concludes, however, that while he may have had a genuine desire to draw 
attention to the moral or ethical aspects of the argument, Rudd’s rhetoric was largely 
tempered by his political need to assert his credentials as an ‘economic conservative’ 
(Australian Labor Party, 2007). 
Questions of equity and justice have not been totally absent from the debate however. 
They have played a role in various attempts to shape international agreements 
such as the Kyoto Protocol (2008) and the Paris Climate Agreement (2016), both of 
which evolved from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(1992). One central, but contentious, principle of that framework for example, has 
been the special status afforded to ‘least developed countries’ (LDC). The IPCC 
(1996) argued that while the historical sources of a large volume of emissions come 
from developed countries who have accrued the ‘benefits’, the ‘costs’ are more likely 
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to be disproportionally borne by poorer countries who are least able to afford, let 
alone adapt, to them. More recently, Pope Francis’ encyclical Laudato Si’ (2015) 
and the 2016 Paris Agreement, reiterated the principles of equity outlined in the 
1996 agreement which stated that ‘all countries agreed to share global mitigation 
efforts following their “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities”’ (cited in Robiou Du Pont, 2017, p. 12). The Paris Agreement further 
required developed countries to take the lead in accepting stronger emission cuts and 
to provide financial support to developing countries in their mitigation efforts. 
Despite these honourable objectives, the papers in this thesis illustrate the extent 
to which ethical perspectives continue to be relegated to second order concerns in 
the political rhetoric. Former Australian prime minister Tony Abbott, for example, 
has recently described Australia’s emissions reductions targets, (agreed to in 2015 
by his own government), as merely ‘aspirations’ (Crowe, 2017). Alluding to his oft-
repeated argument that ongoing fossil fuel use is an ethical responsibility required to 
lift developing nations out of poverty, to maintain regional employment and to keep 
power prices down, he memorably stated that ‘coal is good for humanity’ (Massola, 
Ker, & Cox, 2014). This argument of course conveniently ignores the devastating 
impact on the environment locally and internationally as well as the wasted 
opportunity costs for the economy of not encouraging investment in renewable energy 
sources. Further, in a speech to the sceptical think tank the ‘Global Warming Policy 
Foundation’, Mr Abbott opined with respect to Australia’s responsibilities and policy 
responses that:
As for the general public, of course saving the planet counts – until the bills 
come in and then the humbug detector is switched on (Abbott, 2017).
Using similar arguments, President Donald Trump announced in June 2017 that 
he was withdrawing the US from the Paris Climate Agreement, stating that it was 
unfair to US economic interests. He memorably noted that ‘I was elected to represent 
the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris’ (O’Donnell, 2017). This insular focus on local 
concerns, albeit couched within a faux ethical frame, Donald Brown argues, is a major 
roadblock to broader international action.
Developing countries aren’t likely to step up their commitments unless 
they see developed countries begin to make commitments that clearly take 
their responsibilities to other people seriously (cited in Palmer, 2012).
Many ‘sceptics’ like Abbott, Trump and conservative media voices such as 
Australia’s Andrew Bolt, continue to frame economic and ethical considerations as 
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an antithetical binary choice between ‘progress and planet’ (Charlton, 2011). This 
conundrum is explored in the thesis paper similarly titled (Gurney, 2017b) as well as 
in the exploration of the discourse of climate scepticism in the writings of Andrew 
Bolt (Gurney, 2017a).
The role of media has also been identified as complicit in the dearth of focus on the 
ethical issues in this debate. Donald Brown (cited in Palmer, 2012) points to the 
lack of focus by the world’s press on the link between global warming and natural 
disasters like Hurricane Katrina (2005), Superstorm Sandy (2012), unseasonal 
temperature rises, increasingly frequent and ferocious wildfires and snowstorms and 
events such as the mass coral bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef (Hughes et al., 2018). 
He notes that:
When you have a couple hundred thousand people die in Pakistan, the 
press isn’t linking it to climate change. Americans need to see that they 
have responsibilities to other people around the world. The press doesn’t 
get the justice element of this. If it’s a justice issue, it changes everything 
in the debate. Science and economics now control the debate; not duties, 
responsibilities, and obligations to the rest of the world. Ethical dimensions 
are huge in this problem, unlike any other problem I think the world has 
faced, and yet the justice and ethics part of it is not being covered by the 
press (cited in Palmer, 2012).
While economics frames do appear to control the debate, as noted by the 
International Trade Union Confederation at a 2015 summit, the impacts of these 
shifting industrial sands also encompass a social justice cost. Delegates to that 
summit pointed to the need for a ‘just transition’ to a low carbon economy, predicated 
on equity and recognition of workers’ and communities’ rights.
Our greatest question is: why should the workforce carry the greatest 
weight of haphazard (or worse, no) government policy, and the market 
impacts of climate change, while their employers cut their losses to a 
future with better profit margins? (Scales, 2015).
Recently, there has been some movement in this space, for example with attention to 
the increasing vulnerability of small island Pacific nations (United Nations, 2017) and 
the plight of ‘climate refugees’ (Scales, 2015; Taylor, 2017). There has been recognition 
from ‘the market’ of the declining financial viability of many new mining projects 
such as the proposed Adani Carmichael mine in Queensland (Vincent, 2017) and of 
coal-fired power stations such as Liddell in the NSW Hunter Valley (McCarthy, 2018) 
and Hazelwood in the Victorian La Trobe Valley (closed in March 2017). 
21
At the public level, polls increasingly show that Australians want their governments 
to support the development of renewable energy as opposed to using taxpayer 
funds to prop up carbon intensive energy sources (Hannam, 2017). In response, 
many companies such as AGL and BHP are seeing the economic and PR benefits of 
spruiking their ‘green credentials’ (Hobday, 2017; Robins, 2016). While these trends 
speak positively to growing consciousness of ethical perspectives as a forceful 
impetus to political action, in general, in the current Australian political discourse 
these still remain less politically expedient.
Australian political context 2007-2017: The ‘diabolical 
challenge’
The future of the world’s environment, and thus, its economy and its 
people, is at stake. The climate for change is here, now and urgent … 
After a decade as a climate change laggard, Australia enters these talks 
as an empowered and credible participant. 
Editorial, ‘The Age’ (1 December, 2007)
Australia, with one of the world’s highest per capita emissions, ‘has gone 
from leadership to free-rider status in climate diplomacy’. 
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (4 June, 2015)
The scale of the problem of greenhouse gas emissions is such that it requires 
unilateral political action. However, given the multiple complexities of the issue already 
mentioned, this has proven to be extremely politically difficult. As Graeme Pearman 
observed in the opening quote, while climate change is fundamentally a physical 
phenomenon researched through the prism of the natural sciences, as we have become 
increasingly confronted by its observable impacts, and cognizant of the role of human 
agency in these, the debate has shifted beyond the veracity of the science  and has 
become a catalyst and conduit for a range of other political and ideological struggles. 
Further, Mike Hulme observed that: 
Although it is often framed to be about science, most disputes end up as 
a proxy for deeper conflicts between alternative views of the future and 
competing centres of authority in society (2009, p. 1).
This has certainly been the Australian experience and the papers that comprise this 
thesis have sought to explore these underpinning dimensions. 
22
I was initially drawn to the way much of the popular rhetoric, if not the substance, 
of  the Australian climate change debate had pivoted around Kevin Rudd’s assertion 
prior to the 2007 federal election, that ‘climate change is the great moral challenge 
of our generation’ (Rudd, 2007). As a rhetorical trope, the phrase resonated strongly 
with  the public and the political media and continues to be cited both in support 
of strong climate policy, as well as by those who oppose it. However, when Rudd’s 
speech is examined more closely, it turned out to be a more complex and somewhat 
duplicitous  statement – the ‘moral imperative’ was merely rhetorical ‘window 
dressing’. But why was it so rhetorically powerful?
The intervening years have seen an unusual level of the political instability, much 
of it pivoting around climate change policy. In part this has been due to the power 
of competing vested interests and the complexity of pricing carbon in a country like 
Australia so dependent on mining and coal exports (Chubb, 2014; Marr, 2010; Pearse, 
McKnight, & Burton, 2013). Rudd’s difficulties in first designing, and then enacting, 
his Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) became the catalyst for his later 
political travails which ultimately saw him deposed as Labor leader in June 2010. 
After the defeat of the CPRS in parliament and the subsequent failure of international 
negotiations at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference in which Rudd had invested 
a significant degree of faith, not to mention diplomatic effort, he shelved the policy 
in April 2010, leading to a disastrous dip in his approval ratings from 59 percent to 
41 percent in less than two months. According to newspaper commentary at the time, 
part of the reason was that ‘Rudd’s commitment to action on climate change was [seen 
as] a deep part of his political persona’ (Hartcher, 2010). While the failed climate 
policy was not the whole story, it provided the catalyst for other dissatisfactions with 
his leadership and management style to coalesce, resulting in an unprecedented 
and dramatic leadership spill of a first term prime minister on June 24th 2010. 
Rudd’s successor Julia Gillard, while managing to introduce a carbon price in 
November 2011 with the passing of the Clean Energy Future Bill, was equally haunted 
by carbon pricing, having stated prior to the 2010 election that ‘there will be no 
carbon tax under a government I lead’ (AAP, 2010). Although this was largely quoted 
out of context, given the manner of her ascension to power and the fragile nature 
of her minority government, Liberal leader Tony Abbott was able to mount a hugely 
successful populist scare campaign against Gillard’s ‘carbon tax lie’, characterising it 
both evidence of the illegitimate nature of her government as well as a useless burden 
on domestic households with dire consequences for regional jobs and the broader 
Australian economy. 
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Upon becoming prime minister in 2013 having defeated a reinstated Kevin Rudd, 
Abbott who memorably described climate change as ‘absolute crap’ (Rintoul, 2009), 
then fulfilled his ‘blood oath’ to repeal the legislation in July 2014, Australia becoming 
the first developed nation to repeal a price on carbon emissions (Taylor & Hoyle, 
2014). Prior to the Paris Climate Conference in December 2015, Nobel Laureate 
Peter Doherty noted that Australia was now seen as ‘public enemy number one’ in 
terms of its commitment to international climate change negotiations (Davey, 2015). 
In the  wake of the Paris Climate Conference this remains the view and at the time 
of writing, Australia continues to be internationally criticised for its weak targets 
(Christoff, 2016) particularly given that it has the highest per capita emissions in 
the developed world.
The reinstatement of Malcolm Turnbull in September 2015, memorably deposed 
as Liberal leader in November 2009 over his support for Rudd’s CPRS, seemingly 
promised a renewal of interest in genuine climate change action. At the time of his 
December 2009 loss to climate sceptic Abbott, Turnbull told the ABC’s Four Corners 
program that ‘I will not lead a party that is not as committed to effective action on 
climate change as I am’ (Ferguson, 2009). He went on to critique the party’s ‘Direct 
Action’ policy as ‘bullshit’ and a ‘fig leaf’ (Turnbull, 2009). More recently however, in 
response to criticism, Turnbull has insisted he remains ‘committed to climate change’ 
but  that he had ‘paid a high price’, an obvious reference to his previous political 
difficulties (Parkinson, 2016). When chided by Labor leader Bill Shorten during the 
2016 federal election for merely implementing Abbott’s climate policies after his 
previous principled stance, Turnbull replied that ‘you cannot take people’s remarks 
about different proposals years ago’ (Vorrath, 2015), an indicator of the extent to which 
he remains politically shackled by the conservative elements of his party who continue 
to be sceptical of climate science and ideologically opposed to substantive action. 
Roger Pielke Jnr (2012) argues that various shifts in public attitudes to climate 
change have less to do with believing or not believing the science, and more to do with 
reactions to the use of the issue as a political wedge by both sides. This has certainly 
been the Australian experience. For this reason, while parochial, Australia remains 
a useful case study through which to examine the idiosyncrasies of climate change 
more broadly as a scientific, social and political issue.
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Methodology and its underpinning theoretical constructs
… language is also a place of struggle. 
bell hooks (1989) 
The study of political discourse is largely a study of language. Importantly, political 
discourse ‘relies extensively on narrative patterns as a way of understanding the 
world and endowing it with meaning’ (Shenhav, 2006, p. 246). Political parties 
employ a range of strategies to embed their own worldviews within public 
consciousness via their use of public language and in order to construct effective 
narratives. Narrative patterns work to simplify complex issues by providing a set 
of recognisable connections, but as Shenhav (2006) has argued, narratives are 
constructions, sometimes deliberately manufactured, at other times emanating 
organically from the human need to impose order on a chaotic set of events. 
Even  so,  narratives do not necessarily reflect the ‘political reality’, they are also 
agents  of persuasion, and for this reason they can offer valuable perspectives. 
Because of the power of language to influence the way debates are shaped in the public 
sphere as well as the way that readers and listeners engage with political debate, my 
research has used a mixed methods approach to focus in different ways on the form, 
style, linguistic and discursive characteristics of the climate change debate. The 
analytical framework used in the research articles draws on approaches from both 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1992; Van Dijk, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 
2009) and frame analysis (Entman, 2003; Fillmore, 1976; Goffman, 1974; Lakoff, 
2004). Before describing the specific methods used in the papers, I will outline the 
theoretical underpinning of CDA and frame analysis and the rationale for choosing 
these approaches. The latter part of this section will describe in more detail the specific 
methods used in the individual papers with particular reference to,  and discussion 
of the Leximancer text analytics software and the concept of ‘distant  reading’ 
(Moretti, 2013). 
Overview and rationale for the use of CDA
As a means of exploring the dynamics of the climate change debate, each of the 
papers  in this study has examined the topic from a different perspective, using a 
range  of different text types, and from the position of an interest in the role of the 
operation of the language and the manner in which these texts were produced. 
This data has been used as a prism into the role of these texts in actively constructing 
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or constituting the various positions, frames, ideologies and their expression in 
political and policy action during this period. 
The role of language is a central focus of CDA. Historically this stemmed from 
both Michael Halliday’s (1978) view of language as a ‘social act’, and of Fowler and 
Hodge’s (1979) contention that linguistic choices are both conscious and unconscious 
and are ideologically derived and driven. Fairclough (1992; 1999; 2001) has argued 
with respect  to the value of interrogating language as data, that it needs to be 
considered beyond its semantic characteristics and should not be considered merely 
as ‘a transparent media for reflecting what is’ (1999, p. 75). Texts, in general, are not 
fundamentally fixed and finished products but should be investigated for the way 
their processes of production and interpretation actively constitute, as well as reflect, 
ideologies and social relations. Fairclough argues that this relationship is dialectical – 
that is, they are interrelated in that they reflect, reproduce and appropriate dominant 
discourses and repurpose them for their own ends. Media texts in particular, 
produce, reproduce and sometimes contest dominant ideologies and ‘can also have 
an important agency in bringing new ideological readings of issues or confronting 
those of the dominant’ (Carvalho, 2007, p. 225). For this reason, these are important 
sources of data, especially for such politically contested issues such as climate change. 
As noted, the role of ideology is important in CDA because it underpins discursive 
constructions. Van Dijk (1995, p. 115) argues that ‘ideologies are conceived as basic 
systems of shared social representations that may control more specific group beliefs 
[such as] (knowledge, attitudes)’. In the case of climate change, these interactions 
include the relationship between humans and the environment, between the rights 
of current and future generations, and between the relative role of individuals, 
governments and economic entities and practices. 
The critical study of discourse, therefore, seeks to understand how ideologies and their 
related social or political manifestations evolve, and how they establish, wield and 
maintain power. Foucault’s (1972) notion of discourse has been influential in CDA as 
he saw discourse as actively constituting social relationships. The notion of ‘critical’ 
is also of central importance as CDA goes beyond merely describing discursive 
practices to interrogating the role of power and ideologies in the shaping of systems of 
knowledge, social relations and social identities. Further, ‘ideologies themselves have 
to be inferred from more directly observable structures of cognition, interaction and 
society’ (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 115).
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CDA is also interested in how various texts are shaped by, and in turn shape and 
transform, other related texts. In other words, they see discourse as dynamic and 
interrelated, not merely as singular and passive. To therefore understand the manner 
in which social, cultural and political institutions create, maintain and wield power, 
their discursive practices are important sources of insight. According to Foucault:
… in every society, the production of discourse is at once controlled, 
selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures 
whose role it is to ward off its power and dangers to gain mastery over its 
chance events … (cited in Fairclough, 1992, p. 51).
Finally, it is important to note that CDA is not a uniform methodology. It uses various 
techniques to examine the linguistic and semiotic characteristics of a text or corpus of 
texts at both a micro, textual level (form, structure, organisation, rhetorical strategies, 
use of metaphor, choice of objects of study, morphological characteristics), and at a 
macro, contextual level (place of publication, historical or political context, discursive, 
ideological function, relationships with other cultural texts and artefacts). Van Dijk 
(1988) has further argued that analysis should go beyond the textual and structural 
level of media discourse to consider the production, reception or comprehension 
levels of effect or impact (Boyd-Barrett, 1994). In other words, CDA is also concerned 
with how audiences make meaning from texts and how this impacts on the broader 
tenor of communication. While there are certain differences in approach and interest, 
what unifies CDA practitioners is a set of shared perspectives and common aims that 
recognise discourse as a linguistic as well as a political and social practice, and seeks 
to uncover its dynamic and transformative role in the way in which various practices 
are enabled.
Overview and rationale for frame analysis
The papers in this project also considered the relative framing of the language 
within the various texts and corpus of texts. Frame analysis shares with CDA many 
fundamental principles. Frames are organising mental structures or schema through 
which we make sense of the world. 
The term ‘frame analysis’ was coined by Erving Goffman (1974) to describe the process 
of deconstructing the individual’s ‘organisation of experience’ (p. 11). It works by 
drawing attention to the way arguments are constructed within a text via the mostly 
unconscious selection and organisation of semantic elements. Further, according to 
Entman (2003):
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Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to 
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in 
a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described [author’s italics] (p. 52).
The methodological roots of frame analysis lie in detailed linguistic analysis, but later 
theorists such as Lakoff (2009) have expanded their interest to consider the way that 
frames are cognitively shaped, embedded and activated. 
Early theorists such as Fillmore (1976) argued that individual words or semantic 
constructions work to create meaning by cognitively activating existing knowledge, 
cultural values and ideological perspectives. All texts are framed from a particular 
perspective which are:
… manifested by the presence or absence of certain key words, stock 
phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that 
provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments (Entman, 
2003, p. 52).
Frames work to highlight and focus ways of thinking about a subject, but to also hide 
or deflect other perspectives by the manner in which they guide the cognition of the 
reader or listener. 
Importantly, frame research also argues that the presence of frames within a text 
as identified by researchers, does not guarantee that the audience for those texts 
will understand them in the same way. Lakoff (2004, 2010a) for example, contends 
that our choice of, preference for, and reaction to, certain frames, is strengthened 
and ‘conditioned’ by constant repetition and reinforcement to the extent that these 
become ‘naturalised’ and that ‘these structures are physically realised in neural 
circuits in the brain’ (2010b, p. 71). Therefore, merely expecting ‘facts’ and ‘reason’ to 
evoke the ‘logical’ response (such as accepting scientific warnings about the dangers of 
climate change and as a result agreeing with the need for carbon reduction policies), 
will not necessarily work due to the power of dominant political frames laid down over 
decades. Entman (2003) noted that:
Because salience is a product of the interaction of texts and receivers, 
the presence of frames in a text … does not guarantee their influence in 
audience thinking (p. 53).
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Thus, understanding frames, and the manner in which they impact on how a particular 
issue is communicated, is important for the development of effective strategic 
communication of significant public issues. 
Lakoff (2010b) argues that environmental communication is a case in point. He 
contends that conservative and progressive brains are influenced by different ‘moral 
systems’. The conservative moral system, he asserts, ‘involves a number of ideas that 
work against environmentalism and against dealing with global warming’ (p. 74). 
Progressives regularly fail to gain traction for their positions because they argue 
from within conservative frames (Lakoff, 2010a). This is further complicated by the 
reification or normalisation of frames within institutions, cultural practices and 
ideological perspectives such as neoliberal economics, that make them hard to see, and 
even harder to shift or move beyond. This is particularly pertinent to the way news 
frames work, hence why these offer a useful perspective. 
In summary, both approaches offer different ways of exploring the complexity of 
the  debate by allowing a richer examination of both how the linguistic elements 
work to create, construct and perpetuate meaning, but also how these operate 
within particular social, cultural, political and ideological contexts. Fairclough goes 
further arguing that a critical awareness of language is ‘a prerequisite for effective 
democratic citizenship …’ (1999, p. 71).
Specific methodological approaches: Text case studies, ‘distant 
reading’ and the use of Leximancer
One of the criticisms of qualitative methods generally, and CDA specifically, is that the 
selection by the researcher of what appear to be ‘interesting’ or pertinent examples 
through which to deconstruct and analyse discursive patterns or frames, overstates 
their incidence and prominence. The research papers in this study use both small 
case study samples as well as a large corpora of media texts, the latter analysed using 
Leximancer text analytic software system. In this section I will discuss and describe 
the two approaches, their strengths and weaknesses, as well as how they were applied 
in the papers in question. 
Like all methods, case studies have strengths and weaknesses. Examining a small 
sample of a specific phenomenon, (in my case of the discursive construction of attitudes 
to climate change in sample texts such as major speeches or political marketing 
documents within a specific electoral context), enables a researcher to explore a ‘lived 
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example’ of the reality of the phenomenon in question in a more complex way. This 
is particularly useful where the phenomenon is unusual or rare or when its specific 
characteristics or idiosyncrasies are pertinent to the research focus. According to 
Hodkinson and Hodkinson (2001), case studies are grounded in ‘lived reality’ and 
while it ‘is a truism that all social research simplifies the phenomena investigated’, 
they can help us understand more complex interrelationships. They further argue that: 
… case studies can do this in ways that strongly relate to the experiences 
of individuals, small groups, or organizations. They retain more of the 
‘noise’ of real-life than many other types of research. Indeed, other forms 
of research, such as the experiment or a carefully structured questionnaire 
survey, base their success on the ability to exclude such noise, and focus 
precisely upon the particular phenomenon or possible causal relationship 
that is to be investigated. There are good reasons for doing much 
research in this way, but an unavoidable problem with it is that in some 
circumstances, the excluded noise may be a highly significant part of the 
story (pp. 5-6).
The raison d’être of CDA to focus on context, identify interrelationships and 
make connections to broader trends and infer the meaning of these relationships 
makes this  a useful method, as I have already argued. This was the case in two of 
the four articles where major public campaign speeches were examined for their 
framing and  where the dominance of economic frames was highlighted within both 
parliamentary speeches  and within government publications on the introduction 
of the carbon pricing. In both cases, the analysis focused on specific linguistic and 
semantic choices, rhetorical devices such as metaphor and simile as well as internal 
organizational structures. These were compared with texts in similar contexts and 
with similar rhetorical functions.
However, discursive patterns in larger text corpora are harder to determine. As 
already  noted, the operation of both modern political parties and of Western 
democracies more broadly, have become closely connected to the functioning of 
different forms of media. The impact is that the site of power has shifted from the 
elected representative to the media manager who provides navigation and strategy 
advice. The principal function of the political leader consequently, has evolved from 
facilitator of party political action to media performer or political celebrity, guided by 
their media advisors. Conversely, political journalists and other media commentators 
have acquired a more powerful status as ‘agent provocateurs’ whose function is as 
much to make the news as to report it (Craig, 2008; Mills, 2014; Ward, 2003). For this 
reason, this research examined several large text corpora: one around the reporting of 
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climate change during the 2013 federal election and the other the newspaper columns 
of prolific commentator, blogger and climate change sceptic Andrew Bolt, for the 
manner in which his denialism was framed and discursively constructed. 
Given the large volume of texts, it was necessary to use a form of computer-aided 
analysis. While computer-aided analysis does not guarantee objectivity (one of the 
criticisms of qualitative methods more generally), it does assist with extracting, 
identifying, indexing and categorising commonalities and interrelationships in 
large  bodies of text and in organising these in ways to assist a researcher make 
more  meaningful interpretations. The two studies in question used the text analytics 
software system Leximancer for this purpose (Smith, 2003). Unlike systems such as 
NVivo (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013) or NUDIST (Richards & Richards, 1991) which use 
researcher-generated thematic coding, Leximancer uses a word occurrence and co-
occurrence concept-mapping algorithm to generate theme and concept clusters within 
a text and to induce their connectedness. The Australian designers of the system, 
Smith and Humphreys (2006), describe the process in this way:
The Leximancer system performs a form of automatic content analysis. 
The system goes beyond keyword searching by discovering and extracting 
thesaurus-based concepts from the text data, with no requirement for a 
prior dictionary (p. 262). 
Leximancer generates a two-dimensional map that gives a visual overview of the 
thematic patterns and semantic relationships that exist within the corpus (Angus, 
Rintel, & Wiles, 2013). The resulting output allows a researcher to not only literally 
‘see’ the various intersections and connections, but to interrogate both the direct and 
indirect patterns at the level of sentences and paragraphs for nuance of meaning, 
for less obvious relationships and for instances where the semantic context may be 
ambiguous. The software developers argue that because the text itself generates the 
output, researchers are prevented from ‘fixating on any particular anecdotal evidence 
that may be atypical or erroneous’ (Smith & Humphreys, 2006, p. 262). This enables 
qualitative analysis to be generated from a quantitative base. 
The computational method and the resulting output are designed to simulate the way 
that conceptual structures within language operate. As discussed, this is founded 
on the assumption that there is underlying structure and meaning in the way that 
people write and speak, as well as both conscious and unconscious elements and 
characteristics. High frequency words, their relative proximities and conceptual 
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structures are mapped and can be examined for patterns and meaning. According to 
the designers, the computer-generated output map: 
… is a highly dissipative iterative numerical model and comes under 
the definition of a complex network system. The map is an indicative 
visualisation that presents concept frequency (brightness), total concept 
connectedness (hierarchical order of appearance), direct interconcept 
relative co-occurrence frequency (ray intensity), and total (direct and 
indirect) interconcept co-occurrence (proximity) (Smith & Humphreys, 
2006, p. 264).
The output is interactive and can be customised and interrogated to enable the 
researcher to drill down into both the substance of the generating texts in the corpus 
and the detail of the thematic and semantic interrelationships. An example of the 
concept map and the output of a ‘pathway’ enquiry from the ‘Andrew Bolt and the 
discourse of scepticism’ paper is shown below (Fig 1). 
Fig 1: Sample Leximancer output of Bolt column analysis
A criticism of reliance on computer-aided analysis software such as Leximancer 
is that its underlying epistemology fundamentally relies on quantitative rather 
than qualitative analysis, and that this is reductionist and therefore limited in its 
ability to foster genuine, nuanced insights. While the algorithmic foundation of 
Leximancer is based on the principles of relational content analysis, as with any data 
set, interpretation is necessarily researcher-driven. Leximancer output relies on the 
ability to interpret the significance of the patterns, but also to interrogate explain 
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and argue their significance in terms of the research question. Moreover, qualitative 
research that focuses on language is often accused of cherry-picking sample quotes as 
evidence. However, as Leximancer samples are generated according to their frequency 
and degree of connectedness, the validity is easier to argue. Again, as context is a 
central tenet in any CDA analysis, Leximancer allows a researcher to cross-check the 
generated examples for their contextual relevance. 
The oft-purported binary distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods 
also ignores the inherent strengths and weaknesses of both as well as the extent to 
which they intersect in many disparate research projects. For example, literary critic, 
Franco Moretti (2013) has discussed the relative merits of ‘close’ versus ‘distant’ 
reading in analysis of literary texts. ‘Close reading’ as traditionally used in literary 
studies, and in CDA more generally, is performed when individual texts are closely 
analysed for their linguistic style, organizational structure, use of rhetorical devices 
and semantic relationships to reflect and draw inferences from the significance of their 
discursive patterns. Conversation analysis or comparison of the discursive markers in 
specific political speeches for their approach to a similar topic is an example. Moretti, 
however, also argued the case for ‘distant reading’, a quantitative approach that uses 
some form of computer-aided analysis to search, identify and discern patterns in 
big data sets that can then be more closely analysed for insight they may offer into 
the discursive structure of a particular genre or in this case, a particular author 
on a singular topic. The various papers in this project have used both approaches.
An overview of the papers
Given that political action on climate change has been largely played out in the media 
both broadly and specifically, and via a series of political texts including government 
publications and political speeches, these texts, while samples, were considered 
appropriate data sources for the reasons previously argued. This section will 
overview each of the papers and comment on its place within the research narrative.
Whither ‘the moral imperative’? The focus and framing of political 
rhetoric in the climate change debate in Australia .
The first article published was initially presented as a paper at the ‘Environmental 
Politics and Conflict in an Age of Digital Media Conference’ at the University of 
Tasmania in November 2011. It was then reviewed, revised and edited for inclusion 
in a collection titled Environmental Conflict and the Media edited by Libby Lester 
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and Brett  Hutchins (Gurney, 2013). The revision took account of feedback from the 
conference floor as well as perspectives of other papers, many of which similarly 
focused on the Australian experience. 
As noted, the starting point for the paper was an interest in Kevin Rudd’s early 
success in creating public prominence for the issue, singularly encapsulated by the 
memorable opening sentence of his speech to the National Climate Change Summit 
in June 2007. That sentence has since become an oft-repeated rhetorical trope 
in discussions of climate change and climate policy. However, when you read the 
remainder of the speech, as well as the substance of much of the debate that followed, 
the moral or ethical aspects of the debate are largely absent. The paper then compared 
the language and rhetoric of Rudd’s speech with speeches on climate change by 
both his political opponents Julia Gillard and Tony Abbott. In both cases they were 
significantly different, differences that reflected both the ideological perspectives of 
the speakers and the political context and expedient nature of their speeches. The 
paper goes on to discuss the relevance of ‘the great moral challenge’ perspective in 
climate change politics and why this frame, which resonated so strongly in 2007, has 
lost political currency and would appear to be considered less politically pragmatic.
‘The choice between progress and the planet’: Economics, ethics 
and political discourse in the Australian climate change debate
Following on from the previous paper, I was interested in exploring further the moral 
and ethical dimensions of how climate change was considered and how these impacted 
on policy and political communication. The original version of this paper was published 
in the conference proceedings of the Australia and New Zealand Communication 
Association (ANZCA) Communicating Change and Changing Communication in the 21st 
Century conference held in Adelaide, SA, July, 2012. The paper was originally titled 
‘It’s the economy stupid!: Economics, ethics and the Australian climate change debate’ 
(Gurney, 2012) and was double-blind peer reviewed. In July 2016, in light of further 
research and of the rapidly evolving political landscape, (the demise of Tony Abbott, 
the ascension of Malcolm Turnbull and the July 2016 federal election which gave a 
one seat majority to a weakened Turnbull), it was substantially revised and updated.
The earlier version focused more on why climate change should be considered 
an ethical issue and argued that the narrow focus on economic imperatives as an 
impetus to action not only ignored or glossed over longer term moral imperatives, but 
was founded on the assumption that economics as a ‘science’ is ‘value-free’. As my 
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research evolved however, particularly around the psychological and sociological roots 
of climate scepticism and its discursive construction, a more nuanced perspective 
developed which I believe better explains how ideological worldview in particular 
acts to shape our notions of both human stewardship of the environment and of 
intergenerational equity (Fielding, Head, Laffan, Western, & Hoegh-Guldberg, 2012; 
Lakoff, 2010a; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; Roser-Renouf et al., 2014; 
Rossen, Dunlop, & Lawrence, 2015). The revised version expands this discussion to 
include this perspective in the light of more recent research and in the context of 
ongoing local political developments. The paper was published in The International 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies in March 2017 (Gurney, 2017).
‘Missing in action’: The ‘non’-climate change debate of the 2013 
Australian federal election .
The 2013 federal election marked the culmination of a highly divisive period in 
Australian politics, much of which revolved around Julia Gillard’s Clean Energy 
Bill (aka ‘the carbon tax’), the travails of her minority government and the political 
imbroglio within the ALP after the sacking of Kevin Rudd in June 2010. Within 
this febrile environment, noted political hard man and climate sceptic Tony Abbott, 
successfully mounted a populist campaign to discredit the carbon tax and to cast 
aspersions on the political weakness and legitimacy of Julia Gillard, Australia’s first 
female prime minister. He was ably assisted by both the mainstream conservative 
media as well as by the actions of a highly resentful Kevin Rudd who took every 
opportunity to undermine his successor and to reassert his claim to the leadership 
of the party (Cassidy, 2010; Green, 2013; Kelly, 2014; Walsh, 2013). However, despite 
the focus of political attention between 2010 and 2013 on the rights and wrongs of 
carbon pricing, as the period of electioneering ensued, it seemed that little, if any, 
attention was given by either Rudd or Abbott to the issue. In political communication 
strategy, what is not said or discussed in relation to a contentious issue is usually as 
significant as what is said, and so it was in relation to how both parties dealt with 
the substantive environmental issues around climate change during the election. 
The paper approached the question of identifying the level of climate change discussion 
in several ways. It compared a raw count of news reports mentioning keywords such 
as ‘climate change’, ‘climate change’ and ‘moral’ and ‘carbon tax’ during each of the 
preceding three elections. From this perspective, the number of uses of these terms 
was significantly fewer. It then compared the election launch speeches of Rudd and 
Abbott for the way in which they discussed carbon pricing. Interestingly, given his 
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previous position on the topic, Rudd gave it only cursory mention while Abbott merely 
reiterated his previous argument that it was bad for the economy and promised its 
immediate repeal. Finally, a corpus of media reports was examined for the extent 
to which climate change and carbon pricing were present and the way in which the 
discussion was framed. Leximancer was used to explore this corpus and it generated 
some interesting results. The paper was published as part of a special 2013 Australian 
federal election-themed edition of Global Media Journal (Australia) in December 2014.
Andrew Bolt and the discourse of ‘scepticism’ in the Australian 
climate change debate: A ‘distant reading’ approach using 
Leximancer
Throughout the period of my research, there have been important shifts in public 
opinion related to climate change in general, and carbon abatement policy more 
specifically. These attitudes were mapped over five years (2010-2014) by the CSIRO 
who summarised the trend in their final report, noting that:
The survey showed that attitudes about climate change remained relatively 
unchanged over the survey period. A strong majority of Australians think 
climate change is happening, and support a wide variety of initiatives to 
both mitigate and adapt to the potential impacts. The data also suggest, 
however, that there is ongoing disagreement as to whether the causes of 
climate change are natural fluctuations or are a consequence of human 
activity (CSIRO, 2015).
In comparison, Essential Poll (February, 2017) noted a rise in the level of agreement, 
even among more traditionally sceptical conservative voters. The poll noted that:
60% (up 6% since December) agree that climate change is happening and is 
caused by human activity and 25% (down 2%) believe that we may just be 
witnessing a normal fluctuation in the earth’s climate.
The extent to which these fluctuations have been impacted by, or reflected in, how 
climate science and policy has been reported and discussed in mainstream media, 
was of particular interest. I was especially interested in how so-called ‘scepticism’ had 
been politically appropriated, how it has been discursively constructed and the extent 
to which this was scientifically or ideologically based. 
To this end, this paper harvested as data, a corpus of the columns and blog posts of 
prolific tabloid commentator Andrew Bolt to explore the discursive structure of his 
self-described ‘scepticism’. The data was loaded into Leximancer which examined the 
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extent to which Bolt uses the ‘cover’ of scientific data in his numerous blog posts and 
columns to present a political and ideologically-framed argument and how these were 
constructed. The paper was published in a special climate change-themed edition of 
Global Media Journal (Australia) in December 2017.
Conclusion: Where to now for the ‘climate wars’?
Climate change has become an idea that now travels well beyond its 
origins in the natural sciences. And this idea meets new cultures on its 
travels and encounters the worlds of politics, economics, popular culture, 
commerce and religion – often through the interposing role of the media 
– climate change takes on new meanings and serves new purposes. 
Mike Hulme (2009). ‘Why we disagree about climate change’ p. xxvi
Perhaps the intellectual surrender is so complete because the forces we 
hoped would make the world a more civilized place – personal freedoms, 
democracy, material advance, technological power – are in truth paving 
the way to its destruction. The powers we most trusted have betrayed us; 
that which we believed would save us now threatens to devour us. 
Clive Hamilton (2017). ‘Defiant Earth’ p.ix 
The papers in this research through different lenses have explored the intersections 
between climate change science, political discourse and policy action in Australia since 
2007. While these perspectives form only part of a larger, more complex national and 
international debate, I believe that they make a unique contribution to the scholarship 
around climate change communication in general, and the underlying dynamics of 
the Australian political system of the period in particular. The longitudinal nature of 
the study via the specific publications has allowed me to capture pivotal moments and 
explore in greater depth key developments in more-or-less ‘real time’. 
But what is the state of play at the end of this research narrative? In November 2016, 
the US elected Donald Trump as its 45th president, a man whose campaign statements 
on climate change and post-election administrative appointments now threaten 
the potential for serious policy leadership from one of the world’s largest per capita 
greenhouse gas emitters (Kemp, 2016; Lewis, 2016; Romm, 2016). True to his election 
promise, Trump has now withdrawn the US from the Paris Agreement (Shear, 2017). 
Australian policy remains similarly hamstrung and so from this vantage point, the 
Australian experience is an important case study in how and why climate change has 
37
become such a politically divisive and ideologically contested issue within a country 
that historically has been politically stable and which has traditionally embraced its 
international obligations. Ironically, Australia is also a country whose geography 
makes it more susceptible than most to the extreme impacts of climate change. 
While the constantly shifting political landscape initially proved highly challenging, I 
have tried to harness the ‘sturm und drang’ to reflect more deeply upon the multiplicity 
of factors – political, socio-economic, psychological – which underpin and propel 
the debate. Revisiting the various papers in preparing this thesis has enabled me to 
gain new perspectives that were not apparent in the early stages of my candidature 
– especially the highly complex psychological relationship that societies and cultures 
have with the environment. Initially, from an intellectual viewpoint, Kevin Rudd’s 
evocation of climate change as ‘the great moral challenge of a generation’ seemed the 
perfect rhetorical tool on which to build national consensus to implement emissions 
reductions policy. However, as the forces of climate change denial mobilised and as 
Rudd’s political fortunes and enthusiasm for climate policy ebbed, the challenges of 
driving the national conversation on the shoulders of this frame, became apparent. 
Other, more nuanced perspectives were needed, and this drove the latter stages of the 
project. We are currently seeing a similar dynamic playing out within the government 
of Malcolm Turnbull. In the 2017 budget, the word ‘climate’ did not appear once in the 
Treasurer’s speech and the word ‘environment’ was only mentioned with respect to 
the proposed expansion of the Snowy-Hydro scheme as ‘streamlined environmental 
processes’ (Arnold, 2017; Hanna, 2017). Further, the much anticipated Finkel Review 
into the Australian energy market (Finkel, 2017) was critiqued as largely a political 
whitewash with its focus on energy regulation. Emissions reduction policies needed 
to meet Australia’s Paris Agreement targets were conveniently ignored (Jotzo, 2017; 
Saddler & Pears, 2017). Members of the Liberal/National Party coalition government 
continue to resist attempts to encourage investment in renewable energy, despite the 
terminal decline in coal prices, pleas from the business sector for policy certainty 
and the continued popularity of renewables among the public generally. According to 
Hudson (2017, p. 11), this ‘discursive and policy hostility to renewable energy’ is driven 
by a range of material, ideological and psychological factors. 
My specific methodological focus on how language has operated to construct and 
frame  the debate is instructive of why they are significant in the development of 
effective strategic communication of major public issues like climate change. The 
mixed methods approach that I have taken enabled me to explore the discourse of 
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the  debate via a range of different texts and different approaches that involved both 
‘close’ and ‘distant’ reading. Again, this suited the dynamics of the shifting political 
paradigm and the complex nature of the narrative that has played out in both 
conventional mediums such as political speeches and news reporting as well as less 
traditional, hybrid forms such as political blogs. 
Finally, the placement of this research in the context of the ‘post-truth’ world is 
also important. Compared to 2007 when this research began, 2017 has seen liberal 
notions of ‘facts’ versus ‘truth’ become more marginalised, more contested, more 
normalized and more difficult to discern. So-called ‘post-truth discourse’ (Enfield, 
2017), so cunningly employed and exemplified by Donald Trump, has a long history 
among those who have attacked environmental science for their own corporate and 
ideological ends – a story told by scholars from Rachel Carson (1962) to Naomi Oreskes 
(2010) and Naomi Klein (2015) and more recently Michael Mann (2016). It is a state-
of-affairs that has been ably assisted by the disruptions brought about by new forms 
of media and by the increasing polarization of the political class. As science continues 
to  confirm our worst fears, at the closure of this narrative the ‘great moral challenge 
of our generation’ remains a ‘diabolical problem’. 
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Abstract
In the lead-up to the Australian 2007 election, Kevin Rudd famously amplified 
the political rhetoric on climate change by describing it as ‘the great moral 
challenge of our generation’. However, an examination of three key political 
speeches on climate change policy, concludes that despite this, scant attention 
has been paid to the moral and ethical elements of the debate from either side 
of Australian politics. This paper examines the discursive dimensions of three 
key speeches and considers the broader implications for climate change policy 
in the Australian political arena.
Keywords
Rudd; Gillard; Abbott; climate change; moral imperative; Australian politics 
Introduction
In Australia, as elsewhere, climate change has become a scene of struggle, both 
politically and ideologically. As a nation, Australia’s economy is the envy of the 
industrialised world having managed to sidestep much of the pain of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis by virtue of a sound regulatory banking system and an ongoing 
resources boom which has kept its treasury coffers in credit. However, even with 
its relatively small population, Australia is one of the highest per capita emitters of 
greenhouse gases, and with its large continental landmass and geographic diversity, 
it is especially susceptible to the impacts of anthropogenic climate change (Garnaut, 
2008). While these circumstances should have encouraged bipartisan political support 
for action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the climate change debate since 2007 
has been divisive and acrimonious and a major political football around which the 
fortunes of the main players have revolved. 
Prior to the December 2007 Australian federal election, Kevin Rudd, then leader of 
the opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP), tapped into the prevailing zeitgeist 
of climate change concern when he famously amplified the political rhetoric by 
describing  the need for international action on greenhouse gas abatement as ‘the 
great moral challenge of a generation’ (Rudd, 2007). This widely cited rhetorical 
trope became a metaphorical ‘call to arms’ with an almost religious dimension, 
and after 12  years of conservative government, Rudd led the ALP to a resounding 
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victory. With  an impressive mandate to act on climate change abatement, he made 
the introduction of an emissions trading scheme or Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (CPRS) as it was renamed, a key policy platform of his government’s first 
term. Despite  initial public enthusiasm, the enactment of the policy became mired 
in complexity, poor communication and political brawling which both confused and 
rapidly sapped the patience of the electorate, especially after the failure of the much-
anticipated Copenhagen Climate Conference in December 2009. 
The conservative opposition Liberal/National Party also had its own share of climate 
change casualties, most notably Malcolm Turnbull who was narrowly replaced as 
leader in December 2009 by climate change sceptic Tony Abbott after a party room 
revolt at Turnbull’s agreed support of the CPRS. Turnbull’s demise spelt the end 
of bipartisan support for the CPRS and eventually the death knell of Rudd’s own 
leadership. After failing twice to pass the legislation through the upper house, he 
announced in April 2010 that his government would postpone until 2014 further 
attempts at enacting climate change policy. This announcement sparked a dramatic 
decline in Rudd’s public popularity and became one element in his party’s decision 
to replace him in June 2010 with his deputy Julia Gillard – the only first term prime 
minister since 1929 to lose the leadership of his party.
Since that time Gillard has fared no better. In the wake of the ensuing August 
2010 election, she was forced to negotiate with the Australian Greens and three 
independents to form minority government, climate change abatement being one 
of the agreed conditions. Unfortunately, Gillard had stated during the election that 
‘I don’t rule out the possibility of legislating a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, 
a market based mechanism, I rule out a carbon tax’ (Kelly & Shanahan, 2010). It is 
the last part of this statement upon which the Opposition and large portions of the 
conservative media have since focused, casting aspersions on the Prime Minister’s 
integrity and significantly, (some say terminally), damaging her political credibility. 
While the Clean Energy Act, (generally referred to as the ‘Carbon Tax’), passed 
through the parliament in November 2011, Opposition leader Tony Abbott, whose own 
positions on climate change have vacillated over time (see examples in Keane, 2011), 
has been spectacularly successful in maintaining media focus on both the broken 
promise and on the supposed economic impacts of the carbon tax. He has dramatically 
pledged a ‘blood oath’ to repeal the legislation should he become prime minister. 
The slow pace of action and the lack of political bipartisanship would appear to have 
impacted both the Australian public’s belief in the anthropogenic drivers of climate 
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change and their preferred government policy (Connor & Stefanova, 2012; Leviston, 
2011). But what role has the framing and tenor of the debate since 2007 had in shaping 
the current state of public opinion? Why has the ‘moral challenge’ appeal, a rhetorical 
trope which so captured the Australian national imagination in 2007, become 
subjugated by other discourses and other frames? What did Rudd mean by the  ‘moral 
challenge’ and where does climate change as a ‘moral challenge’ fit in relation to 
the broader frames of the debate more broadly, in particular those strategically 
encapsulated by important political speeches? 
The role of framing in the climate change debate
Like most complex issues climate change has many dimensions with competing 
and conflicting values and agendas. These are debated using frames which filter 
perspectives through the lens of existing ideological beliefs and worldviews 
(Goffman, 1974). Frames, according to Nisbet and Mooney (2007), use language 
to ‘organise central ideas, defining a controversy to resonate with core values and 
assumptions.’ Unpacking how an issue is framed is important in order to expose the 
underlying assumptions and power relationships upon which knowledge production 
in any particular discourse is founded (O’Brien, St Clair A., & Kristoffersen, 2010). 
The media play a pivotal role in both the production and reproduction of different 
frames, or what Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p. 3) call ‘interpretative packages’. 
These make suggested meanings available for the attentive public through linguistic 
devices such as metaphors, catchphrases, historical examples and visual images. 
They also act to construct reasoning devices such as appeals to causal relationships 
and to principles such as moral arguments (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, pp. 3-4). 
Lakoff (2008) contends that because repeated frames are cognitively reinforced, the 
discourse becomes ‘internalised’ as Foucault (1972) would argue, making it difficult 
to think outside the boundaries of those recurring frames. 
Understanding the nature and direction of the debate also needs to consider the 
way people use media to inform their opinions, the power of media as a gatekeeper 
and framer of different narratives (Couldry, 2000), and the importance of language 
in this process. In the case of climate change in particular, the shift from political 
bipartisanship to ideological divide on environmental issues has forced individuals 
to seek out what Brulle et al (2012, p. 8) describe as ‘elite cues’ wherein ‘individuals 
use media coverage to gauge the positions of elites and interpret the information 
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based on their party and ideological identification.’ This is particularly cogent in the 
case of politics, which Castells (2009) has argued is itself fundamentally framed by 
‘the inherent logic of the media system’ (cited by Lester & Hutchins, 2009, p. 590) 
resulting in the privileging of some frames over others. As a result, political parties, 
and even activist organisations like Greenpeace, are often forced to operate within, 
and therefore unwittingly legitimise and reproduce, dominant and powerful frames in 
order to attract media attention and garner public legitimacy, a strategy it is argued 
that ‘limits their political capacity to spur genuine political transformation’ (Lester & 
Hutchins, 2009, p. 582). 
Numerous researchers believe that at the heart of the general lack of engagement in 
Australia as elsewhere (see Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 2010) with 
the urgency for unilateral action to reduce carbon pollution, lie more fundamental 
issues. For some (e.g. Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Hamilton, 2009; Hamilton, 
2010; Lovelock, 2006; Merchant, 1993) the explanation lies in the human species’ 
historically fraught cultural, ideological and psychological relationship with nature 
and climate. Chakrabarty (2009) for example, notes that historically, humankind has 
viewed itself as a ‘prisoner of climate’, a ‘biological agent’, forced to operate within and 
to be constrained by, boundaries set by nature. Climate change however, has required 
a reconceptualising of humans as ‘geological agents’ (Oreskes, 2004, p. 93) whose 
actions have altered the power dynamic to fundamentally shift the natural order. 
This has collapsed the traditional humanist distinction between ‘natural history’ and 
‘human history’ requiring social theorists to re-examine their traditional assumptions 
about the relationship between humans and the planet and hence their moral and 
ethical responsibility for its long-term welfare. 
These shifting paradigms and peculiar dynamics of the problem (Moser & Dilling, 
2004) make our ability to consider the phenomenon of climate change, and the threats 
it poses, much more difficult. Despite the best efforts of those lobbying for urgent 
action, arguments that challenge traditional ways of thinking about the relationship 
between humans and the planet, are continually derailed because they are ‘fought’ 
within the dominant frames of those in whose interests it is to maintain the status 
quo or who frame the debate as ‘a choice between progress and planet’ (Charlton, 2011, 
p. 65). The discursive focus on individual self interest and repeated foregrounding 
of the spectre of dire economic consequences, makes engagement with the bigger 
picture more difficult, doubt easier to fuel and substantive action something that 
can be deferred. The temporal lag and spatial dispersion of climate change means 
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the connection, particularly in media coverage, between cause (emissions) and effect 
(weather) (Howard-Williams, 2009) is lacking, making the ‘moral’ argument about 
our responsibility for future consequences and present culpability more difficult to 
popularly conceptualise. 
Nisbet (2009, p. 18) provides a useful overview of some of the competing frames in the 
climate change debate, examples of which are present in the Australian context. But it 
is the moral and ethical frame, which became so rhetorically significant in 2007 when 
highlighted by Kevin Rudd, in which this chapter is interested.
What is the ‘moral imperative’?
The climate change debate has a number of moral or ethical perspectives. Nisbet’s 
(2009) typology defines this frame as ‘a matter of right or wrong; or of respect or 
disrespect for the limits, thresholds, or boundaries’. Some are overtly articulated 
while others are implied or assumed. Many are esoteric, most are difficult to quantify 
and all are shaped by divergent worldviews and by differing cultural and ideological 
perspectives (Hulme, 2009). The ‘concept’ of climate, as a range of scholars have 
argued, is about more than merely science, meteorology, weather patterns, ecosystems 
and the environment, it also has reverberations for societies, cultures and worldviews. 
As human life, like that of other species, develops within, and is dependent upon 
climate, the notion is culturally central. From a moral perspective, responses to 
climate change incorporate considerations of equity, security and fundamental human 
rights as well as those of non-human species.
A major moral or ethical issue is that of intergenerational equity – the needs and 
rights of future generations to a habitable planet. But how ‘quality of life’ is measured, 
how ‘costs’ are calculated and how ‘responsibilities’ for damage and future actions 
are apportioned, is a matter of dispute (Gardiner, 2004). Should rich, industrialised 
countries shoulder the ‘burden’ of action when poorer, developing nations are excused 
even if their emissions rise as they too aspire to Western-like living standards 
powered by cheap fossil fuels? The IPCC (cited by Gardiner, 2004, p. 579) noted 
that while developed nations are historically responsible for the current level of 
emissions and have been the ones to largely benefit, the impacts are expected to fall 
disproportionately on poorer nations who are least able to adapt. Additionally, both the 
magnitude of change, environmentally and economically, are compounded the longer 
unilateral actions are delayed, resulting in higher costs and more severe consequences 
for future generations.
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Another moral issue is that of stewardship of the environment in such a way so as 
not  to  contribute to climatic changes which will impact on future quality of life 
for a diverse number of societies and cultures including the potential intrinsic and 
aesthetic loss of ecosystems and non-human ‘capital’. Many religious leaders see the 
planet as a gift from God which we have a duty to preserve (Hulme, 2009, p. 149; 
Rudd, 2006). Others (Chakrabarty, 2009; Donner, 2007) see the difficulty in the 
challenge to entrenched religious and historical paradigms which traditionally posit 
climate as what Donner terms ‘the domain of the gods’, an infinite and transcendent 
system beyond human control, distinct and separate from humans and their earthly 
activities.  Donner argues that accepting human culpability for climate change 
necessitates a reframing of this power relationship, requiring a difficult philosophical 
mindshift. Climate change generally, according to Jamieson (1992, p. 290), poses 
fundamental questions about ‘how we ought to live, what kinds of societies we want, 
and how we should relate to nature and other forms of life.’
From a secular perspective, Dunlap (2007) points to three important parallels 
between some religious traditions and environmentalism including the focus on 
symbiotic relationships between humans and nature, the recognition of the spiritual 
or transcendent dimensions of the natural world and the view that while science 
is powerful, it is never totally able to give us access to all that is truly important. 
Similarly, Lovelock (2004), contends that we are ethically bound to protect ‘Gaia’, the 
metaphor he invokes for the Earth as a living organism, because it has value of and 
for itself, not merely as a resource upon which we humans feed for our own ends. 
A major difficulty for those prosecuting the moral or ethical arms of the debate is 
that as a substantially deferred phenomenon (that is, we are currently living with 
the results of past emissions), long term impacts of climate change are difficult to 
imagine making short term pain and costs more unpalatable. Politically, other short 
term priorities like improving economic growth and maintaining living standards 
become more cogent, tangible and urgent. Many politicians and economists consider 
that disregard for the disruptive economic consequences of policies which may impede 
the level of economic growth to which the Western world has become accustomed 
and to which the developing world aspires, is itself immoral and unethical (Charlton, 
2011). Others (O’Brien, St Clair, & Kristoffersen, 2010) argue that a singular focus on 
environmental perspectives ignores the potential threat to human security posed by 
climate change. The practical issue for international policy makers has created what 
Gardner labels ‘a perfect moral storm’ (2006). 
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Brown et al (2006) contend that scientific and public policy instrumentalities such as 
the IPCC raise serious, but rarely considered, ethical issues and that the assumptions 
underpinning definitions of values and even methodologies are not adequately 
interrogated in policy formulations. Widely used indices of economic modelling such 
as cost-benefit analysis reflect unquestioned value judgements based on a paternalistic 
Western paradigm and assume a level of cultural and political homogeneity which 
does not necessarily exist (Gardner, 2006; Jamieson, 1992; Morgan, Kandlikar, Risbey, 
& Dowlatabadi, 1999; Nelson, 2008; Neumayer, 2007; Spash, 2007; Toman, 2006). 
Charlton (2011) argues that this was central to the failure of the 2010 Copenhagen 
Climate Conference. Gardner (2006, p. 408) notes that the tendency of political actors 
to emphasise considerations such as economics and scientific uncertainty, to focus 
selectively on individual powerlessness and national self interest, acts to ‘problematise 
action’, while a focus on intergenerational ethics demands it, a position which is 
uncomfortable to those with a vested interest in ‘business as usual’. Yet insufficient 
consideration of the ethical implications and moral underpinnings of policy may 
mean that proposed solutions are potentially unfair and unjust to those most at risk.
Approach
This study is interested in the extent to which the various moral and ethical themes 
outlined are present in the Australian climate change debate as evidenced by the 
language and discourse of key speeches of the major political actors between 2007 and 
2011. These speeches have been chosen as being illustrative only, and the choices do 
not imply that these are the only positions or frames used by these speakers. Political 
speeches have an important strategic place in political discourse (Glover, 2007) as they 
are explicitly written to set the agenda and vocabulary for debate and often become a 
key source for political commentary in both print and electronic media. In the case 
of Kevin Rudd’s speech, his rhetorical evocation of the ‘great moral challenge of our 
generation’ not only set the Australian climate change debate in motion, but has been 
the phrase around which much of the ensuring debate has pivoted. 
The research question asked ‘how significant is the ‘moral challenge’ with respect to 
climate change in the Australian political debate’? The speeches analysed were Kevin 
Rudd’s (2007) opening remarks as opposition leader to the National Climate Change 
Summit in Canberra, current opposition leader Tony Abbott’s (2009) speech to the 
David Davies Memorial Dinner, and current prime minister Julia Gillard’s address to 
58
the National Press Club in July 2011, delivered immediately prior to the introduction 
of the Clean Energy Act (Carbon Tax bill) into the Australian parliament. 
The speeches were analysed using a qualitative critical discourse analytic (CDA) 
framework which as a methodology, is concerned with examining the nature of power 
relationships within language and the manner in which these contribute to, or inhibit, 
the enactment of social or political change (Fairclough, 2001; Van Dijk, 2002). The 
symbolic importance of language in political debate is recognised especially as the 
insatiable needs of the 24-hour modern news cycle means that political comments 
become key sources of news content, often forensically analysed for nuance of 
meaning and intent (Jones, 2012; Tanner, 2011). More broadly, as language, discourse 
and frames reflect the social, political, cultural and economic milieu within which 
they operate, and from which they are spawned, they are important sources of insight.
Results
Kevin Rudd and ‘the great moral challenge’
It was this speech that set the benchmark motif of the climate change debate in 
Australia. The opening salvos are somewhat like a ‘call to arms’ on climate change, 
an issue that Labor strategists believed was politically significant and one that Rudd 
needed to muster effectively to distinguish himself from incumbent prime minister 
John Howard who, along with US president George W. Bush, had steadfastly refused 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. At the time Rudd was working hard to develop his 
image as someone with a vision for Australia and who was concerned about ordinary 
‘working families’, as distinct from Howard who was being framed as a prime minister 
desperately clinging to power whose policies and ideologies had had their time.
Consistent with Rudd’s personal style and developing public persona, the speech 
is almost evangelical in tone. The word ‘challenge’ is repeated – moral challenge, 
environmental challenge, economic challenge, security challenge, a challenge of 
massive  dimensions – all of which creates a tenor of religious fervor. He thanks the 
participants for ‘making the pilgrimage to Canberra’ and acknowledges a possible 
diversity of views saying that he doesn’t expect the participants to be all ‘singing 
from the one hymn sheet’. 
Strategically, Rudd is positioning himself as someone who is up for the ‘challenge’ 
in  many arenas: diplomatically, economically, technically – a ‘can do’ potential prime 
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minister, consultative and consensus-driven. There are numerous references to 
Australia’s international role and the respect in which we are held, our predilection 
for being ‘sensible’, ‘practical’ and well liked, a global leader punching above our weight 
– characteristics popularly considered uniquely Australian. With the repeated use of 
the generic ‘we’, Rudd is inviting all the attendant captains of industry, trade unions 
and government to be part of this new consensus. Helping the global ‘challenge’ on 
climate change is part of his ‘mission’.
While the ‘great moral challenge’ is mentioned first as a rhetorical anchor and 
opening  flourish, it is the last of five core reasons for action that Rudd details. 
In order, these  are: science and risks of unpredictable climate variations; the 
costs to the  economy  and jobs; the global nature of the problem requiring global 
participation;  and  the diplomatic advantage to Australia to lead. The fifth and final 
reason is that of intergenerational justice. Of this he says: 
How you sustain a proposition which says that when the evidence is in and 
the scientific evidence is in, the economic data is accumulating that when 
that is presented to us in the year 2007 and we fail to act, how can we 
look towards the interests of the generation which comes after us and say, 
‘I’m sorry, it was too difficult to act’. For me, that is a compelling argument 
as well [para 23].
The last line flags Rudd as signaling that he may be alone in considering the moral 
and ethical dimensions of climate change. The ‘as well’ can be read as something of 
an afterthought, that this perspective is not the most important, nor perhaps one that 
holds much weight among the assembled congregation to whom he is making what 
is a strategic political pitch. Rudd’s referencing of the moral challenge is not entirely 
strategic however, but reiterates the position articulated in his essay ‘Faith in Politics’ 
(2006) and is therefore consistent with his personal beliefs and ‘evangelical’ fervor 
as well as with the public persona he was working hard to establish (Marr, 2010; 
Stuart, 2010).
However, as this speech proceeds, there is little further exploration of the moral 
imperative. He possibly believed that other arguments were more likely to resonate 
with those present and hence more pragmatically translatable into political support. 
Strategically, Rudd was also keen to establish his management ‘credentials’, having 
earlier described himself as a ‘fiscal conservative’ aiming to deflect the usual 
conservative framing of Labor policies as fiscally reckless, evoking the spectre of 
the excesses of Gough Whitlam’s 1972-1975 Labor government. For this reason, the 
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choice of the word ‘challenge’ itself is telling, as it is an example of the euphemistic 
managerial style of language of which Rudd was extremely fond. 
Towards the end, he does return briefly to the arena of ethics and morals by alluding 
to questions of ‘responsibility’:
… what are the best policy settings for what might be described as personal 
responsibility, corporate responsibility, community responsibility agenda? 
How do we individually act as citizens, engage with the great challenge 
of climate change to do our bit to reduce our own carbon footprints? 
[para 35].
Overall however, more time and emphasis is given to the economics frame. For 
example,  in the paragraphs about the economic implications, he revisits the 
conclusions  of the Stern Review. Later he concurs with Stern when he says: ‘climate 
change does represent significant market failure, that’s where Governments have 
to enter the field …’ [para 43]. So therefore, it seems that from this speech, while 
the moral  imperative is  important for him, it is the concern for the Australian 
economy and the possible price ‘it’ (the economy, like the all powerful ‘market’, 
is anthropormorphised), will have to pay without climate change abatement, that 
remains the most politically strategic and cogent argument for action.
Tony Abbott and ‘A Realist’s Approach to Climate Change’
For Tony Abbott, the man who reportedly said ‘[climate change] is absolute crap’ 
(Rintoul, 2009), and whose ascension to the leadership of the opposition Liberal 
Party spelt the defeat of Rudd’s CPRS, it was difficult to find a speech to analyse. 
The one being discussed was delivered in July 2009 and sits mid-point between Rudd’s 
‘moral challenge’ speech and Gillard’s ‘Clean Energy Future’ speech. Given Abbott’s 
shifting positions on climate change science and policy, it makes interesting reading, 
particularly in the current Australian political context. 
The lecture is intriguingly titled ‘A Realist’s Approach to Climate Change’. Abbott, 
‘the  realist’ of the title presumably, opens with an appeal to pragmatism: facts that 
can  be ‘measured and considered’ should be what governs any ‘rational discussion’ 
rather than peoples’ beliefs (which presumably are not necessarily rational: an 
interesting point from a publically devout Catholic). Arguments should be separate 
from ideology and, in a dig at environmentalists and pro-CPRS supporters, should 
not ‘become a basis for heresy hunting’ [para 3]. The moral imperative he argues, 
should not be used as an emotional weapon against those who question the science 
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when the rationale and outcomes are uncertain. He diminishes the moral aspects of 
the environmental argument by an appeal to commonsense with the comment that:
Every sensible person understands that we have to protect the 
environment because it’s the only one we have. This is why the debate 
over climate change shouldn’t be couched in morally loaded terms such as 
believers versus deniers [para 3].
Environmentalists or ‘eco-fundamentalists’ do not have exclusive claim to the moral 
high ground. Protecting the planet should be assumed to be the ultimate aim of 
everyone, not just those who label themselves ‘environmentalists’. The descriptor 
‘eco-fundamentalists’ diminishes their status and rhetorical position with respect 
to the ‘realists’ who legitimately question the science and who demand certainty 
before supporting policy which may not have the desired environmental outcomes.
In terms of policy, adaptation (he cites the ‘skeptical environmentalist’ Lomborg, 
2007), might make more practical sense.
What we can say, though, is that we should try to make as little difference 
as possible to the natural world. As well, prudent people take reasonable 
precautions against foreseeable contingencies. It’s the insurance principle. 
The premium we are prepared to pay, though, should relate to the extent 
of risk and the magnitude of the possible loss. If carbon dioxide might be 
contributing to harmful climate change and emissions can effectively be 
reduced at reasonable cost, it certainly makes sense to do so. Of course, 
what we shouldn’t do is embark on a cure that turns out to be worse than 
the disease [para 7].
This paragraph is interesting from the point of view of the way that it mixes the 
discourses of risk and economics, positioning them as rational. While he begins with 
a disclaimer about the need to make as little difference as possible to the natural 
world, there is no sense that humans have a broader ethical obligation beyond what 
is ‘prudent’. He remains sceptical about the science (‘if carbon dioxide might be 
contributing to harmful climate change’), and about the impact (climate change is part 
of the natural ecological processes). The words ‘reasonable precautions’, ‘foreseeable 
contingencies’, ‘insurance’, are economic terms all with an implied set of values against 
which action should be measured in order to be ‘rational’. Policy decisions therefore 
should be neither emotively nor ideologically driven. The ideological underpinnings 
of his own position are conveniently ignored and the assumptions about what 
constitutes ‘reasonable cost’, how those costs are measured, and costs for whom, are 
not interrogated. His position is assumed to be value free, therefore inherently more 
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‘rational’. Because the need for ‘rational’ consideration is framed in terms of economic 
costs and benefits, the moral dimension can be assumed and is not necessarily a 
primary argument in itself.
Ironically given his current position (see details at Liberal Party of Australia, 2010), 
Abbott is not against either an emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax at the time 
of this speech, the caveat being it must be ‘necessary’. These solutions however, are 
couched in the language of doubt: ‘should’ is an oft repeated word. An emissions 
trading scheme, he observes, is in some ways inherently dishonest because it creates 
a perception that ‘… it’s a cost-less way to avoid climate catastrophe’. ‘Cost’ again is 
framed as an economic one.
On the subject of Australia’s international obligations, Abbott plays the line that 
Australia has only a small impact on global emissions (despite the fact that per capita 
our contribution is one of the highest) compared to China and India, and so therefore a 
go it alone scheme will only hurt our economy without any impact on global emissions. 
He goes on to say:
As a good global citizen and on the right issues, Australia should be 
prepared to take a lead but there are normally limits to unilateral action 
even in the best of causes [para 11]. 
Presumably, this is not one of the ‘right issues’ or the ‘best of causes’ and Australia’s 
economic interests should be paramount and we should not be taking a lead should 
there be a danger that our economy may suffer. The economy is framed as something 
separate from issues of global environmental responsibility, the implication being that 
Australia can remain aloof from its international obligations.
Finally, Abbott argues that the political contingencies, rather than the moral ones, 
must be considered in how the Coalition votes. He chides Rudd for acting out of 
political expediency rather than genuine commitment (para 22). He says:
As long as people are thinking about the possible dangers of climate 
change, they are unlikely to be worrying about the more imminent and 
more certain dangers of economic change [para 24]. 
Economic change is the primary issue and the moral argument is merely an emotional 
and political distraction, of concern to ‘eco-fundamentalists’ who are framed as ‘non-
realists’ and who are a danger to the economy in their ideological quest for some, 
pseudo-religious, but uncertain cause. 
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Julia Gillard and the ‘Clean Energy Future’ 
Prime Minister Gillard’s speech was delivered in July 2011 prior to the introduction of 
the Clean Energy Act (Carbon Tax bill) into parliament and is quite different in style 
from Rudd’s evangelical approach. The central trope is the ‘future’ – ‘clean energy 
future’ being the catch phrase. Ironically however, her arguments are framed in the 
context of the past, as a continuation of major Labor structural reforms of the 1980s 
Hawke-Keating era, universally lauded as having been instrumental in Australia’s 
economic success in a rapidly evolving global economy. Gillard seeks to position herself 
as a reformer in this Labor tradition with fairness and equity as the central principles. 
The carbon tax is couched within the paradigm of such major structural changes. 
Carbon pricing she says, ‘is this Government’s biggest reform yet’, a reform which 
has long term implications, achieving ‘a change of far greater structural significance: 
decoupling the growth of carbon pollution from the growth of our economy’. In 
other words, it will encourage continuing growth on the back of structural changes 
in energy emission. Growth is the mantra, propelled by transformative new 
technologies which will enable new opportunities. In paras 31-34, the reform frame 
is well and truly reinforced, but it is economic reform first and environmental reform 
second. The moral imperative to drive the reform is absent from the argument. 
Outlining how the carbon price and the permit system will work, she notes that it is 
predicated on the ultimately ‘rational’ basis of : 
… evidence-based emissions targets, abatement at the lowest economic cost. 
A new bottom line, where polluters pay [paras 61-62].
The inherent logic of the market is central. Costs are decentralised with 
the government mopping up the excess with tax cuts and household 
assistance, tax cuts which ultimately will provide extra incentives to 
create work. Understanding the environmental imperative is coupled with 
understanding the economics [para 77].
In the final parts of the speech, Gillard reiterates her reform agenda with the repetition 
of ‘walking the reform road’. The future is down this road, albeit a road, and a future, 
defined by economic progress and continued growth [paras 94-96]. The moral to 
which she refers is encompassed by equity and fairness in economic policy rather than 
by any broader, altruistic imperative.
Finally, the proposed reform is framed as a matter of faith: ‘faith in [Australia’s] 
capacity to reform’, ‘realistic faith’, ‘determined faith’, ‘faith shared between a 
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creative and confident people’. Despite being a declared atheist, Gillard, like Rudd, is 
evangelising and exhorting the ‘true believers’ (to use the traditional ALP descriptor) 
to put their faith in the mystical historical propensity of Labor for fairness and 
reform as well as in the ‘inherent logic of the market’. Like that of Abbott, Gillard’s 
faith is parochially rather than globally focused: on Australia rather than the world, 
on individual needs rather than global responsibilities, predicated on the ‘natural’ 
inclinations of the market rather than on any acknowledgment of a broader moral 
responsibility to the global environment. 
Conclusion
For each of these Australian political actors, climate change has had significant 
political ramifications, their political fortunes and credibility pivoting around the 
strategies with which they have engaged with the issue. The three speeches reflect the 
differing styles of the speakers, their divergent political positions but also the stage of 
the debate in which they were delivered. While Rudd flagged the ‘moral challenge’ as 
a central trope of his sermon, the dominant frame was economic. Abbott positioned 
himself as a calm, conservative rationalist holding back a sea of hysteria from 
uncertain science and rampaging ‘loony’ environmentalists hell bent on wrecking 
the economy for their own ideological ends. Gillard extols the virtues of economic 
reform with an environmental purpose, but one which makes no reference to either 
individuals’ or nations’ moral or ethical responsibilities to the global environment. 
The question posed was to what extent did these speeches address the moral and 
ethical aspects of climate change? What underlying values does the discourse reflect, 
what are the dominant frames and how do the speeches work rhetorically to construct 
the problem as a moral and ethical one? In general, despite Rudd’s ‘call to arms’ about 
the moral imperative for unilateral global action, his arguments are overwhelmingly 
economic. The moral is acknowledged but its function in this speech is fundamentally 
rhetorical. Abbott’s cursory reference to the larger question of moral responsibility 
to the planet implies that his focus on economic consequences encompasses those 
concerns anyway, and that any other argument is mere ideologically-driven emotional 
blackmail rather than policy based on reason and evidence. The ‘clean energy future’ 
extolled by Gillard, is essentially one which is business as usual via a different energy 
route. The ‘future’ about which she speaks, is an economic, not an ecological one. In 
each case, the central argument is that the only way to protect natural resources is to 
price them, to treat them like a product or commodity and trade them. The ‘costs’ are 
65
economic and political. The moral imperative is cursorily acknowledged but is mostly 
either assumed or subsumed to more urgent and important economic imperatives.
Both Rudd’s and Gillard’s speeches are strategic political ‘acts’, designed more to 
bolster their short term political currency than to reflect a genuine ideological 
narrative. The general political inability to engage with the ethical or moral tenets of 
the debate, Gardner (2006, p. 400) argues reflect a broader problem of ‘institutional 
inadequacy’ in Western political structures where the power of media and of public 
opinion generally hampers political action. Always the political pragmatist (Coorey, 
2011), Abbott’s speech attempts to further seed the doubts on the reality of climate 
change by casting suspicion on those claiming the moral high ground. Doing so acts 
to frame the sceptical position as value neutral and ‘rational’ in comparison with the 
‘eco-fundamentalists’ of the pro climate change lobby. 
Both the UK Stern Review (2007) and the Australian Garnaut Review (2008) which 
focused on the economic costs of inaction on climate change, have ironically done 
much to shape the language and policy agendas in the UK and Australia. They equally 
reflect what Paton (2011, p. 355) refers to as a ‘market trance’ and serve to empower 
‘the intellectual imperialism of mainstream economics’ (Hamilton, 2010, p. 59) 
which has become so normalised within media discourse generally, and pervasive 
in climate change discourses in particular. The ‘market’ has been psychologically 
and discursively bestowed a level of animism acting on some intrinsic, natural 
organising force or ‘‘natural’ properties and truths’ (Doyle, 2010, p. 158) to the 
extent that the focus on the welfare of individuals as ‘consumers’ has weakened the 
power of sovereign  governments to speak about, let along act on, climate change in 
any way which challenges the prevailing powerful neoliberal narrative. While the 
‘moral imperative’ trope served Kevin Rudd politically in 2007, allowing him to raise 
the national consciousness on the importance of global action on climate change 
abatement, this paper has argued that it was rhetorically hollow, subjugated to the 
more strategically powerful economic frame. The question remains as to the extent 
to which this is detrimental to the long-term objectives of this important debate. 
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Abstract: 
This study explores, with a particular focus on the Australian political context, 
how the ethical impacts of pursuing effective climate change policy have been 
diluted by the singular focus on economic implications. The paper uses critical 
discourse analysis to examine examples of political speeches and documents. 
It gives an historical overview of political problems of pursuing climate policy 
(Australia has had five prime ministers in six years, all of them whose political 
incumbency has pivoted around their positions on climate change.) The paper 
then discusses more generally, why economics has become the dominant 
narrative and the arguments for considering climate change as a moral or ethical 
issue, hence the title ‘the choice between progress or the planet.’
Keywords
climate change; Australian politics; economics; ethics; morals 
Introduction
We do not inherit the earth from our parents, we borrow it from our 
children.
Ancient Indian Proverb
In 2007, Australian Labor Party (ALP) leader Kevin Rudd successfully capitalised on 
the prevailing zeitgeist of climate change concern by signaling the moral and ethical 
dimensions of the issue. His much-quoted call to arms on climate change as ‘the 
great moral challenge of our generation’ (Rudd, 2007), became key in his campaign 
to return the ALP to office after twelve years of conservative government. Since then, 
Australia has had five prime ministers in six years with much of the political turmoil 
pivoting around climate change policy. The issue has become one of both political 
and ideological struggle.1 While the September 2015 demise of climate sceptic Tony 
Abbott and reinstatement of climate advocate Malcolm Turnbull to the leadership 
of the Liberal Party promised a change in the political rhetoric and policy direction, 
Turnbull appears shackled to the contentious ‘Direct Action’ policy, something he 
previously described as ‘bullshit’ (2009) and a ‘fig leaf’ (Jones, 2011). The power of the 
conservative elements of the Coalition, as well as Australia’s economic dependence on 
coal exports, continues to shape the country’s environmental policies.
1 For a comprehensive timeline of both policy and politics see Talberg, Hui & Loynes (2013).
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This paper will discuss why the ethical dimensions of the climate change issue have 
been mostly absent from recent Australian policy debate. It will further explore 
whether the primacy afforded parochial economic concerns in particular, and larger 
economic concerns more broadly, has disguised, weakened and detracted from the 
ethical imperative that so strongly resonated with the Australian public in 2007.
What happened to the ‘great moral challenge’?
Rudd’s ‘great moral challenge’ mantra, part of his landmark speech to the National 
Climate Change Summit, resonated strongly with the Australian voting public. It 
continued a theme initially flagged in his 2006 essay, ‘Faith in Politics’, where he 
framed climate change as an issue closely linked to Christian ethics. He wrote: 
It is the fundamental ethical challenge of our age to protect the planet – in 
the language of the Bible, to be proper stewards of creation … the time for 
global, national and local action has well and truly come … So, is it ethical 
to engage in the deliberate sabotage of global co-operative efforts, under 
the Kyoto Protocol, to roll back global climate change? Or is it ethical 
instead to become an active, constructive part of the global solution? 
(2006, 17).
However, while Rudd’s 2007 speech is largely remembered for its rhetorical 
evocation of the moral and ethical imperative for governments to act both locally and 
internationally to combat climate change, the substance still predominantly focused 
on the economic case for action (Gurney, 2013). It concluded by concurring with the 
UK Stern Review (2007) that ‘climate change does represent significant market 
failure, that’s where governments then have to act’ (Rudd, 2007). 
The dominance of economic frames by both sides of Australian politics is a recurring 
feature of recent political struggles over climate change policy. Rudd’s Minister for 
Climate Change, Senator Penny Wong, for example, described the government’s 
proposed Climate Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) as ‘the most significant 
economic and structural reform undertaken in Australia since the trade liberalisation 
of the 1980s’ (cited in Burdon, 2015, p. 2). On the other side of politics, then-Liberal 
Party leader Tony Abbott repeatedly framed the Gillard government’s so-called 
‘carbon tax’ as an economic negative likely to create a ‘wrecking ball across the 
Australian economy’ (Australian Conservative, 2012). 
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In both cases, the local economic imperative was positioned as central to the political 
narrative for either accepting or rejecting the policy. Further:
A succession of reports [between 2008 and 2010] … all failed to reference 
Australia’s moral responsibility to reduce emissions and our ethical 
obligations to vulnerable countries. Instead, government reporting focused 
on protecting Australia’s ‘international competitiveness,’ ‘domestic 
economy’ and limiting action to our ‘appropriate’ or ‘full proportionate 
share’ of any global mitigation effort (Burdon, 2015, p. 2).
This focus had significant implications for the manner in which Rudd, Gillard, Abbott 
and now Turnbull, have prosecuted their policy positions. With respect to Rudd’s 
difficulties in legislating his CPRS, a series of poor strategic decisions, including the 
deliberate move not to negotiate with the Greens in order to win industry and Liberal 
Party support, meant that the scheme became increasingly complex as vested interests 
extracted both weaker targets and higher levels of compensation (Chubb, 2014). The 
sense of urgency spawned by Rudd’s heightened ‘moral challenge’ rhetoric, gradually 
waned, eroded by both the slow pace of change and the absence of bipartisan political 
support as the urgency for immediate action and difficult decisions appeared to have 
been overstated (Mackay, 2011). 
In general, political strategies focusing on economic arguments have problematized 
and created obstacles, rather than imperatives, to action (DeCanio 2006) and ironically 
have acted to reinforce the dominant neoliberal frames that have impeded, rather than 
propelled, effective policy action (Doyle, 2010). Gardiner, for example, observed that:
Much of what passes for even the most progressive discussion of climate 
change these days is devoted to persuading us that dealing with the 
problem will not be costly in terms of our current lifestyles. [This], it seems 
to me, … is the wrong discussion to be having (2011, p. 11).
In the Australian context, Chubb (2014, p. 84) argues that in deliberately not 
communicating the potential costs of the CPRS and articulating the need for all 
parties to share the burden in the interests of a greater cause, Rudd squandered 
the 2007 consensus, leaving room for the scare campaign that was to follow. As 
opposition leader, Tony Abbott deftly used the tax frame as a political wedge to 
polarize the electorate by falsely narrowing the terms of the debate, thus deflecting 
attention from the substantive, long-term consequences. After the defeat of the Labor 
government in September 2013, led once again by Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard (2013) 
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concurred, reflecting that as prime minister she erred in not contesting the ‘tax’ label 
for the fixed  carbon price policy and that this had caused her major political damage. 
During this period, shifts in public opinion appear to mirror the political framing. 
For example, the June 2011 annual Lowy Institute report noted a 41 percent support 
for climate change action, even if it meant a significant cost – a substantial decline of 
27 percentage points compared to the 2006 poll (Independent Australia, 2011). This 
result is consistent with trends internationally (e.g. Leiserowitz et al., 2010). Australian 
polls also noted that arguments over the economic efficacy of climate change policies 
were uppermost in the minds of Australian voters (Leviston et al., 2011) at this time.
Since 2012 there has been a gradual reversal of this trend. The most recent Lowy 
Institute Poll (2016) noted that: 
… concern about global warming continues to trend upwards: 53% of 
Australians say ‘global warming is a serious and pressing problem [and] we 
should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs’  
(up 17 points since 2012).
Politically, however, there remains a parochial focus on Australia’s economic interests 
rather than any impetus to action arising from the broader impact of our high per 
capita emissions on less developed countries. Calls for Australia to act as an ethical 
global citizen to reduce its emissions are largely muffled by the louder voices of 
economic rationalists. Further, Burdon observes that while: 
Australian governments have frequently used the language of equity and 
justice when explaining national GHG targets….these arguments have 
always been directed at purely national concerns (2015, p. 4).
This posture remains central to the Liberal Party’s ‘Direct Action’ plan: 
We will take direct action to reduce carbon emissions in a practical, 
affordable way inside Australia, not overseas. … All money spent will be on 
Australian green projects, not foreign carbon credits, keeping more jobs in 
Australia (Liberal Party of Australia, 2010).
It also dominates the ALP platform:
If climate change continues unmitigated over the coming years, it will 
cause serious and damaging economic dislocation across the world, with 
Australia set to suffer the worst consequences. For Australia, unmitigated 
climate change will come at a huge economic cost … (Australian Labor 
Party, 2016).
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From Rudd through Gillard to Abbott and now Turnbull, the balance between 
the environment and the economy has been politically problematic. Australia’s 
championing of, and reliance upon, fossil fuels has shaped, and continues to shape, 
much of the policy agenda – as Tony Abbott memorably asserted, ‘coal is good for 
humanity’ (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2014). The question is therefore 
whether the fundamental framing of the debate, described by Rudd’s former 
economics advisor and representative at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference, as 
‘a broader conflict between economics and the environment’, or ‘the choice between 
progress and  planet’ (Charlton, 2011, pp. 4–5), has deflected from the moral and 
ethical imperatives inherent in what many2 see as fundamentally an ethical question? 
Can we ‘divorce the economy from the environment’ (Gittins, 2015), and are these two 
ethically incompatible?
How is climate change an ethical issue? 
Broadly, ethical perspectives address questions such as: 
How should we live? […] What are our obligations to the other creatures 
with whom we share this planet and to the generations of humans who will 
come after us? (Singer 1985, p. 627).
Applied to the potential consequences of unmitigated anthropogenic climate change, 
Brown (2011b) maintains that focus on the ethical dimensions of the debate is essential 
because scientific and economic frames often ignore or hide these, pretending to 
be ethically neutral, and that this failure is one of the barriers to substantive policy 
development. In terms of the likely impacts of climate change, international accords, 
such as the 2016 Paris Agreement, will ultimately determine the following: 
• Which species or ecosystems will survive? 
• Which nations will be more vulnerable to the impacts of rising seas, extreme 
droughts, floods, bushfire and storm damage, ecological or cultural degradation?
• Who should ‘pay,’ how are costs calculated and payment apportioned? While 
the  historical source of a large volume of emissions come from developed 
nations  who have accrued the benefits, the ‘costs’ are more likely to be 
disproportionally borne by poorer countries who are least able to afford, let 
alone adapt, to them (IPCC, 1996).
2 These include authors already cited but also include Brown et al. (2006); Jamieson (1992); 
and Toman (2006), all of whom have written extensively on this topic.
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• Notions of ‘equity’ and ‘fairness’ must encompass a range of perspectives related 
to how ‘value’ is defined and measured. 
• As ‘stewards’ of the environment, Christian ethics posits that we have a duty to 
protect ‘God’s gift’ as it has value for, and of, itself. 
• The notion of intergenerational equity is central as future generations will be 
more severely impacted by the actions/inactions of current generations and yet 
are unable to transact with present day agents to ensure that their rights are 
fairly embedded within policy.
• As an example of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968), unmitigated 
climate change allows the actions of some exercising their ‘immutable rights’ 
to use a universal ‘resource’ (the atmosphere) to impose costs on others by 
degrading or polluting that resource to the point that it may become unusable or 
its inherent properties or natural potential irretrievably altered. 
These are all large and inherently complex questions with which economic models 
used to calculate the costs and benefits of immediate versus future actions on climate 
change mostly fail to capture equitably. The assumptions underpinning these models 
are not ethically neutral, yet many economists fail to recognize or acknowledge the 
role of implicit value judgments inherent in their analyses (Broome, 2008; Brown et al. 
2006; Gardiner, 2011). The market-based approach to measuring ‘value’ and ‘values’ is 
limited in that ‘it avoids the theoretical question of why things should be as they are …’ 
(Corner, Markowitz & Pidgeon, 2014, p. 412). 
Framing the climate change debate
The role of framing is central to understanding why climate change has become 
so highly politicized and divisive as well as the residual power of the dominant 
frames. Frames are defined as deeply ingrained, intersecting, culturally and socially 
constructed mental pathways through which different perspectives are filtered 
(Goffman, 1974). Operating through the lens of existing cultural beliefs and worldviews, 
they shape our responses to rhetorical appeals by selecting:
… some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in 
a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal representation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation (Entman, 2003, p. 52).
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Climate change has a wide range of implications – environmental, scientific, cultural, 
diplomatic, political, economic and ethical (Hulme, 2009). These challenge a range of 
divergent socially and culturally-embedded values allowing:
… ancient battles – about personal responsibility, state intervention, the 
regulation of industry, the distribution of resources and wealth, or the role 
of technologies in society – to be fought all over again (Tranter, 2013, p. 410).
Lakoff (2008) contends that frames operate cognitively by constant reinforcement, and 
therefore shifting beyond dominant frames that have become ‘naturalized’ within the 
discourse, is very difficult, making competing arguments harder to contest. He notes:
Language gets its power because it is defined relative to frames, prototypes, 
metaphors, narratives, images and emotions. … If we hear the same 
language over and over, we will think more and more in terms of the 
frames and metaphors activated by that language. [Even] if you are 
negating words or questioning them, the same frames and metaphors will 
be activated and hence strengthened (2008, p. 15).
From this perspective, media play a significant role in shaping and perpetuating different 
environmental frames, and in the production and reproduction of public attitudes to 
climate change and related policy options (Boykoff, 2011; Hansen, 2010; Painter, 2013). 
Add to this aggressive misinformation campaigns from conservative think tanks funded 
by vested interests (Jacques, Dunlap & Freeman, 2008; Oreskes, & Conway, 2010; Klein, 
2015) and the role of the journalistic norm of balance in environmental reporting 
creating a sense of scientific uncertainty where one doesn’t exist (Boykoff & Boykoff, 
2004), and the hegemony of dominant narratives3 is hard to escape. 
All debates, therefore, have a focal frame. Particular metaphors, catchphrases, visuals 
or historical allusions act to construct a rhetorical position that will resonate with 
the core cultural and ideological values of an intended audience. This frame is not 
always transparent, however, regardless of the information available and the critical 
ability of the audience to interpret it. Nelson (2004) notes that political controversies 
by their very nature involve fundamental clashes of values, and so communicators, as 
well as advocates with a vested interest in particular perspectives, will frame these: 
… to assert the special importance or priority of a specific policy goal. 
… This rearrangement in value priorities can subsequently affect policy 
opinions, even when the objective beliefs about the issue remain unaltered 
(2004, p. 581).
3 The concept of ‘hegemony,’ or ideological domination, was most famously posited by Italian 
Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci (2011) in Prison Notebooks.
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Within the climate change debate there a number of competing frames. Nisbet’s 
(2009) typology identifies frames of ‘social progress,’ ‘scientific and technical 
uncertainty,’ ‘conflict and strategy,’ ‘morality and ethics’ and ‘economic development 
and competitiveness’. He argues that none are mutually exclusive and that within 
any particular frame differing positions can co-exist. The economic frame, for 
instance, has been used to argue both for and against climate change action. The Stern 
Review most notably concluded that ‘the benefits of strong, early action considerably 
outweigh the costs’ (cited by Ackerman, 2007).
In a study of dominant frames in the coverage of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report 
across a range of US and UK media, O’Neill and colleagues (2015) found that the 
‘morality and ethics’ (ME) frame was used far less frequently in most UK newspapers 
than both more dominant frames of ‘settled science’ (SS) and ‘political and ideological 
struggle’ (PIS) or the economic arguments for immediate action (E1) or delayed action 
(E2). In US newspapers, the economic frame was less frequent than those relating to 
the veracity of climate science while the ME frame was not found at all. In Australia, a 
study of media coverage of climate change during the 2013 federal election concluded 
that not only was it largely ‘missing in action’ (Gurney, 2014), but that that which did 
occur was predominantly framed from the perspective of carbon pricing as economic 
impediment – the environmental, social and ethical dimensions were notably absent. 
Similarly, during the 2016 federal election, the Turnbull government’s focus was on 
‘jobs and growth’ with virtually no reference to environmental policy (Hudson, 2016). 
Frames, however, are also shaped by other complex factors beyond media, and 
audience studies ‘tell us that people make sense of the environment through multiple 
and often overlapping, interpretative frames’ (Cottle, 2013, p. 2). Further, Jacques 
(2006, p. 77) observes that ‘the struggle over the state of the planet is a struggle over 
society’s dominant core social values that institutionalize obligation and power’. 
With specific respect to climate change denialism, research notes that views tend 
to be polarized along political and ideological lines with conservative voters and 
candidates more likely to be skeptical of the scientific consensus and potential 
impacts, and less inclined to support government intervention.4 Corner and colleagues 
(2012) attribute this to what they label ‘biased assimilation’ wherein people interpret 
information in ways that are compatible with their worldviews or cognitive frames. 
4 This is point has been made in a number of studies including those in the US by Leiserowitz’s 
(2010) ‘Yale Project on Climate Change’ and in the Australian context by Fielding et al. (2012).
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It’s the economy, stupid: The ‘trance of the market’
As already noted, the recurring political strategy in Australia has been to frame 
climate change as fundamentally an economic issue: who should pay and what 
price?; who should be compensated?; what market incentives are required?; should 
Australia act before an international agreement is developed and risk becoming less 
economically competitive? But why has this frame become dominant and does it 
encompass or conflict with the ethical perspectives of this argument?
Taylor’s (2014) historical overview of Australian climate policy argues that this has not 
always been the case. Citing government documents from the 1980s, she maps how 
environmental issues became policy mainstream and notes that the prevailing narrative 
around Australia’s need to act as a good global citizen and to regulate ‘for the common 
good’ was strongly evident. She further observes that early political rhetoric around 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions was ‘framed in a language that spoke of solidarity, 
equity and accountability – in  other words, an ethical framework …’ (p. 19). During 
this period, there was bipartisan support for a national emissions reduction strategy. 
A significant shift occurred in 1991, however, with the onset of economic recession. 
Hawke government science minister Barry Jones recalled that:
… the political priorities seemed to change. Jobs, jobs, jobs became the 
priority and in some quarters there was a cynical reaction suggesting that 
environmental issues were luxuries which characterised affluent times. 
(cited in Taylor, 2014, p. 46).
Since then, the central rationale for action from both parties been economic and the 
policy prescriptions have been market-based mechanisms such as emissions trading 
and carbon pricing schemes in a manner that reflects what Paton (2011, p. 18) describes 
as a ‘market trance’. Taylor (2014) observes that the rhetorical coupling of individual, 
local and international economic interests fed this dominant narrative.
Familiar themes invoked a mental pathway where jobs and family ‘us’ 
would lose out should action on climate change involve any change from 
the energy system status quo: for example, employers would go offshore 
if their needs for cheap power were not met. This narrative has made the 
economic interests of multinational companies synonymous with the 
national interest and rhetorically with every family’s interests (p. 79).
This narrative frame remains dominant, even among environmental NGOs. Political 
opponents and climate skeptics for example, often frame their opposition to policy 
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action pragmatically, arguing that actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should 
not occur at the expense of economic growth as it would hurt the vulnerable and cost 
jobs – the argument consistently used by the Abbott-led Coalition. In one of the few 
comprehensive speeches on climate change given prior to his becoming party leader, 
Tony Abbott argued that while it should be taken as given that ‘every sensible person’ 
will want to protect the environment, the ‘cure’ should not be worse than the ‘disease.’ 
What we can say, though, is that we should try to make as little difference 
as possible to the natural world. As well, prudent people take reasonable 
precautions against foreseeable contingencies. It’s the insurance principle. 
The premium we are prepared to pay, though, should relate to the extent 
of the risk and the magnitude of the possible loss. If carbon dioxide might 
be contributing to harmful climate change and emissions can effectively 
be reduced at reasonable cost, it certainly makes sense to do so. Of course, 
what we shouldn’t do is embark on a cure that turns out to be worse than 
the disease (Abbott, 2009). [emphasis added]
The italicised words illustrate how Abbott used economic metaphors to rhetorically 
facilitate his argument, framing the economy as separate and independent from the 
biophysical world in which the market operates. He cites ‘skeptical environmentalist’ 
Bjorn Lomborg (2007) who argues that it is far more expensive to radically cut CO2 
emissions than to pay the costs of future adaptation. 
Economic frames continue to dominate across the political spectrum, a consequence 
of the repeated framing of environmentalism as antithetical to economic progress 
(Hamilton, 2010; Doyle, 2010). Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2009) advocated a 
communication strategy that recast climate change as an opportunity for economic 
growth in order to avoid ‘apocalypse fatigue’. It was this strategy that Julia Gillard 
(2011) embraced in defense of her carbon pricing legislation and with which the Liberal 
Party framed its opposition to the ‘great big new tax on everything’ (Taylor, 2009). 
Burdon also observes the extent to which NGOs have had to frame their campaigns 
in ‘purely instrumental or economic language’ in order ‘gain access to power and have 
their opinions communicated in the press’ (2015, p. 8). This is a deliberate strategy by 
activist organisations broadly, and social democratic political parties in particular, to 
garner public ‘legitimacy’ by appropriating the discourse of the market and to distance 
themselves from the ‘anti-economy’ perceptions associated with the Greens. As noted, 
Rudd’s fateful decision to negotiate with the conservative opposition rather than with 
the Greens to pass his CPRS is evidence of this strategic mindset. 
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But why is this so? In Australia since the 1990s, and exacerbated by the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis, political success has become equated with economic management. 
Hamilton (2010) argues: 
Economic growth has become … the mark of vitality, the bearer of 
dynamism, the symbol of life itself. It is what vivifies a nation, gives 
reality to dreams of prosperity and confers cultural superiority. … Growth 
is the vehicle that delivers nations and peoples from backwardness 
into modernity. A nation whose economy is not growing is seen to be a 
moribund nation, a ‘basket case’. … [In the 21st century] growth provides 
the raw material from which we construct our sense of who we are …  
(pp. 64–5).
The modern media fixation with the various indices of economic activity – monthly 
GDP and unemployment statistics, hourly updates on the stock market – is testament 
to this view. Anthropomorphised as organic, economists, politicians and journalists 
regularly express concern about the ‘health’ and ‘growth’ of the economy. Economics 
has become the natural starting point for deliberation of policy considerations from 
education and health to the environment. We have ‘internalised’ the discourse, as 
Foucault (1972) argued, to the extent that ‘we begin to articulate the interests of the 
system and govern ourselves according to its rules’ (Hamilton, 2010, p. 49). The frame 
of society as a marketplace, and of individuals as consumers, has made it increasingly 
difficult to initiate mass community action based on shared belief systems, as opposed 
to individual needs and wants (Doyle, 2010). The dominant neoliberal economic 
paradigm stresses the power of individualism to drive ‘progress’ when what is required 
to conceptualize climate change from a stronger ethical perspective is a broader, 
collective focus: a macro versus a micro view. In Australia in 2013 for example, the 
‘great big new tax’ slogan was more politically potent than the ‘clean energy future’. 
The primacy of economic perspectives to governments in garnering support for 
climate  change abatement policies is further evidenced by the fact that both Tony 
Blair in the UK and Kevin Rudd in Australia commissioned economists, Sir Nicholas 
Stern (2007) and Professor Ross Garnaut (2008), to undertake economic modeling 
to counter the arguments that action to counter greenhouse gas emissions would 
be  economically ruinous. Both concluded that the economic benefits of aiming for a 
500-550 ppm reduction target of greenhouse gas abatement outweighed the costs, 
and would reduce global GDP by a mere one percent by 2050. 
Significantly, a distinctive (and controversial) feature of the Stern Report was the 
acknowledgment, despite the economic orthodoxy, of the role of value judgments in 
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the analysis – the implication being that there are some things that are inherently 
unquantifiable, and are therefore beyond the measurement parameters of cost/benefit 
analysis. It was this particular caveat that most enraged economists such as William 
Nordhaus who accused Stern of abandoning traditional economic thinking, and of 
writing a ‘political document’ (Hamilton, 2010, p. 57). The 2001 IPCC report, however, 
similarly recognized that:
Natural, technical, and social sciences can provide essential information 
and evidence needed for decisions on what constitutes ‘dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’. At the same time, 
such decisions are value judgments through socio-political processes, 
taking into account considerations such as development, equity, and 
sustainability, as well as uncertainties and risk (Gardiner, 2004, pp. 556).
This position challenges the underlying assumption that as a ‘science’, economics is 
value-neutral or an ‘ethics-free zone’ (Nelson, 2008, p. 442). The market is conceived 
as a spontaneous order, an organic mechanism that operates on inherent natural 
properties and truths. Individual self-interest, given free rein, always represents the 
best way to nurture and advance social responsibility, free from the interference 
of governments. With its roots in the neoliberal economic theories of Frederick von 
Hayek and Milton Friedman, this paradigm has become the economic orthodoxy 
since  being championed in the 1980s by US President Ronald Reagan and UK Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher. Both embarked on wholesale programs to minimize 
the role of the state in areas such as health, education and employment in order to 
maximize the available space for private markets. 
The impacts of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, exposed the flaws in neoliberal-
empowered policy. Rudd, for example, argued that:
Neoliberalism, and the free-market fundamentalism it has produced, has 
been revealed as little more than personal greed dressed up as an economic 
philosophy (2009, p. 25).
Others note that the pretense that the market is inherently ‘natural,’ and that 
economic prescriptions are ‘scientific’ and therefore politically and ideologically 
neutral, has been empowered by ‘the intellectual imperialism of mainstream 
economics’ (Hamilton, 2010, p. 59; Manne, 2009). Framing individuals as ‘consumers’ 
and society as a ‘marketplace’ serve to place individual self-interest above broader 
collective concerns. 
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Politically, this has weakened the power of sovereign governments to act on climate 
change in any way which challenges the prevailing orthodoxy, or which acts contrary to 
powerful vested interests. The difficulty is that greenhouse gas emissions and notions 
of economic progress and personal and national wellbeing are closely entwined, both 
built on increasing levels of material consumption, so it is no wonder that this frame is 
so powerful. While in Australia most people are relatively affluent, we believe we are 
‘battling’. The Gillard government, for example, marketed its Clean Energy Bill (aka 
‘the carbon tax’) from the viewpoint of ‘What a carbon price means for you?’ – the title 
of the document distributed to all households in Australia in 2011. The booklet aimed 
to dispel fears, fanned by opposition fear mongering, that individual households would 
bear the brunt of the policy to reduce emissions. For example, the introduction reads: 
Some of the costs paid by big polluters will be passed through to the prices 
of the goods you buy. That is why over half of the money raised from the 
carbon price will be used to fund tax cuts, pension increases and higher 
family payments. The remaining money will be invested to support jobs 
and help to build Australia’s clean energy future (Department of Climate 
Change and Energy Efficiency, 2011, p. 3).
The table of contents covers fourteen sub-sections, all but two framed around 
questions of how individuals will be economically buffeted by the government. These 
include: ‘What does the carbon price package mean for me and my family?’; ‘Millions 
of households will be better off’; ‘How much will I get?’; and ‘Tax cuts and increased 
payments for families.’ This strategy appeared to reflect market research indicating 
the source of public concern over the impacts of the legislation. 
This frame was also evident in Julia Gillard’s defense of the carbon price in July 2011 
where she positioned the policy in the tradition of the revered Labor reforms of Hawke 
and Keating during the 1980s: 
The carbon price is our dollar float. A vital economic reform which will 
build our clean energy future (Gillard, 2011).
At no stage is the question of whether the ‘future’ about which she speaks is perceived 
other than in terms of continued levels of economic growth, and whether what 
Hamilton (2010) labels ‘growth fetishism,’ is antithetical to effective abatement policy. 
The imperative for sustained levels of growth is unquestioned. While Gillard talked 
about the future, it was economically and parochially framed, not one that considered 
Australia’s broader local and international ethical obligations. 
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This approach was articulated by the influential Stern Review that entrenched and 
legitimised the view that climate change action, and existing levels of economic 
growth, are compatible. This has been variously contested, with UK economist Tim 
Jackson (2009, p. 5) noting that ‘the concept of economic prosperity – and the elision 
of rising prosperity with economic growth – is a modern construction.’ This is highly 
pertinent considering that we live on a planet with finite resources. 
This premise underlies the Liberal Party’s ‘Direct Action Plan’ where polluting 
industries are paid a subsidy to invest in projects that reduce emissions. The policy 
statement reasons that: 
… with appropriate support and incentives, committed individuals, 
communities, organisations and companies can help address these great 
environmental challenges. (Liberal Party of Australia, 2010, p. 2).
Criticisms of this ‘claytons’5 policy have been numerous, including from Malcolm 
Turnbull, (after he was deposed as Liberal leader in 2011), who observed that it would 
become very expensive in years to come. Various commentators have noted (e.g., 
Eltham, 2011) that paying polluters not to pollute seems antithetical to Liberal Party 
philosophy and is especially ironic in the light of its oft-repeated assertion that Labor 
governments are always profligate with taxpayers’ money. 
However, Turnbull’s successor, Tony Abbott, was spectacularly successful in framing 
the terms of the debate as one of ‘tax’ rather than of ‘environment.’ In two examples of 
many, Abbott argued: 
What’s the point of a carbon tax if it doesn’t make it harder for people to 
turn on their air conditioners or to drive their cars? … If a carbon tax does 
not reduce the use of fossil fuels, it’s just another tax, not an environmental 
measure at all (2011b).
Later he noted that:
The carbon tax is just another example of the current government’s anti-
growth mindset … a go-it-alone carbon tax that discourages economic 
activity and puts our manufacturers at a growing competitive disadvantage 
… (2011a).
Even a relatively minor impost on economic growth cannot be justified.
5 ‘Claytons’ is brand of non-alcoholic drink marketed in Australia and New Zealand during the 
1970s and 1980s as ‘the drink you have when you’re not having a drink.’ The word has entered 
the local vernacular where it stands for a poor substitute or something that is obviously of 
lesser quality.
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Abbott’s arguments in particular, and the framing of the Coalition’s policy in general, 
is also indicative of the extent to which climate change is seen as an individual 
and parochial problem, rather than as a systemic and international one with broad 
environmental, social and human consequences. The Gillard government’s advertising 
around the introduction of the compensation package, framed payments as ‘household 
assistance’ – the carbon price was not mentioned at all. The impact on public perceptions 
was to ‘bright-side’ (Voronoff, 2012) the rationale for the policy – that is, frame it as 
good news rather than bad news. Strategically, this failed to engage the community 
in the imperative for action. Without stating the problem – namely the severity of the 
threat, our susceptibility to it, our need to share the cost burden and our ethical duty to 
future generations and to those nations likely to be most severely impacted – there was 
no compelling argument for change. Voronoff (2012) describes  this as the equivalent of 
the anti-smoking advertisement that fails to mention mouth and lung cancer, telling the 
smoker they should give up a pleasurable habit of ten years because they’re certain to 
feel better – ’the evidence shows this appeal just doesn’t work’. 
Economics: A ‘value-free zone’?
I have argued so far that the neoliberal-inspired privileging of economic criteria as the 
dominant frame through which climate policy has been fought, politically constrains 
the debate to an artificial, parochial, short-term, binary choice between ‘progress or 
the planet.’ The impact has been to narrow the public conversation and to marginalize 
and delegitimize broader, more nuanced and equitable ways of considering the 
problem. Former NSW Greens leader, John Kaye, for example, argued that:
Our capitulation to market instruments and confidence in economic 
theory abandons our responsibility to make informed moral judgements. 
The economic ‘colonisation’ of environmental issues removes such 
questions from moral debate. It converts political and ethical argument 
into economic certainties thereby closing off any opportunity to explore 
alternatives (2014, p. 17).
He argues against unbridled faith being placed in the technical calculations of 
economic models as they ‘represent a set of abstract possibilities that should not be 
applied literally to real-life capitalism’ (p. 17). Policy prescriptions based purely on 
economic factors make unjustified claims about the ‘objectivity’ of economic analysis, 
a mindset that has been compounded by the elevation in recent years of economics 
to ‘scientific’ status (DeCanio, 2006) – that is, a belief that economic indices reflect 
‘immutable laws of behaviour’. 
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Like any discipline, economics is not ethically neutral as inherent in any model or 
theory are implicit value judgements that reflect the ideological perspectives of those 
determining the parameters. Metrics such as cost-benefit modeling either assume or 
disregard, the ethical implications of the assumptions upon which these formulae are 
based (that is, ‘least common denominator utilitarianism’ or LCDU). This is further 
complicated by the problems of calculating the ‘worth’ of ‘public goods’ such as 
climate, the utility of which will ultimately be compromised by the long-term effects 
of greenhouse gas emissions. As an ‘externality’ in the calculation of utility, the 
‘costs’ of carbon emissions do not include the impact on other people and species in 
the ‘price’ (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 43). Framing the Earth’s climate system ‘as a 
type of capital, like office buildings or industrial machinery’ (Hamilton, 2010, p.  60), 
raises a range of complex ethical conundrums including that of ‘justice’ wherein the 
localised ‘value’ accrued by pursuing a particular policy may significantly impact 
others, for example in developing countries. In determining the economic ‘value’ of 
alternative policy options, the ethical implications of the broader consequences must 
be considered (Broome, 2006).
Many of the indices of economic modeling on the impacts of climate change themselves 
are by their very nature value judgments, not scientific calculations (Jamieson, 1992; 
Neumayer, 2007; Gardner, 2006; Morgan et al., 1999; Nelson, 2008; Spash, 2007; 
Toman, 2006). These include: the value of various tradeoffs (for example higher 
temperatures in traditionally colder parts of the world as a tradeoff for improved 
agricultural yields; the cultural value of particular habitats or species); adaptation 
(Lomborg, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008); social discount rates; and intergenerational equity. 
All are calculated as probabilities built into the mathematical algorithms and assume 
a level of cultural and political homogeneity which does not necessarily exist, and 
which is based on a paternalistic Western value model. Popular markers of economic 
well-being such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are regularly used as a rhetorical 
index of the impact (good and bad) of carbon abatement policies. But in measuring 
the value of goods and services produced per financial year, GDP is not a measure 
of individuals’, or even nations’, well-being because it does not take into account 
the unequal distribution of income. It also assumes that individual wealth equates 
with  increased happiness and increased prosperity (Hamilton, 2010; Jackson, 2009). 
Finally, and most importantly, the pervasiveness of this framing has the effect of 
distracting policy makers and voters from acknowledging and addressing the root 
causes of climate change, and of Western capitalism’s complicity, by enabling them to 
ignore the systemic nature of the problem. Framing the environment as a utility to be 
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bought, sold or compensated for in terms of loss of future profits, ignores the fact that 
we are part of, not separate from nature and that we have ethical obligations to both 
future generations and to others with whom we share the planet.
The role of competing values
A counter argument is that in assessing the efficacy and ethics of different policy 
positions, notions of ‘values’ and ‘morality’ are not homogeneous and that differing 
‘values’ or moral perspectives exist. Social psychologists define ‘values’ as series of 
relatively stable guiding moral principles that individuals use as a latent means of 
evaluating or arbitrating ‘between situational preferences which might otherwise 
compete’ (Corner, Whitmarsh & Xenias, 2012, p. 413). 
Lakoff (2010a) argues that the cognitive frames or prisms through which arguments 
about a range of issues are filtered are shaped by worldviews he labels ‘conservative’ 
and ‘progressive’. These are influenced by differing priorities and predispositions. 
In the case of unilateral, government-led action on climate change, conservative 
worldview privileges individual responsibility and freedoms, free of government 
interference as encapsulated by free-market ideology. This conservative cognitive 
frame, he argues, is a major impediment ‘working against environmentalism and 
against dealing with global warming’ (Lakoff, 2010b, p. 74). In this worldview, market 
fundamentalism is both ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ hence: 
Environmental regulation and government subsidies for sustainable 
energy, green technology, and green jobs are seen as government 
interference in the market, and hence immoral (p. 75).
From a different theoretical perspective, Rossen and colleagues (2015) agree. They 
cite ‘moral foundation theory’ which posits that conservatives differ from progressives 
in the competing moral domains of ‘harm and fairness,’ the stronger imperatives of 
‘in-group loyalty’ (favoring one’s own group first) and ‘authority’ (a preference for 
traditional social structures). The impact is that: 
… legislation designed to mitigate climate change may be perceived to 
place the interest of international communities over and above that of the 
individual’s own country, which would conflict with the moral foundation 
of in-group. Similarly, facing up to the reality of climate change leads to 
questioning the collective wisdom of the current social and economic order, 
built upon the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels, thus potentially 
actively challenging the moral domain of authority (Rossen, Dunlop & 
Lawrence, 2015, p. 43).
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Further, Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) cultural theory of risk perception sees 
cultural worldviews as exhibiting two intersecting, and sometimes antagonistic, moral 
dimensions: ‘hierarchy-egalitarianism’ (a preference for equitable division of resources 
irrespective of race, gender and religion) and ‘individualism-communitarianism’ (the 
question of whether individual interests should be subordinated to collective ones). 
From this perspective, Corner and colleagues (2012) conclude that: 
Those who identify strongly with self-enhancing values (e.g. materialism, 
personal ambition) tend not to identify strongly with self-transcending 
values (e.g. benevolence, respect for the environment) and vice-versa (p. 412).
These competing moral value systems, therefore, apportion priorities differently and 
will respond to different frames in ways that are consistent with their ideological 
worldview – this in turn is a predictor of resistance to climate change mitigation 
policies and messages (Rossen, Dunlop & Lawrence, 2015). From this perspective, 
guilt or fear-based messages around ‘saving the planet’ which appeal to those with 
dominant ‘self-transcendent’ values may ironically have the effect of both polarising 
the debate and increasing the resistance of those who privilege self-enhancement 
because they hear these messages as an implicit attack on their values (Corner, 
Whitmarsh & Xenias, 2012).
The Australian experience illustrates the dominance of the economic frame in 
the discourse of both those who resist action and those who advocate change. In 
the case of the latter, the co-opting of these types of appeals speaks to the extent 
to which the discourse has become ‘naturalised’ and ‘internalised’ as well of the 
trend to adopt social marketing techniques which play to the priorities of different 
audience segments. This has created the paradoxical situation where attempts to 
promote environmentally-friendly behaviours or policies privilege the economic or 
materialistic, rather than the environmental, altruistic or ethical benefits of doing so 
(Corner, Whitmarsh & Xenias, 2012). However, what Markowitz and Shariff (2012) 
label the ‘trojan horse approach’ – that is, the construction of motivating appeals based 
purely around extrinsic motivators such as economic self-interest (both personal and 
national) – is problematic. While politically useful in the short term, excessive focus 
on economic incentives can ‘crowd out’ the intrinsic motivation to adopt the behaviour 
long term. Critiquing the strategies of environmental organisations including his own, 
Kaye (2014, p. 17) noted that current environmental discourse ‘rejects the language of 
ecological limits … [and] ‘government through the market’ has failed ‘sustainability’ 
in terms of equity and environment.’ This point concurs with Leitch and Davenport’s 
(2007) assertion that the concept of ‘sustainability’ itself is a form of ‘greenwashing’ 
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or discursive ‘strategic ambiguity’ (Eisenberg, 1984), that enables often antagonistic 
ideological positions to co-exist beneath an environmentally sound veneer, 
obviating the need to interrogate or challenge their broader ethical implications. 
Conclusion
In his essay on the Global Financial Crisis, Rudd noted that Stern’s description of 
climate change as ‘the greatest market failure in human history is dismissed by 
neoliberals as a prescription for wanton interference in market forces’ (2009, p. 23). 
While economic perspectives remain important, particularly given the temporal 
time lags between cause and effect, their major weakness is the implicit assumption 
of scientific objectivity. They have been conveniently misused in the interests of 
short-term political expediency as has been Australia’s experience since 2007. When 
considering economic arguments, policy makers need to consider and acknowledge the 
ethical implications of the value judgements upon which their preferred calculation 
mechanisms are founded. In Australia in particular, the authoritative status of free-
market economic paradigms continues to hijack the political discourse and play into 
the hands of those who deliberately appropriate its seemingly unassailable logics 
in the service of ‘brutal retail politics’ (AAP, 2017). Australia remains locked in a 
policy vacuum and toxic partisan political battle propelled by the perceived political 
advantage of framing climate policy in purely economic terms (Kenny, 2017). The 
impact has been to stifle alternative ways of thinking, resulting in policy paralysis 
as record-breaking temperatures become the new norm of the Australian summer 
(Bureau of Meteorology, 2017). 
The uncritical imperative of ‘business as usual’ economic growth not only ignores the 
potentially catastrophic impact of unmitigated greenhouse gas emissions, but shrouds, 
entrenches and licenses the view that individual corporations’ or nations’ interests 
should be privileged over more collective, universal concerns. The unquestioning 
embrace of market theory mostly ignores or glosses over questions of equity, fairness 
and moral culpability to future generations and to peoples, species and ecosystems 
unable to speak for themselves. While the Paris Climate Agreement (2016) appears 
a victory for common sense, the election of US president Donald Trump threatens 
to empower those whose economic interests are threatened by unilateral climate 
policies. More research is needed to be able to nuance climate change communication 
to activate the particular ethical motivators that will engage a broader collective 
consciousness and hopefully politically drive more effective policy before it is too late. 
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Abstract
While Liberal Party leader – and now PM – Tony Abbott declared the 2013 
Australian federal election to be a ‘referendum on the carbon tax’, debate on 
climate change by both major parties, as a problem and as a policy, appeared 
to be largely absent. This paper examines the discursive characteristics of this 
debate by examining the election launch speeches of both party leaders and 
by using the Leximancer text analytics software to map both the frequency and 
conceptual relationships within mainstream media coverage. The strength of this 
software is that it allows a researcher to both map the quantitative nature of the 
linguistic characteristics of a corpus of texts, and to use this conceptual mapping 
to examine the results qualitatively. The paper concludes that quantitatively, in 
comparison with the previous two elections, climate change was a second order 
issue. Further, a qualitative analysis of the debate that did occur, concluded 
that it was largely framed in relation to the politically contentious ‘carbon tax’. 
Building on these results, it then discusses whether the apparent waning of 
political will by both major parties to substantially engage Australian voters on 
the need to take carbon abatement seriously, is a genuine reflection of voter 
apathy, a reaction to an over reliance upon opinion polls or symptomatic of a 
broader political and media disconnect.
Keywords
Climate change; carbon tax; 2013 Australian federal election; opinion polls; media; 
Gillard; Rudd; Abbott; Australian politics 
Introduction
Political debate around climate change policy has been central to much of the drama, 
rancor and division that has characterised Australian politics since 2007 when 
Kevin Rudd famously declared climate change to be ‘the great moral challenge of 
our generation’ (Rudd, 2007). Since that time, the political fortunes of Rudd himself 
and of his successor Julia Gillard, as well as of Liberal Party leaders Brendan Nelson, 
Malcolm  Turnbull and now-PM Tony Abbott, have pivoted around their various 
positions on the issue. Climate change policy, according to one commentator, has 
become ‘the black death of Australian politics’ (Hanson, 2010). 
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By the time of the September 2013 election, after three years of minority Labor 
government, the political sparring largely revolved around Julia Gillard’s so-called 
‘carbon tax lie’ (Bolt, 2012). In an attempt to recalibrate her position during the 2010 
election, Gillard stated in an interview that ‘I don’t rule out the possibility of legislating a 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, a market-based mechanism, I rule out a carbon tax’ 
(Kelly & Shanahan, 2010). It was this statement, largely misquoted and out of context, 
that provided the rhetorical prism through which Abbott’s opposition to Gillard and 
her ‘illegitimate’, ‘chaotic’ government, was focused. He pledged a ‘blood oath’ to repeal 
the carbon tax legislation should he become prime minister, describing it as ‘the longest 
political suicide note in Australian history’ (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). 
While both major parties maintained during the 2013 election that they were 
concerned about combating climate change, and committed to the implementation 
of effective policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the political momentum 
appeared to have waned and any consensus appeared irretrievably lost. This paper 
uses a variety of media and political sources to examine both the extent and the 
nature of the debate by the two major parties during the election. The media sources 
are examined primarily using the Leximancer text analytics program which maps the 
quantitative nature of the corpus and then uses this conceptual mapping to explore the 
linguistic connections qualitatively. From this, the paper then considers some of the 
broader factors that have contributed to the manner in which the policy and politics of 
climate change have played out in the Australian political context. 
From ‘the great moral challenge of our generation’ to 
‘axe the tax’
Climate change, as a domestic and international issue, has become a scene of political 
and ideological struggle. As an ideological issue, it has run parallel with, and can be 
seen to be influenced by, both major shifts in the political economy of mainstream 
media and major structural changes in the political party systems in Western 
democracies more broadly (Blyth & Katz, 2005; Jones, 2012; J. Keane, 2013). As an 
area of knowledge, climate change has become highly contested in the public arena 
(Boykoff, 2011; Hamilton, 2010; Hulme, 2009; Moser & Dilling, 2007), creating what 
Rudd government climate advisor Professor Ross Garnaut described as a ‘diabolical 
challenge’ (AAP, 2008) due to the complex and long term nature of the problem, the 
lack of international political consensus, and the power of vested interests to sway the 
public debate and the political imperatives. 
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The historical timeline for the ‘sturm und drang’ of climate change policy and politics 
in Australia is reasonably well known (for a comprehensive overview see Talberg, 
Hui, & Loynes, 2013). During Rudd’s first term as prime minister – 2007-2010 – 
policy action on climate change via the introduction of an emissions trading scheme 
(ETS), support for collective international action by signing the Kyoto Protocol and 
involvement in the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference, were central planks in the 
Labor Party narrative. In 2007, Rudd was able to harness and cultivate the prevailing 
zeitgeist of global warming concern to distinguish himself from the traditional 
conservatism of former prime minister John Howard who had belatedly added the 
introduction of an emissions trading scheme to his 2007 election platform (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2007). Howard has described himself as being an ‘agnostic’ 
on the subject, saying that he took the policy to the 2007 election because he could 
sense the public mood for action on the basis of the precautionary principle even 
though he believed (and continues to believe) that the predictions of environmental 
catastrophe are exaggerated (AAP, 2013).
In June 2013, the Labor government, wreaked by internal dissent, returned to a 
reportedly despised former leader (Vasek, 2012) in an effort to ‘save the furniture’ 
(Grattan, 2013) from an impending electoral disaster. By the time of Rudd’s ‘second 
coming’ as prime minister, particularly in the wake of six years of bruising political 
debate, the prevailing ‘orthodoxy’ was that public support for action on climate change 
had largely dissipated, despite the ongoing Lowy Poll of 2013 showing a resurgence 
in concern about global warming and support for action (Lowy Institute, 2013). 
Once reinstated, Rudd attempted to distance himself from the poisoned semantic 
chalice of the so-called ‘great big new tax on everything’ (Parkinson & Vorrath, 2011), 
announcing that a re-elected Labor government would scrap the ‘carbon tax’ and move 
to an emissions trading scheme one year earlier than had previously been announced 
(Benson, 2013).
The alternate ‘Direct Action Plan’ (Liberal Party of Australia, 2010) was derided 
widely by both economists and environmentalists (Wade, 2013), described at one stage 
by previous Liberal leader Malcolm Turnbull as a ‘fig leaf’ (Turnbull, 2009b), and by 
Ross Garnaut, the architect of Rudd’s original ETS, as ‘like a Martian beauty contest’ 
(Hannam & Swan, 2014) in that its lack of detail or costing would mean that the Senate 
would be unable to see what it was voting for. Regardless of the inconsistency of Tony 
Abbott’s various positions on climate change (B. Keane, 2011), or of the inherent 
contradiction of the Liberal Party opposing a market-based mechanism, Abbott 
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declared the 2013 election to be ‘a referendum on the carbon tax’ (Griffiths, 2013). 
The notion of the need to address climate change as a moral imperative, or to minimize 
its potential impact on the environment, appeared to be missing from the debate.
Does the tail wag the dog? The role of media in driving 
the political debate around climate change policy
In order to test these assertions in the Australian context, this research has focused 
on the language of the debate as it has been reported in mainstream media during the 
2013 election period. The role of the media in influencing public attitudes to climate 
change has been widely discussed (for example see: Boykoff, 2011; Cox, 2010; Hansen, 
2010; Lester & Hutchins, 2013; Painter, 2013). The theory of agenda setting (McCombs 
& Shaw, 1972) for example, contends that while media attention to particular issues 
does not necessarily tell people what to think, it influences what they think about 
by signaling an issue’s relative importance in broader public debate. Cottle (2013) 
however, asserts that the relationship is more complex and that we need to move 
beyond ‘media-centrism’ to also consider the power of institutional factors such as 
competing ‘news values’ as well as the power of ‘claims makers’ in the privileging of 
certain perspectives, representations and discourses. Audience studies he points out, 
‘tell us that people make sense of media representations of the environment through 
multiple and often overlapping interpretative frames’ (Cottle, 2013, p. 24). The complex 
psychological and cultural relationship that people have with the environment 
(Hamilton, 2010; Merchant, 1993) plus the power of think tank lobbies and other 
vested interests to muddy the waters (Oreskes & Conway, 2010), are examples of some 
of these factors. 
If mass media representations don’t directly drive public opinion on climate change, 
they are, however, a significant contributor in ‘shaping our perceptions, considerations 
and actions’ (Boykoff, 2011, p. 28). In particular, Boykoff points to the weight given 
to media coverage by political actors that makes the study of media representations 
important. He says that:
… to the extent that elected officials, (climate) policy negotiators and rank-
and-file policy actors view amplified media attention to climate change 
(and pressure for action), these trends have the potential to catalyse 
climate mitigation and adaptation actions. Conversely, a diminished 
amount of coverage can be seen as detrimental to putting forward strong 
climate policies (Boykoff, 2011, p. 28).
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While quantity of news coverage is not necessarily an indication of quality or a 
measure of influence, it was a useful starting point for this analysis. Various studies 
have tracked both the number and substance of climate change coverage during the 
past several years. In a study of world newspaper coverage between 2004 and 2010 
(a sample of which included Fairfax and News Limited publications in Australia), 
Boykoff (2011, p. 22) noted an increase in the volume of coverage of about five times 
compared to the turn of the millennium. The graphed trend shows a series of peaks 
and troughs due to the intersession of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 (trough) 
and the Copenhagen Climate Conference in December 2009 (peak). In Australia, this 
trend is supported by Crikey’s Media Monitors whose figures show climate change in 
Australia during 2009 as being the single biggest issue when all media were counted. 
In 2012, the carbon tax ranked third when all media were counted (cited in Painter, 
2013, pp. 80-81). 
In comparison, in a study which looked more specifically at the focus of the news 
coverage, as opposed to the sheer volume, Bacon (2013) examined the pattern of 
climate science reporting across 10 Australian publications during February-April 
in both 2011 and 2012 and noted both a drop of both 19% in the overall number of 
articles  and a 9% drop in those with a climate science focus (the 2012 sample was 
taken  after the introduction of the Clean Energy Bill in November 2011). The results 
of these studies would, on the surface, indicate a shift of focus from the problem and 
policy to the politics in this period. This is consistent with US studies by McCright 
and Dunlap (2011) and Brulle et al (2012) whose empirical study of the relationship 
between public levels of concern and climate change coverage in the US 2004-2010 
concluded that:
… information-based science advocacy has had only a minor effect on public 
concern, while political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups is 
critical in influencing climate change concern (p. 1).
Was climate change ‘missing in action’?
A starting point for this enquiry was to compare the level of coverage of climate change 
during the most recent three federal elections. I did three initial searches of the 
ProQuest ANZ Newstand database (which sources news stories from Australia, New 
Zealand and Papua New Guinea) using the search terms ‘climate change’ and ‘climate 
change’ + ‘moral’ and ‘climate change’ + ‘carbon tax’. The date ranges used were 
from the formal election announcement to actual polling day. The use of the search 
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term ‘moral’ aimed to capture the extent to which Rudd’s ‘greatest moral challenge’ 
catchphrase was still being cited in discussions of the topic and also if the coverage 
discussed the moral or ethical implications of climate change politics or policy. 
Fig 1 compares the raw number of ‘hits’ for the three searches. 
ELECTION DATES
SEARCH TERMS
2007 
14 Oct-24 Nov
2010  
17 July-21Aug
2013 
5 Aug-7 Sept
‘Climate change’ 3928 3851 1568
‘Climate change’ + ‘moral’ 115 154 66
‘Climate change’ + ‘carbon tax’ 171 502 463
Fig 1: Comparative results of search in Pro-Quest ANZ Newsstand for numbers of climate 
change stories during the Australian federal elections 2007, 2010 and 2013
A comparison of the pure quantitative count of news stories, (after culling duplicates, 
non-Australian news outlets and non-Australian stories), shows that there was a 
dramatic decrease (almost 40%) in the raw number of stories mentioning the phrase 
‘climate change’ between the 2007 and 2013 elections (n=3928 in 2007 to n=1568 in 
2013). There was roughly a 50% decrease in those which included both the words 
‘climate change’ and ‘moral’ between the years 2007 (n=115) and 2013 (n= 66), although 
the number rose between 2007 and 2010 (n=154). 
Looking at the figures for the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘carbon tax’, again there 
was a slight decrease between 2010 (n=502) and 2013 (n=463 or a decrease of approx. 
8%). The differences for the second and third searches can partly be explained by the 
fact that in 2007 the term ‘carbon tax’ was not widely used and, by the time of the 2013 
election, the use of Rudd’s ‘greatest moral challenge’ catch phrase had waned as  his 
political fortunes wavered. However, given the elevated political prominence over 
the preceding parliamentary periods to the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme  (the 
Rudd government’s rebadged emission trading scheme) and the Clean Energy Bill 
(the Gillard governments ‘carbon tax’), the overall level of decrease is still significant.
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The campaign launch speeches: ‘Don’t mention the 
climate …’
A second useful source for a sense of the importance of an issue, or the prism through 
which political parties wish to frame their campaign narratives, is the campaign 
launch speech. Political speeches have an important strategic place in political 
discourse (Glover, 2007) as they are explicitly written to set the agenda, vocabulary 
and tone of the debate. As sources of analysis, speeches allow a direct view of how the 
political actors in question, as ‘primary definers’ (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & 
Roberts, 1978), wish to be ‘seen’. While this article doesn’t propose to discuss these in 
any detail, I examined the speeches of both Rudd and Abbott for the extent to which 
they mentioned climate change, the environment and/or the carbon tax, and in what 
general context. 
Rudd’s speech in comparison to Abbott’s was relatively short: 90 paragraphs 
compared  to 145. While he mentions the economy, economic growth, economic 
challenges, jobs, living standards, and the relatively low level of government debt and 
so on in 31/90 of these paragraphs, climate change is mentioned only once, only in a 
cursory fashion, and is relegated to the 66th paragraph. Here he says: 
And on climate change, our plans are clear while Mr. Abbott, a climate 
change denier from way back, has an approach he has never properly 
explained and it does not work [para 66] (Rudd, 2013). 
There is no mention of his promise to repeal the carbon tax, of its replacement with 
an emissions trading scheme or of Labor’s continuing commitment to addressing the 
‘great moral challenge’. 
While Abbott’s speech mentions the carbon tax more often as you would expect given 
that the carbon tax repeal was a central election promise, it is still only mentioned 
directly in 5/145 separate paragraphs: twice with respect to its impact on the cost of 
living, twice reiterating the promise to repeal it, and once with respect to its political 
cost to Rudd. He says for example:
We’ll scrap the carbon tax so your family will be $550 a year better off.  
[para 14]
We’ll abolish the carbon tax so power prices and gas prices will go down.  
[para 27] 
He [Rudd] knows that the carbon tax has been a disaster – that’s why he’s 
faked abolishing it [para 108] (Abbott, 2013b).
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Like Rudd’s speech, 37/145 paragraphs are devoted to the theme of ‘building a stronger 
economy so everyone can get ahead’, the promise to achieve a budget surplus, and 
how a future Abbott government proposes to deal with various examples of Labor’s 
profligacy. In both, climate change is a ‘non’ subject. The positive impact of the carbon 
tax on reducing emissions from electricity generation (Australian Government, 2014) 
is not mentioned, and he frames associated emissions reduction instrumentalities, 
such as the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, as a form of corporate welfare: 
The Clean Energy Finance Corporation will cease making non-commercial 
loans with taxpayers’ money [para 38].
Their role in encouraging commercial investment in clean and renewable energy is 
ignored.
From the point of view of the environment, there are two curious paragraphs in 
Abbott’s speech worth noting. In paragraph 94, he has a veiled swipe at those he 
has previously labeled ‘eco-fundamentalists’ and alludes to themes raised in a much 
earlier speech titled ‘A Realist’s Approach to Climate Change’ (Abbott, 2009). This is 
a theme that reverberates through other parts of this speech particularly in terms of 
freeing the economy from unnecessary government interference so that Australia can 
once more be ‘open for business’. He says: 
When I look at farmers and fishermen and foresters, I don’t see people 
despoiling the environment but people who are our best conservationists 
because that is the only way that their children and grandchildren can 
follow the same calling [para 94]. 
Along with ‘direct action’ and the 15,000 strong ‘green army who will be working with 
councils, farmers and volunteers to clean up our polluted waterways and restore our 
degraded bush’ [para 46], the implication is that imposing restraints from above is 
unnecessary because people can be trusted to do the right thing when it is in their 
economic interests to do so. Any necessary actions are relegated to the responsibility 
of individuals, rather than corporate entities or national governments, the logic being 
that it can be taken for granted that individuals will be appropriately motivated by 
their concern for their family’s future. The environment, and the need to care for it, is 
still framed in terms of future individual economic needs. The role of capitalism – and 
its appropriation of environmental resources – is not mentioned. 
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Further, the final paragraphs allude to Abbott’s view of the need to restore the political 
status quo in terms of environmentalism. This seems to require its removal from the 
mainstream political agenda.
To Labor voters wondering why your party has sold its soul to the Greens; 
to Green voters wondering why your party has embraced socialism over 
environmentalism …, I say: give my team a chance. [para 135]
The conflation of ‘socialism’ and ‘environmentalism’ is a form of ‘dog whistling’ to 
those  who see action on climate change as a surreptitious attempt to undermine 
capitalism. Malcolm Turnbull made a similar observation in 2009 after he was 
defeated for the party leadership over his support for Rudd’s emissions trading scheme. 
At the time, he wrote in his blog: 
As Tony observed on one occasion ‘climate change is crap’ or if you 
consider his mentor, Senator Minchin, the world is not warming, it’s 
cooling and the climate change issue is part of a vast left wing conspiracy 
to de-industrialise the world (Turnbull, 2009a).
Again, the frame of economics is central.
Framing climate change during the 2013 federal election
As a means of understanding how particular issues are broadly represented, 
analysis of  media discourse via close interrogation of representative media texts, 
has been widely  used (for example Fairclough, 1995; Van Dijk, 1988). Texts are 
multifunctional in that they are both ‘sites’ of power in terms of the production, 
consumption and conventions of their specific genre, and semiotic systems wherein 
the ‘linguistic choices  that are made … carry ideological meaning’ (Fairclough, 1995, 
p. 25). An  important limitation that must be acknowledged here is that any corpus 
of media texts is never totally complete. Not all voices are represented or even equal. 
However,  the choice of media texts remains important as sources of insight and 
analysis. According to Stuart Hall and colleagues:
The media define for the majority of the population what significant events 
are taking place, but, also, they offer powerful interpretations of how to 
understand these events. Implicit in those interpretations are orientations 
towards the events and the people or groups involved in them (Hall et al., 
1978, p. 57).
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Additionally, the study of news frames (for example Entman, 2003; Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989; Hansen, 2010) allows a more nuanced view of how issues are 
represented, how possible actions are promoted and the manner in which the language, 
style and choices of rhetorical elements work to appeal ‘in perceiving, thinking and 
communicating, to structured ways of interpreting experiences’ (Boykoff, 2011). 
Therefore, examining how media use language in their coverage of both climate change 
in general, and the politics and policies in particular, is important as it can give insight 
into the prisms or frames through which we understand the issues. As Fairclough 
(1995) argues, language is a central source for: 
… the fundamental concerns of social analysis: questions of knowledge, 
belief and ideology …, questions of social relationships and power, and 
questions of identity (Fairclough, 1995, p. 17).
From Fillmore’s (1976) and Goffman’s (1974) early work on frame analysis, we can 
see that frames are mental or cognitive processes that operate linguistically and act 
through the lens of both memory, context, existing worldviews and cultural beliefs. 
According to Nisbet (2009): 
Frames are interpretative storylines that set a specific train of thought in 
motion, communicating why an issue might be a problem, who or what is 
responsible for and what should be done about it (Nisbet, 2009, p. 15).
In the case of climate change, Nisbet proposes a typology of competing frames 
which include: social progress, scientific and technical uncertainty, Pandora’s box/
Frankenstein’s monster, conflict and strategy, morality and ethics and economic 
development and competitiveness (Nisbet, 2009, p. 18). These, he argues, are not 
mutually exclusive and that even within any particular frame, differing positions can 
co-exist.
The power of frames to influence perceptions, reasoning and understanding of 
particular  issues Lakoff (2008) argues, occurs as a result of constant repetition and 
reinforcement. Dominant frames therefore, by virtue of their repetition, also act to 
‘naturalise’ the discourse, making competing arguments more difficult to contest. 
Additionally, ‘since political ideologies are, of course, characterised by systems of 
frames, ideological language will activate that ideological system’ (Lakoff, 2010, p. 
72). The dominant framing of climate change policy through the lens of economics 
(‘the great big new tax on everything’) (Gurney, 2012; 2013), has served to narrow 
the Australian debate to one of short term, hip pocket and economic interests, and to 
obfuscate the longer term environmental, moral and economic consequences of inaction. 
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Mapping the focus of climate change reporting during the 
2013 federal election using Leximancer 
In order to identify the main themes that characterised media coverage of climate 
change during the 2013 election, a corpus of 1568 news stories was downloaded from 
the ProQuest ANZ Newstand database using the keywords ‘climate change’ between 
the dates 5 Aug-7 Sept 2013 (the dates of the ‘official’ election period). The ‘hits’ were 
edited for duplicates and non-Australian stories (the database also covers New Zealand 
and AAP wire stories) and the identifying metadata was removed. The texts were then 
uploaded into the Leximancer text analytics and data mining software to map the 
conceptual relationships (Leximancer.com., 2014). 
Leximancer is an Australian-designed software program that uses word occurrence 
and co-occurrence to automatically generate thematic and conceptual relationships 
from a corpus of texts without the need for interpretative coding from the researcher 
(Smith & Humphreys, 2006). Its strength is that it allows qualitative analysis to proceed 
from a quantitative base. The program generates an interactive concept map and set of 
explanatory tables which allow a researcher to examine these relationships both visually 
and at the level of textual themes, the related text and thesaurus terms (Angus, Rintel, & 
Wiles, 2013). After the initial run, I merged several concepts that were merely variations 
of the same word (e.g. issue/issues, Tony Abbott/Abbott, Kevin Rudd/Rudd). Other 
important concepts that were initially identified separately, but were spatially close 
on the concept map and used together in the text such as climate and change (climate 
change), carbon and tax (carbon tax) and prime and minister (prime minister), were merged 
and renamed. Figures 2 and 3 show screenshots of the concept map and themes output 
of the second ‘run’ of the corpus with all the concepts visible. In Leximancer, the theme 
labels are automatically generated to reflect the dominant set of concept relationships. 
The spatial connection between the themes and concepts
At its default 33% theme size, the initial distribution of concepts from the corpus 
(Fig 2) is interesting. In Leximancer, the most significant themes are visually coded as 
a heat map, the ‘hottest’ being in red. This is also shown the theme summary (Fig  3). 
In  this example, the strongest theme was labeled ‘carbon tax’ and encompassed 
concepts such as carbon tax, government, Coalition, policy, emissions, billion, scheme, 
action, plan, economic, power. The other themes in order of dominance were ‘Labor’, 
‘climate change’, ‘party’, ‘issues’, ‘year’, ‘future’, ‘Rudd’, ‘people’, ‘global’, ‘area’, ‘man’ 
and ‘sea’. 
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Fig 2: Leximancer concept map ‘Climate change’ 2013 Australian federal election 
dataset set at the default 33% theme size
Fig 3: Leximancer thematic summary ‘Climate change’ 2013 Australian federal election 
dataset set at the default 33% theme size
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If you enlarge or reduce the theme size, concepts may shift into other themes and new 
themes may emerge: the smaller the theme size, the greater the number of themes, 
and vice versa. For example, setting the theme size to 50% reconfigures the theme 
summary. The carbon tax concept is now located within the ‘Labor’ theme which is now 
the strongest, with ‘climate change’, ‘party’, ‘people’, ‘Rudd’, ‘world’, ‘cost’ and ‘water’ 
in descending order of strength or dominance. At this level, Rudd still commands his 
own theme, yet the concepts within largely relate to his political status rather than 
his beliefs or policies as indicated by the named concepts Rudd, prime minister, leader, 
debate, week, during, days, former. Another point worth noting is that it is not until you 
reduce the theme size to 15% that specific ‘Abbott’ and ‘Liberal’ themes emerge. Prior 
to that, they are located within the ‘Labor’ and ‘party’ themes respectively. The corpus 
therefore, is more focused generally on Rudd and on Labor than on the alternative 
government or its leader. 
Exploring the ‘carbon tax’, ‘Labor’ and ‘climate change’ concepts
Given the level of detail within the Leximancer output, I will only summarise what 
I see as the most salient points of the strongest themes as they relate to the research 
focus of this paper. 
My initial observation was that while the three strongest concepts are obviously 
closely connected, the fact that ‘climate change’ ranks third in order of dominance in 
this corpus is relevant – in other words as a concept on its own, separate from politics, 
it is not the most significant. While this is perhaps understandable given that the 
media corpus was extracted during an election campaign, it does point to the weight 
of the focus being on the politics rather than on any communication of the purpose of 
the policy. This is supported by samples of related text which Leximancer allows you 
to see – climate change (problem or issue) is mostly being discussed in terms of the 
carbon tax (policy and politics), its cost, its impact on the economy, on various forms 
of power generation and in terms of the Coalition’s promise to repeal it. Carbon pricing 
as a policy to reduce emissions by providing a market-based incentive for industries 
to  either reduce their energy dependence or to switch to clean energy sources, is 
rarely mentioned. 
In the Leximancer concept map, those with the strongest connections have visible 
links in a manner similar to the way in which molecules in a chemical compound chain 
are represented (see Fig 2). From this perspective, the map draws a direct line between 
the carbon tax and Coalition concepts indicating that the policy is more directly linked 
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in the corpus to the Opposition than to the government itself. However the fact that 
the concepts of government and Coalition are spatially in close proximity within the 
broader ‘Carbon tax’ theme indicates that they are also closely semantically related. 
In other words, the frame in which the carbon tax is being discussed in relation to 
both sides of politics is not dissimilar: while it is the government’s policy, and while 
Labor and Rudd are discussed more often, it is the Coalition’s frame which dominates.
The ‘Labor’ theme ranks second in terms of strength and encompasses the concepts 
of Labor, election, Abbott, campaign, Greens, policies and federal. As you would expect, 
much of the focus is on the comparative strengths and strategies of the campaign 
and the potential outcome of the election and respective policies. Importantly, while 
both Abbott and the Greens concepts are located within this theme, Rudd is not, even 
when you enlarge the theme size. The extent to which Labor’s 2013 campaign was 
centred almost solely around Rudd in an attempt to recapture some of the mojo of the 
Kevin ’07 campaign, is an explanation here. The increasing disconnect and antipathy 
between Rudd and his party, which had fuelled many of the party’s problems since 
2010, was noted, post-election, by then prospective, now incumbent, ALP leader Bill 
Shorten when he declared, ‘The era of the messiah is over. No more messiahs.’ (Lane, 
2013). Interestingly, when you examine some of the illustrative text related to the 
concepts of leader and prime minister, Abbott is mentioned more often than Rudd (24% 
to 14%), although often in a sense of questioning his (Abbott’s) suitability for the role. 
The ‘climate change’ theme, while ranked third in terms of strength, is the largest and 
incorporates a greater diversity of concepts as you would expect given the predicted 
wide ranging ramifications for agriculture, land use, health, tourism and so on. The 
concepts include climate change, Australia, support, need, economy, funding, public, 
education, health, take, including and national. Text references to the economy concept 
show that the impact of climate change on the economy is largely debated in terms of 
the carbon tax. However, health is both identified as one of the big three major issues 
along with education and climate change. The context of the discussion is mostly in 
terms of the impact of climate change on both the health of the land and on the health 
of the population generally, and mostly in letters to the editor which are included in 
the corpus from a range of regional and national newspapers. 
Finally, what is telling is that neither ‘environment’ nor ‘science’ is present as a concept 
in this corpus broadly, nor in the ‘climate change’ theme in particular. However, when 
the theme size is enlarged to 50%, the carbon tax concept is subsumed into the ‘Labor’ 
theme, and a ‘water’ theme emerges (see Fig 4) indicating that this aspect of the 
112
impact of climate change in Australia as one of the driest continents is reflected in the 
discussion. 
Fig 4: Leximancer concept map ‘Climate change’ 2013 Australian federal election  
dataset set at 50% theme size 
What do the ‘concept pathways’ tell us?
In order to explore some of these relationships more closely, ‘pathways’ were activated 
between a number of different concepts. The ‘pathway’ function allows the researcher 
more closely see indirect mediating and moderating semantic relationships (see 
Fig 5). This is useful because even though concepts may be closely spatially related on 
the map, the pathway between them may tell a slightly different story. For example, 
as Fig  5 illustrates, the pathway between climate change and economy (which are 
spatially close within the ‘climate change’ theme bubble), takes a circuitous route 
via a range of different concepts including most directly, carbon tax. Similarly, when 
interrogating  the relationship between the concepts of climate change and water, 
climate change and health, and climate change and emissions, in each case the pathway 
drawn is directly via carbon tax. Again, this speaks to the dominance of the carbon tax 
frame in relation to the various discussions of the impact of climate change in general 
and the policy in particular. 
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Fig 5: Pathway between climate change and economy
Similarly, the pathway between the concepts of policy to climate change is telling 
(Fig  6). It travels firstly through Coalition before reaching government, then carbon 
tax and onto climate change. An ‘eyeballing’ of both the sample text extracts and 
the related thesaurus terms shows that it is being discussed usually in terms of the 
political problems it has created for the Gillard and Rudd governments, the Coalition’s 
stated promise to repeal it once in government as well as a range of comments raising 
doubts about both the effectiveness and costs of the alternative Direct Action policy. 
Again, what is notable in this corpus is the negative connection between carbon tax 
and policy, rather than any positive or substantial debate about the alternate positive 
impact of ‘Direct Action’. It is a policy which has been, (and continues to be), posited 
without any substantial argument about how it will be more effective than either an 
ETS or a carbon tax. 
An additional pathway was also drawn between the concepts policies and emissions as 
I was interested to see how these were connected. It travels via the Greens concept but 
not via Labor (Fig 7). I read this to indicate that the problem the carbon tax policy was 
developed to mitigate (emissions) is more closely related in the text to the third major 
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political party, the Greens, with whom Julia Gillard had to negotiate in order to form 
her minority government in 2010. Interestingly, the emissions concept is also located 
on the perimeter of the ‘carbon tax’ theme indicating that this concept is peripheral: 
the Abbott rhetoric of subsuming the debate in terms of the frame of economic 
progress and waste is dominant as indicated in his campaign speech where he says: 
‘So  that everyone can get ahead. We’ll scrap the carbon tax, we’ll end the waste, 
we’ll stop the boats and we’ll build the roads of the 21st century’ (Abbott, 2013a). 
          
Figs 6 & 7: Pathways between policy and climate change and policy and emissions
Finally, what is notable about these connections, (and there are many more that could 
be discussed), is the distance of both Labor in general, and Rudd in particular, from 
these concepts in the text. In fact when the theme size is set at 33%, even though Rudd 
has the 9th most significant theme (see Fig 3), his concept is located on the outside 
perimeter of the ‘Rudd’ theme bubble and has a direct pathway to the climate change 
concept only via Abbott and carbon tax (Fig 8). Abbott is closer than Rudd to the 
climate change concept because he is controlling the narrative. 
Fig 8: Pathway between Rudd and climate change 
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The power of dominant framing
The question that this paper set out to explore was the extent to which climate 
change,  as both a policy and a problem, was ‘missing in action’ in the political 
debate during the 2013 Australian federal election. As shown in Fig 1, there were 
significantly  fewer mainstream news stories and references to climate change 
during  2013 in comparison with the two previous elections. Although quantity 
does not  necessarily equate to either substance or influence, as initial indicator it is 
interesting.
Another important indicator of how a political party wishes to frame its election 
strategy and the policy elements upon which it wishes the electorate to focus, is 
the campaign launch speech. In Rudd’s speech, climate change was only afforded a 
cursory reference, and then with reference to Abbott. While he is correct to say that 
Abbott’s policy has not been explained, he makes no attempt to argue for the relative 
merits of Labor’s policy, nor the consequences of inaction. Abbott, for his part, merely 
reiterates his mantra about the carbon tax being bad for the economy, curiously 
arguing, as he has done before and since, that he is a conservationist at heart (Hurst, 
2014). Again, both speeches focus primarily on the importance of the economy and 
economic growth. The relationship between the long-term impacts of climate change 
on economic growth, on tourism, on agriculture and on health, to name a few, was 
ignored. The fact that climate change is not merely an environmental problem but one 
with significant economic ramifications, has been variously argued from Sir Nicholas 
Stern (2007) to Australia’s Professor Ross Garnaut (2008). 
While the relative absence of both political and media attention to this important 
topic during the election is telling, the focus of what reporting there was about climate 
change and policy during the election tells a more nuanced story. The Leximancer 
analysis, both quantitatively and qualitatively, illustrates that what reference there 
was to climate change policy and issues are largely discursively constructed in terms 
of the carbon tax by all sides of politics, including the Greens. Abbott’s spectacular 
success during the Gillard years in myopically framing the carbon pricing scheme 
as a ‘tax’, by coupling it with Gillard’s so-called ‘lie’ (Bacon, 2013), the ‘illegitimacy’ 
of both her ascension to the prime ministership and of her minority government 
and its ‘ineptitude’, enabled him to effectively control the language and frame of the 
debate. The media mostly played Abbott’s tune. The constant ‘sideshow’ which ex-
Rudd minister Lindsay Tanner (2011) noted with respect to the relationship between 
politicians and the media, worked to distract the focus of media coverage from the 
116
actual policy objective and the massive nature of the problem. The sheer intensity with 
which Abbott pursued the issue, created an environment in which the politics became 
more newsworthy than the issue itself. Both Labor and the Greens, by falling into 
the Coalition’s frame, were politically outmaneuvered and unable to ‘sell’ the policy’s 
environmental purpose. 
The extent to which ‘the conservative frame’ as Lakoff (2010) describes it, was 
dominant,  is evidenced by both the language of the debate as I’ve noted, and 
the political  strategies employed. The perception that the carbon tax policy was 
politically  ‘toxic’ and that the broader concern about climate change among 
voters had waned, was reflected in the reinstated Rudd’s strategy to immediately 
neutralise  Abbott’s ‘axe the tax’ line of attack by promising to move one year earlier 
than Labor had originally intended to an emissions trading scheme. While the 
potential  impact of this plan, which moved from a fixed price on carbon to one 
aligned  with the European price, was debatable (as the European price remained 
low), Rudd also failed to explain how it differed from the existing plan or why it would 
be more effective. The effect was to merely reinforce the perception that the carbon 
tax was a bad thing and something associated with the woman who usurped him as 
prime  minister: the politics took precedence over the objectives of the policy in the 
political discourse. 
In a broader sense, resistance to the carbon tax as a means of controlling 
greenhouse  gas emissions was also exacerbated by the prominence given in the 
conservative media to climate change denialism in particular (Bacon, 2011; Manne, 
2011) and the delegitimisation of science in general (Nelson, 2004). The repeated use 
of the word ‘tax’ had the effect of creating and reinforcing the perception that the 
policy was aimed at individuals rather than at carbon polluting companies. Again, 
Labor’s decision after 2010 to focus their message on ‘household assistance’, with 
only  minimal  mention of the ultimate purpose or rationale for the policy, played 
into the ‘tax’ frame. For example, of the 14 points listed in the table of contents of a 
booklet  titled ‘What a carbon price means for you’ (Australian Government, 2011) 
sent out to all households prior to the tabling of the Clean Energy Bill, only two 
referred to cutting carbon pollution: the remaining 12 referred to assistance, tax cuts 
and saving  money. While the Gillard Labor government’s preferred descriptor was 
‘carbon  pricing’, the then Minister for Climate Change, Greg Combet, agreed under 
questioning that it would ‘operate like a carbon tax’ (Peacock, 2011). In the days 
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after the election defeat, Gillard herself admitted the importance of this politically 
when she wrote:
I erred by not contesting the label ‘tax’ for the fixed price period of the 
emissions trading scheme I introduced. I feared the media would end up 
playing constant silly word games with me, trying to get me to say the word 
‘tax’. I wanted to be on the substance of the policy, not playing ‘gotcha’. But 
I made the wrong choice and, politically, it hurt me terribly (Gillard, 2013).
Lakoff (2008, 2010) argues that ‘conservative frames’ have become so reified via 
the discourse of ‘market fundamentalism’ that competing ‘progressive frames’ are 
difficult to contest. Conservative frames tend to conceptualise the ‘environment’ or 
natural world in terms of the ‘market’, an external entity that always operates more 
effectively (according to the conservative worldview) if left to its own devices without 
government interference. Taxes, in the populist sense, are an impost, instruments that 
penalise personal freedoms and stifle entrepreneurial initiative. They are increasingly 
associated with anti-government suspicions, a trend noted by a range of political 
analysts (for example see Burchell & Leigh, 2002; Faulkner, 2005; Goot, 2002; Mair, 
2013). Former ALP leader Mark Latham observes in the introduction to his most 
recent book that: 
Whereas citizens once passively delegated authority to political 
institutions, they now distrust the system’s work and motivations 
(Latham, 2014, p. 13).
In such an environment, factors such as Gillard’s so-called carbon tax ‘lie’, Rudd’s 
perceived reticence to more actively agitate for a solution to the ‘greatest moral 
challenge of a generation’, along with the framing of climate change advocacy as a 
form of ‘secular religion’ (McKewon, 2012) or left wing, anti-capitalist conspiracy 
(e.g. Plimer, 2009), these frames more easily became dominant.
What do the voters of Lindsay think? 
In the case of public support for climate change action in the lead up to the 2013 
election, to what extent did strategists from both sides misread an apparent antipathy 
to the ‘carbon tax’ as framed by Tony Abbott, with a declining public concern about 
climate change impacts more broadly? Were they, as Jonathan Green (2013, p. 141) has 
asserted in relation to dealing with climate change, ‘timid and reactive to opinion’? 
And whose opinions did they consider? A comparison of various polls presents a 
complex picture. For example, in their ‘Climate of the Nation’ report (2013), The 
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Climate Institute noted a change in attitudes since their previous poll in 2012 and 
reported that in 2013 two thirds of Australians were genuinely worried about the cost 
impacts of extreme weather and climate change. They also noted however that while 
climate change was not perceived as a major issue during the election, and that broadly 
the carbon tax policy was not popular, its repeal was not a major reason for voting for 
the Coalition. This conclusion is also supported by two Lowy polls on climate change 
(Lowy Institute, 2013; 2014) which show a gradually rising level of support for the 
question ‘Global warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking 
steps now even if this involves significant costs’. The predicted ‘wreaking ball’ to the 
economy (Griffiths, 2012) which according to Tony Abbott, would wipe the South 
Australian mining town of Whyalla ‘off the map’ (Pedler, 2011), did not eventuate, and 
while the majority of those polled in November 2012 still opposed the carbon tax, they 
agreed that it had made no difference to their lives (Coorey, 2012). 
The context of the polls is important. Pietsch and McAllister (2010) for example, have 
argued that issues such as health and education tend to relegate the environment to a 
‘second order election issue’, a contention borne out by the results of the ABC’s (2013) 
‘Vote Compass’ survey which noted ‘the economy’ as being the most important issue for 
voters. One interpretation is that this result is indicative of the extent to which Labor 
under Rudd had retreated even further from commitment to greenhouse gas abatement 
policies because of the success of the Coalition’s attacks, and because strategists no longer 
believed it was an electorally popular concern. Another is that it is a measure of the 
increasingly symbiotic relationship between political media managers and journalists 
(Louw, 2010; Savage & Tiffen, 2007; Stockwell, 2005; Ward, 1991; 2007), creating a form 
of ‘feedback loop’ that served to reinforce the prevailing views of those wishing to assert 
their power by appearing to control the message. This phenomenon has previously been 
discussed in relationship to both the 2010 coup against Rudd (Hodge & Matthews, 2011) 
and his return to the leadership in June 2013 (Walsh, 2013). 
The extent to which political action in Australia and more broadly is increasingly poll 
driven has been noted in analyses of the so-called ‘malaise’ of Australian politics of 
the past decade (for example Megalogenis, 2010; Mills & Tiffen, 2012; Tanner, 2011; 
Ward, 2007). Kevin Rudd reportedly rarely made an announcement without one eye 
on the media (Button, 2013), and in their forensic analyses of both the 2010 and 2013 
elections, journalists Barrie Cassidy (2010) and Jonathan Green (2013) document the 
extent to which opinion polls in marginal seats were a significant driver in the election 
strategies of both major parties. 
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The complexity of climate change as an issue – and of communicating the nuances of 
alternative policies – is also a problem. An analysis of public opinion data in Australia 
collected in late 2008 about the introduction of an emissions trading scheme (Pietsch 
& McAllister, 2010), notes that climate change, as a specialised scientific and public 
policy issue, is hugely problematic for national governments upon whom the onus for 
significant action falls in the absence or failure of global movements. This is because 
they are they are ‘circumscribed in the action they can take by the views of the public’ 
(p. 218), particularly as significant action requires that individuals and businesses 
change long established patterns of behaviour. Even so, their analysis concluded that 
at this time, ‘while many Australians are willing to pay for environmental protection, 
a large majority remains to be convinced of the merits of an ETS’ (p. 232).
In recent years, opinion polls have become an increasingly prominent part of both 
political strategy and reporting in Australia and elsewhere in recent years. With respect 
to their impact on public opinion more broadly, some argue that their sheer ubiquity 
means that they can ‘manufacture collective sentiment’, allowing them to take on 
a life of their own and ‘dictate public opinion rather than reflect it’ (Holmes, 2013). 
This is particularly the case when party leaders lose favour, as the role of polls in the 
Rudd/Gillard leadership tussle demonstrated (Hodge & Matthews, 2011; Walsh, 2013). 
Further,  blogger and political analyst Peter Brent (2014b) points to the artificial nature 
of poll results taken months or years out from an election posited on the hypothetical 
question ‘if an election were held this weekend …’ arguing that they serve to fill the 
columns of newspapers and news broadcasts rather than having any real statistical 
meaning.
The extent to which they are able to accurately reflect and measure the views of a 
constituent sample, and whether or not ‘public opinion’ in fact can be said to exist as 
a heterogeneous and measurable concept, has been variously debated (Blumer, 1948; 
Bourdieu, 1979). Bourdieu, for example, makes the point that polls are inadequate 
mechanisms because of the simplistic and false assumptions upon which they are based:
It imposes the idea for instance, than in any given assembly of people there 
can be found a public opinion, which would be something like the average 
of all the opinions or the average opinion. The ‘public opinion’ which is 
stated on the front page of the newspapers in terms of percentages (60% of 
the French are in favour of …) is a pure and simple artifact whose function 
is to conceal the fact that the state of opinion at any given moment is a 
system of forces, tensions, and that there is nothing more inadequate than 
a percentage to represent the state of opinion (1979, p. 125).
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In the case of polls on climate change policy in Australia, Peter Brent (2014a) notes 
the susceptibility of the responses by survey respondents to the manner in which 
a question is worded, a conclusion that should caution against giving undue and 
uncritical weight to some surveys:
When opinion pollsters ask Australians if the Labor opposition should 
allow the government to abolish the ‘carbon tax’, they tend to respond in 
the affirmative. After all, it was a high-profile promise taken to last year’s 
election. But when surveyed about their own policy preferences, their 
responses are susceptible to how the question is worded (Brent, 2014a).
Further, a study by Leviston et al. (2013) also concluded that opinions about the 
existence and causes of climate change in Australia were subject to ‘strong false 
consensus effects’ and were particularly influenced by ‘systemic biases in media 
reporting [that] can lead to collective distortions about the popularity of certain 
opinions’ (p. 334). In other words, people tend to overestimate the number of 
people who reject the existence of climate change in the broader community, and 
this in turn can impact on their own espoused views. Add to this a growing sense 
of antipathy towards political parties broadly, and the incumbent government in 
particular, as well as the ‘cognitive impact’ (Lewandowsky, 2011) on opinion by what 
some see as a concerted campaign of misrepresentation of the science in mainstream 
media (Bacon, 2013; Manne, 2012), and the usefulness of polls as the basis of policy, 
is questionable. This is further exacerbated in the media, as Boykoff and Boykoff 
(2004; 2007) have argued, by ‘the norm of balanced reporting’. They conclude that:
… the prestige press’s adherence to balance actually leads to biased 
coverage of both anthropogenic contributions to global warming and 
resultant action (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004, p. 125).
The impact, according to Lewandowsky (2011), is that:
… the Australian media have failed the public by creating a phoney debate 
about climate science that is largely absent from the peer-reviewed 
literature, where real scientific debates take place. 
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Conclusion
A complex range of factors can be seen to have contributed to the ‘greatest moral 
challenge of our generation’ being politically ‘missing in action’ during the 2013 
Australian federal election, despite an apparent growing level of general public concern 
about the need for action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The contradictions 
between these two positions would indicate that the manner in which the political 
debate had been narrowly framed, influenced both the tenor and substance of the news 
reporting, as well as the perceptions of the efficacy of the policy itself. Both Rudd and 
Gillard chose to construct their carbon pricing policy defenses within Abbott’s ‘tax’ 
frame, giving it added power and credence. The role of the framing of media coverage 
of the politics, not to mention the science, of climate change, while not the only factor, 
was very important in influencing the public’s attitudes as measured by the polls and 
focus groups, and by extension the manner in which policies were framed during 2013. 
With increasingly depleted newsroom resources, and a preference for reporting the 
drama of the political contest played out daily in Canberra, the media contributed 
to the narrow frame of the debate. Despite increasing evidence that the prophesied 
impacts of global warming are already being felt, it would seem that both major 
political parties chose the ‘small target’ approach to climate change policy for different 
reasons. The ‘diabolical challenge’ to which Ross Garnaut (AAP, 2008) referred, was 
very much evident in the enactment of this campaign. 
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Abstract
In Australia since 2007, attempts to deal with anthropogenic climate change 
have become highly politicised, politically poisonous and discursively fractious. 
Central to the toxic politics has been a vocal media campaign from so-called 
‘sceptics’ and ‘denialists’ who have largely framed their opposition to carbon 
reduction policies in terms of the scientific basis of climate change in general, 
and the economic implications, in particular. Using the text analytics program 
Leximancer, this paper applies a mixed methods approach of ‘distant’ and more 
traditional ‘close’ reading to examine a large sample corpus of the columns of 
prolific Australian conservative commentator and climate sceptic Andrew Bolt 
for the manner in which he discursively constructs his views on climate change. 
It then discusses the extent to which Bolt’s self-labeled ‘scepticism’ is consistent 
with both the traditional application of scientific scepticism and the broader 
strategies of climate change denialism and its role in legitimizing doubts about 
the both the veracity of climate science and scientific consensus. The Leximancer 
analysis works on a large-scale corpus that demonstrates the manner in which 
Bolt’s arguments are inconsistent with genuine scientific scepticism, but are 
examples of denialism that is largely ideologically driven.
Keywords
Andrew Bolt; climate change; scepticism; denialism; media; Australian politics; 
Leximancer; distant reading 
Introduction
Despite increasingly strident warnings from the scientific community about the 
impending impacts of anthropogenic climate change and almost universal acceptance 
of the role of human activities in these changes (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), 2014; Oreskes, 2004a), development of substantive policy 
to significantly reduce carbon emissions in Australia remains gridlocked. While 
the September 2015 ascendence of climate advocate Malcolm Turnbull to the prime 
ministership offered hope for a change in political attitudes and policy direction, 
to date, powerful voices of denialism continue to hold sway within the Australian 
government. 
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In this context, the dynamics of the debate and the role of media in shaping and 
influencing public and subsequent political attitudes on climate change are significant 
(Boykoff, 2011; Cox, 2010; Hansen, 2010; Lester & Hutchins, 2013; Painter, 2013). 
Boykoff (2011) for example, pointed to the weight given to media coverage by political 
actors that makes the study of media representations important. The pro-active 
role of conservative think tanks in ‘organising denial’ (Oreskes & Conway, 2010; 
McKewon, 2012), the over-representation of climate contrarian views within powerful 
sections of the conservative media (Elsasser & Dunlap, 2013; Jacques, Dunlap, & 
Freeman, 2008; Manne, 2011; McKnight, 2010) and the ‘echo chamber’ effect of this 
confluence of views on public opinion, all impact the extent to which various forms 
of media set the agenda for debate and provide the impetus for policy formation on 
matters previously considered the realm of experts. Sociologists have labeled this the 
‘denial countermovement’ (Dunlap & McCright, 2015), a movement that has arisen 
spontaneously among groups within a society whose hegemonic power (economic, 
political, cultural and professional) is threatened. 
A pervading rhetorical trope of media-based climate change denialism is that of the 
‘climate sceptic’. While the over-representation of these views in Australian media 
has been previously identified and mapped (Bacon, 2013; McKnight, 2010), the specific 
manner in which ‘climate scepticism’ is working discursively within these media texts 
remains unclear. In particular, are the approaches and practices of these self-labeled 
‘sceptics’ consistent with scepticism that is a traditional canon of empirical science? 
Further, to what extent has the authoritative guise of scepticism been appropriated 
as a convenient cloak to hide both the ideological wellspring of climate denialism 
while giving it rhetorical and popular legitimacy? In the unregulated court of public 
opinion where powerful opinion leaders and political and economic interests can use 
their influence to shape public opinion and impact political agendas in ways that serve 
their own interests, the ‘sceptic’ label acquires new meanings, new methods and new 
importance in this debate. 
In order to explore this phenomenon more closely, this paper examines the writings of 
high profile conservative commentator Andrew Bolt as a case study in the construction of 
so-called ‘climate scepticism’ for the extent to which it is consistent with the traditional 
use of the term. The research employs a mixed methods approach that uses the insights 
afforded by the unique Leximancer text analytics software to explore a large dataset of 
Bolt’s writings for patterns and connections that extend analysis beyond the level of the 
more traditional ‘close reading’ approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA). 
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Andrew Bolt: A wolf in ‘sceptic’s’ clothing?
As a case study in media-generated climate scepticism, Andrew Bolt is worthy of 
study for a number of reasons. He is touted as having ‘Australia’s most read political 
blog’ and his regular newspaper column is syndicated in numerous Australian capital 
and regional newspapers. He hosts his own weekly television talk show, ‘The Bolt 
Report’, and has a nightly segment on radio 2GB. He is unapologetically partisan in 
his views and both his columns and his blog regularly lambast and deride the actions 
of ‘the Left’ while sparing any similar level of critique for the conservative side of 
politics. He  makes little effort to adhere to the norms of journalist balance and his 
polemical style, it could be argued, is a characteristic that endears him to his audience. 
In terms of the overall volume of populist ‘debate’ in Australia, Bolt plays a significant 
role as an agent of climate change denialism. Bacon’s (2011) study of Australian media 
coverage of climate change for example, estimated that Bolt accounted for almost 
half of the number of words in articles written on climate change, climate science 
and climate policy in the Murdoch-owned Herald Sun newspaper, 96% of which was 
negatively framed. In terms of his reach and impact, Crikey.com’s 2011 Power Index 
named Bolt as its number 1 ‘megaphone’, stating that:
No other commentator has been as successful at undermining public trust 
in the science of man-made climate change and whipping up opposition to 
a carbon tax (Knott, 2011).
Fig 1: Screen shot from Andrew Bolt’s blog  
http://blogs .news .com .au/heraldsun/andrewbolt/
The vociferousness of Bolt’s campaign against the global warming ‘orthodoxy’ and 
his crusade against the ‘hypocrisy’, ‘folly’ and ‘false prophesies’ of those he derides 
as ‘alarmists’, ‘warmists’ or ‘eco-fundamentalists’, is evidenced by the sheer number 
of daily blog posts and weekly columns dedicated to the topic. His fixation on climate 
change has been described by one commentator as a form of ‘religious fanaticism’ 
(Mayne, 2015). Andrew Bolt does not hold any university degree, let along one in 
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science, yet he constructs the illusion of informed and rational engagement with the 
data by providing detailed explanations, references and graphs and by appropriating 
the language, jargon and authority of science to argue his views. 
Bolt’s writings on climate change are illustrative of the tenor, tactics, rhetorical 
strategies and ideological worldviews of other self-labeled media ‘climate sceptics’ 
(e.g.  Farmer & Cook, 2013; Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 2010) and 
while it is difficult to assess his level of influence more broadly, Bacon (2011, p. 93) 
notes that given his ubiquitous media presence, Bolt likely ‘plays a significant and 
strategic role in the production of climate scepticism in Australia’. To this extent, the 
media have an important role as agents, as well as conveyors, of ideology.
But to what extent are Bolt and fellow anti-climate science commentators, ‘sceptics’ in 
the traditional sense of the term? The Leximancer analysis explores the language with 
which Bolt’s scepticism is constructed and the extent to which it is more politically 
than scientifically framed. It illustrates that Bolt’s rhetorical focus leans more strongly 
on the ideological leanings and political motives of climate change advocates and it 
does so as a vehicle through which to attack the legitimacy of the scientific evidence 
and arguments for urgent carbon abatement policies. His contra ‘evidence’ is sourced 
mostly from other contrarian blog sites as opposed to peer reviewed scientific 
journals and is usually cherry-picked, often misinterpreted and taken out of context. 
As a consequence, he has repeatedly been called out for his misuse of examples and 
quotes cited to support his assertions (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2006, 
2011, 2013). For example, in December 2012, the Australian Press Council upheld 
a complaint about the manner in which Bolt, in a piece titled ‘Time that climate 
alarmists fessed up’ (February 1, 2012), had recycled a story about the UK Met Office 
without bothering to report the Met Office’s response that the data cited in the original 
article was misleading (Australian Press Council, 2012). 
When is a ‘sceptic’ not a ‘sceptic’?
The Skeptics Society (2014) points out that ‘skepticism is a method, not a position’. 
Before describing the specifics of the research, it is useful therefore to overview the 
traditional role and function of ‘scepticism’, described by Bourdieu (1999) as one of 
science’s most sacred ‘methodological canons’ (p. 264). 
In the classical discourse of science, scepticism is a tacit and desirable state of critical 
engagement. Science is advanced and evolved by the questioning of, and challenge 
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to, its epistemology, forms of measurements, interpretations of data and the value 
ascribed to these measurements and interpretations (Herrick & Jamieson, 2001). 
Unlike mathematics, Naomi Oreskes argues (2004b, p. 369), ‘science does not provide 
logically indisputable proofs about the natural world’ but acts like: 
… an ongoing courtroom drama, with a continual stream of evidence 
being presented to the jury. But there is no single suspect and new 
suspects regularly wheeled in. In the light of the growing evidence, the 
jury is constantly updating its view of who is responsible for the data 
(Lewis, 2014).
In other words, research continually evolves, its sources and methods questioned and 
its interpretations contested. Stephen Schneider further notes that: 
In science … [t]here are rarely just two polar-opposite sides, but rather a 
spectrum of potential outcomes, which are often accompanied by a history 
of scientific assessment of the relative credibility of reach possibility 
(2009, p. 203).
The traditional ‘ideal’ view of science, and one through which much of its power and 
idealised authority historically has been generated, is of an activity or endeavour, 
separate from politics, in which knowledge is sought in a systematic and objective 
manner, ultimately for the public good. Science observes, measures and predicts, has 
systematic methods of selecting and testing hypotheses and uses multiple streams of 
enquiry, analysis and interpretation. It evaluates ‘evidence’ based on what is testable, 
measurable, observable and reproducible, and develops explanations based on, and 
often developed from, previous theories or explanations. Its method of enquiry has 
been described as a blend of logic and imagination (Rutherford & Ahlgren, 1991). 
According to one definition: 
Science, in its purest sense, is not a worldview but a method for 
systematically investigating and organising aspects of reality that we 
access through our senses (McFarlane, 2002). 
Like all intellectual endeavours, however, its foci and approaches are multi-faceted. 
As Merton (1973) and other more recent sociologists of science have argued (e.g. 
Kuhn, 2012; Latour, 2009; Woolgar, 1988), science is both a social institution and 
a cultural phenomenon. It is not conducted in a vacuum, and like all producers of 
knowledge, scientists are equally influenced and constrained by the historical context, 
institutional structures, power hierarchies, ideological and cultural norms in which 
they operate. Historically, the practices, debates and controversies of science have 
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occurred largely on the periphery of mainstream public attention and have been 
characterised by a shared discourse and a common understanding of the nuances of 
methods, assumptions and interpretations of scientific research.
In recent decades, however, the emergence of complex new social and scientific 
phenomena (such as anthropogenic climate change) characterised by ‘high levels 
of uncertainty’ and higher levels of risk (Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008), 
have challenged traditional knowledge paradigms and the reputation, efficacy and 
traditional authority of scientific method, its internal mechanisms and raison d’être. 
These pressures have impacted the public understanding of the formalisms of science. 
What Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) have labeled ‘the post-normal age’ of science, has 
increasingly demanded a more ‘democratic’ and ‘transparent’ dialogue and critique of 
the social impacts, directions and ‘value’ of scientific endeavour and research priorities. 
There has also been a call for ‘stakeholders’ and other knowledge holders to participate 
in this discussion and for scientists to play a greater role ‘in the management of these 
crucial uncertainties’ (p. 742). In the case of major public health controversies such as 
smoking and vaccination, the effect has been to shift much scientific conversation into 
the broader public sphere and to shape the expectations of the populace more broadly 
in terms of their engagement in this conversation. 
The challenges posed by an environmental issue such as climate change, and the 
implications for the political and economic status quo of dealing with these, have 
further shifted these norms, leading to a much more overtly politicised public debate. 
The popularly espoused distinction between ‘sound science’ and ‘junk science’ (Baba, 
Cook, McGarity, & Bero, 2005), a dualism that portrays scientific method as both 
singular and universally identifiable, is an example of this shift. This dichotomy 
is not only empirically impossible to support given the sheer diversity of modern 
scientific activity, but one that seriously misrepresents the complexity and nuance 
of the scientific process (Edmond & Mercer, 1998; Herrick & Jamieson, 2001). It also 
disguises the extent to which internal differences and disagreements over methods 
and interpretations are the norm within the scientific community and the extent to 
which debate already exists.
In the public and political ‘debate’ over climate science and climate change policy, 
the traditional understanding of the term ‘sceptic’ also appears to have shifted. In 
our highly mediatised and participatory culture, enabled by new more technically 
sophisticated and democratic media platforms and unencumbered by traditional 
journalistic norms of fact checking and balance, the voices of experts and non-
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experts alike are considered of equal value (Keen, 2007). Anyone with strong views 
or  a political or ideological ‘barrow’ to push is able to publish, and the veracity or 
basis in evidence of these positions is rarely contested in what has been described 
an era of ‘post-truth’ politics and media (Ellerton, 2016; Viner, 2016). In the case of 
climate science, opposition to the publication of contrarian views is often seen as an 
attack by  so-called ‘elites’ (Bolt, 2014; Delingpole, 2014) on the common sense views 
of ordinary people and an attempt to curtail their freedom of speech. 
The specific interest of this paper is how climate scepticism is discursively 
constructed  by those who, like Bolt, wear the label of ‘scepticism’ as a marker of 
their political and popular identity. It argues that the label has been deliberately 
appropriated to legitimise the views of those who contest the validity of empirical 
scientific evidence and its implications for proposed carbon abatement policies while 
ignoring the underlying principles of its praxis and scepticism’s traditional function 
within the epistemology of science. Research needs to track these changes as they are 
occurring via a range of voices across a broader number and dispersed set of texts and 
media platforms. This poses methodological challenges that require extending the 
scope and methods of close analysis that has traditionally been used for this purpose. 
Methodology/Approach
From this perspective, this research has used a mixed methods approach to analyse 
a large sample of Andrew Bolt’s popular and widely read Herald Sun columns that 
specifically focus on climate change. These columns give both prominence and 
authority to Bolt as an anointed conservative political and social commentator. The 
research has used a combination both traditional qualitative ‘close reading’ and what 
literary critic Franco Moretti (2013) has labeled ‘distant reading’. ‘Close reading’ as 
used in literary studies and in CDA more generally, is performed when individual 
texts are closely analysed for their linguistic style, organizational structure, use of 
rhetorical devices and semantic relationships to reflect and draw inferences from the 
significance of their discursive patterns. Conversation analysis or comparison of the 
discursive markers in specific political speeches for their approach to a similar topic is 
an example (e.g. Gurney, 2013). 
One of the criticisms of qualitative methods generally, and CDA specifically however, 
is that the selection by the researcher of what appear to be interesting or pertinent 
examples through which to discern discursive patterns or frames may overstate their 
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incidence and prominence – for example, during the 2013 federal election, while 
Kevin Rudd’s (2007) description of climate change as ‘the great moral challenge of 
a generation’ was frequently cited, it was used mainly as a pejorative in the context 
of the argued negative economic impacts of the Rudd/Gillard government policies 
rather than in relation to the moral or ethical perspective of climate change as a 
pressing policy issue (Gurney, 2014). For this reason Moretti has argued the case for 
‘distant reading’, a quantitative approach that uses some form of computer-aided 
analysis to search, identify, plot and discern patterns in big data sets that can then 
be more closely  analysed for insight they may offer into the discursive structure 
of a particular genre or in this case, a particular author on a singular topic. In this 
project for example, distant reading highlighted both the extent to which scepticism 
in the Bolt corpus was politically rather than scientifically framed and the structural 
manner in which this was working across the corpus. While Bolt’s ideological bias 
is unsurprising, the specific manner in which his scepticism is constructed and the 
identification of underlying assumptions at its core, become much clearer, easier to 
identify and to analyse.
Given the extensive nature of Bolt’s writings on climate change, this study used the 
Australian-designed text analytics program Leximancer 4.0 that is gaining increased 
recognition for its application in both marketing and in academic research (for 
examples, see Cretchley, Gallois, Chenery, & Smith, 2010; Hodge & Matthews, 2011; 
Young, Wilkinson, & Smith, 2015). The Australian designers of the system describe it 
in this way:
The Leximancer system performs a form of automatic content analysis. 
The system goes beyond keyword searching by discovering and extracting 
thesaurus-based concepts from the text data, with no requirement for a 
prior dictionary (Smith & Humphreys, 2006, p. 262). 
In other words, the relationality between themes and concepts is generated by the 
extent of their presence, co-occurrence and relative recurring proximity in the text 
corpus. While the software design is based on content analysis methodology, it does 
more than merely count the frequency of words. The underlying theoretical premise is 
that key concepts and themes are identifiable from the way that words travel together 
both directly and indirectly (Smith & Humphreys, 2006). For example, this analysis 
highlighted the extent to which concepts such as ‘warming’ and ‘scare’ as well as 
others such as ‘facts’ and ‘wrong’ are closely correlated in the corpus.
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Further, because authors make both conscious and unconscious linguistic choices in 
terms of words chosen, the order in which words are used as well the rhetorical and 
metaphorical devices deployed, the ability to map these relationships across a large 
dataset provides the opportunity for both a broader overall perspective as well as 
more accurate and insightful interpretation that may not be possible with selective 
choice of isolated individual sample texts. In support of this, the developers argue that:
The process is deterministic and results in an explicit and reproducible 
coding that reflects the semantics and interrelationships present in the 
text. Use of Leximancer thus overcomes some of the problems qualitative 
researchers face, such as justifying their coding, intercoder reliability, and 
their interpretations (Young et al., 2015, p. 113). 
A unique characteristic of Leximancer compared to other computer-aided software 
such as NVivo, is that the output allows a researcher to literally ‘see’ the conceptual 
connections from the perspective of both broad themes, the concepts with which these 
are composed and their relative proximity and conceptual structure. Interpretations 
can be verified by the functionality that allows you to interrogate the output at the 
level of the generating texts for the context, tone and semantic characteristics. For 
example, interrogating text samples generating concepts such as ‘science’, ‘facts’ and 
‘evidence’ illustrated the extent to which Bolt uses these terms differently depending 
on the rhetorical objective and focus of the specific column. The legitimacy of ‘facts’ 
and ‘evidence’ is dependent on the source and the interpretation and the extent to 
which these support his views. While analysis the output is necessarily qualitative, the 
usefulness of Leximancer’s functionality is that it enables and: 
… highlight[s] a visual approach to analysis which changes the way text is 
used as evidence and forms the basis for decision-making. [Computer-aided 
qualitative discourse analysis software applications] are an invaluable 
tool for semi-automating, flexibly organising and presenting the results of 
open, axial and selective coding of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Moghaddam, 2006) and allied qualitative social research methods (Angus, 
Rintel, & Wiles, 2013, p. 262).
The combination of both close and distant reading methods using Leximancer 
therefore enables qualitative analysis to be generated from a quantitative base, taking 
advantage of the strengths of both approaches. 
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Leximancer mapping of the Herald Sun columns: 
Initial reading
A corpus of Bolt’s columns between the years 2001 and February 2015 was 
downloaded  from the ProQuest ANZ Newsstand database using the search terms 
‘climate’, ‘global  warming’ and ‘scien*’ (kw), ‘Andrew Bolt’ (au) and Herald Sun (pub) 
and returned 617 results. The search specified the Herald Sun publication as these 
columns are syndicated in several other Australian major newspapers owned by 
News  Limited but are often republished with different headlines. The ‘hits’ were 
edited to remove the identifying metadata and then uploaded into Leximancer 4.0 to 
map the conceptual relationships (Leximancer.com., 2014).
In Leximancer, the relative strength of the themes is determined by both the frequency 
of co-occurrences, their hierarchical order of appearance within the text segments 
and their relative proximity (Smith & Humphreys, 2006). The output is visually coded 
as a heat map, the ‘hottest’ or most prominent theme being in red, the ‘coolest’ or least 
strong, being in purple. The theme size can be adjusted from the default of 33% using a 
slider between 0-100%, the effect being to relocate the ‘concepts’ (which remain static) 
within either smaller, more specific themes, or larger, more general ones. This may 
result in some themes disappearing while new ones emerge. The theme and concept 
names are automatically generated and reflect the most frequent and semantically 
connected concepts within the corpus. 
In the Bolt corpus, the most prominent theme was warming. It is important to note 
that Bolt uses the terms ‘global warming’, ‘warming’ and ‘warmists’ differently, the 
latter two expressed as derogatory rather than neutral labels. For this reason, the text-
generated theme name warming rather than global warming is significant as it points 
to the dominant focus of this theme. Other themes in order of strength were year, 
carbon, seas, facts, ABC, green, instead, power, people, Labor, Australia and political. 
Figures 2 and 3 show screenshots of the initial output of the data at the default level of 
33% as both a ‘concept map’ and ‘concept cloud’. 
Within each theme, the most significant concepts can be identified by the size of the 
individual concept nodes. Related concepts appear as nodal clusters and these clusters 
and their relative proximity are important. Additionally, the strongest connections 
between the various concepts are represented by visible links similar to the way in 
which molecules in a chemical compound chain are represented. 
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Fig 2: Initial Leximancer concept map of Bolt column corpus set at theme size 33%
The composition of the clusters themselves and their relative spatial positioning 
indicate the substance of Bolt’s arguments and manner in which they are constructed. 
For example, the ‘warming’/‘global warming’/‘world’/‘cause’ cluster is illustrative of 
his repeated claim that temperature statistics showing the incremental trajectory 
of global temperatures are being misread and that there has been no warming since 
1997 (e.g. ‘How much global warming is just fiddled data?’ 24 June, 2014). He regularly 
takes issue with the interpretation of the so-called ‘hockey stick graph’ (Mann, 
Bradley, & Hughes, 1998) which shows that the trajectory of warming has been higher 
than in any period since the 1400s, this is despite the fact that the robustness of this 
model has been variously verified (e.g. Wahl & Ammann, 2007). 
The second major cluster incorporating the concepts of ‘data’ /‘evidence’ 
/‘climate’/‘temperature’ and so on, is spatially separate and is linked to the first cluster 
via ‘climate’ rather than ‘science’. In other words, this indicates that while the ‘cause’ 
of global warming is a regular theme, it is rarely discussed in the same frame as the 
‘science’. In a similar way, the concept of ‘man’ is both on the periphery of the warming 
theme but is disconnected from both ‘science’ and ‘temperature’. This is indicative of 
the extent to which man’s responsibility for global warming is only remotely discussed 
in connection with either the science or the environmental impact. 
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The alternate ‘concept cloud’ view (Fig 3) allows the relative spatial positioning of the 
concepts and the direct links emanating from the dominant themes to be seen more 
clearly. This is important because in Leximancer, while concepts may be spatially 
close, their strength (or disconnection) in the corpus also needs to be considered. 
From the perspective of the focus of this paper, what is most striking is the manner 
in which the concepts of ‘scare’, ‘tell’, ‘real’ and ‘faith’ in particular, radiate in a direct 
line from the various concepts closely clustered around ‘warming’. Further, the 
‘IPCC’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) concept while directly linked 
to concepts around ‘global warming’, is spatially separate within the theme bubble. 
It has its strongest connection to the ‘warming’ concept cluster rather than to the 
‘data’/‘evidence’ cluster. As noted earlier, Bolt uses the term ‘warming’ as a derogatory 
label. Text samples generating this concept indicate that the IPCC is repeatedly 
constructed as a political instrument rather than as a scientific body responsible for 
collating evidence in order to communicate about climate change. Bolt repeatedly 
accuses the IPCC of being involved in a conspiracy evidenced by ‘Climategate’ to fake 
scientific evidence for political purposes (e.g. ‘Climategate’s most damning emails’ 
25  November, 2009). While this is not unexpected, it is illustrative of a consistent 
theme of the columns over the period of the data and the manner in which his ‘crusade’ 
against the ‘warmists’ is regularly rhetorically constructed.
Fig 3: Initial Leximancer ‘concept cloud’ of Bolt column corpus set at theme size 33%
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Another of the initially dominant themes is carbon incorporating the concepts of 
‘carbon’, ‘emissions’, ‘carbon tax’, ‘tax’ and ‘debate’. Again, while this is unsurprising 
given that climate change is being driven by excessive carbon emissions, when you 
inspect the sample text, the ‘debate’ in question relates to whether the science is 
‘settled’ and the focus is predominantly on both Kevin Rudd’s proposed emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) in 2009 and Gillard government’s so-called ‘carbon tax’ 
introduced in 2011. Importantly, the Liberal Party’s alternative ‘Direct Action’ policy 
is not present within the map, its absence evidence of the Bolt’s one-sided focus. 
A manual search of the corpus for discussion of ‘Direct Action’ found only one mention 
of the Abbott government policy over the period of the columns with Bolt describing 
it as merely as ‘pointless as Labor’s’ (‘Abbott’s climate plan as bad as Labor’s’, 24 Oct, 
2013), arguing that it too would merely impose economic costs but make no material 
impact on the world’s emissions. In each case, the ‘debate’ is framed in a simplistic, 
highly political and binary manner: ‘warmists’ versus ‘sceptics’, left versus right, elites 
versus the average man in the street, free speech versus ‘orthodoxy’. This is evidenced 
in the concept map by the proximity of the carbon theme to the political theme, which 
if you shift the theme size marginally to 40%, disappears and is subsumed into an 
enlarged carbon theme. Again, Bolt’s so-called ‘sceptical’ stance is more strongly 
politically than scientifically framed. 
When is a ‘fact’ a fact?
The theme of ‘facts’ as it relates to Bolt’s ‘scepticism’ is highly pertinent although 
somewhat weaker within the initial concept map. The ‘concept cloud’ view shows 
that while there is a direct link between the concepts of ‘facts’ and ‘warming’, ‘facts’ 
is closer thematically to ‘Flannery’ (former Climate Commissioner Tim Flannery), 
‘Age’ (the rival Fairfax newspaper), ‘claimed’ and ‘wrong’. What constitutes a ‘fact’ 
in climate science is important in Bolt’s discursive construction of ‘scepticism’, and 
the ‘facts’ around carbon emissions and their impacts are those that he most hotly 
contests. A fact is both positively and negatively framed, its legitimacy relative to the 
political or ideological leaning of the agent espousing the claim. In the related text, 
Bolt, for example, demands of Tim Flannery: 
I mean, shouldn’t a scientist be in the facts business?  
(‘Tim’s Science Fiction’ 14 October, 2005).6
6 Text samples from the Bolt columns and blog cite the title and publication date. All can be 
found at http://blogs.news.com.au/heraldsun/andrewbolt/
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The implication is that ‘facts’ or ‘evidence’ speaks for itself and that as a scientist, 
opinion or interpretation is inconsistent with scientific method. Similarly, in one of his 
numerous critiques of Al Gore and of ‘Climategate’ and the IPCC, Bolt argues in an 
ironic tone: 
Yes, you trust Gore, this Nobel Prize laureate and Oscar winner when 
he tells you that the leaked emails from the University of East Anglia’s 
Climatic Research Unit don’t in fact show that the world’s most influential 
climate scientists used ‘tricks’ to ‘hide the decline’ in temperatures. 
You trust him when he also denies that they show this powerful clique 
of scientists destroying inconvenient data, committing fraud, censoring 
sceptical scientists and privately admitting to doubts about the warming 
theory they publically scream is settled (‘In Gore’s opinion, Climategate 
was only an inconvenient hiccup, 11 December, 2009).
The ‘facts’, as advanced by the ‘warmists’, are usually posited as either deliberate lies 
cooked up to scare the general public for a range of nefarious political, ideological or 
unethical scientific purposes, or are either misinterpretations or gross exaggerations 
that are easily countered by either the common sense view (it’s snowing so where’s the 
warming?) or by Bolt’s countervailing ‘facts’. His ‘scepticism’ is most often predicated 
on the political motives of scientists as opposed to any particular scientifically argued 
critique of methods or interpretations of evidence. His alternate ‘evidence’ most often 
revolves around the oft-repeated examples of ‘dud predictions’, an argument that 
simplistically ignores both the difference between climate and weather as well as the 
complexity of the Earth’s climate system. While casting derision on Gore’s, Flannery’s 
and the IPCC’s ‘facts’, Bolt is happy to uncritically promote the interpretations 
provided by those scientists, politicians or commentators with whom he agrees, 
regardless of their expertise.
As discussed, moving the ‘visible concepts’ slider from zero to 100% provides a slightly 
different perspective from the original output map. Initially, the strongest concepts 
already noted appear in order of their strength within the corpus overall. However, at 
14% the ‘facts’ concept (located within the facts theme) appears and at 16%, ‘carbon’ 
and ‘emissions’ (located within the carbon theme) appear before any of the remaining 
concepts in the stronger warming theme. This indicates that while these latter 
concepts are more strongly bonded to the localised concepts in their themes (rather 
like a magnetic field via their semantic relationships), they are stronger in terms of 
their presence in the corpus overall than some others in the stronger themes. In other 
words, ‘facts’ as a concept is more significant than it initially appears. Interestingly, 
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it  is located a long way from ‘evidence’ and from ‘sceptics’ indicating that Bolt 
constructs these separately.
As you enlarge or reduce the theme size from the default 33%, the initial view of the 
relationship between the concepts and themes will alter, with some disappearing and 
new ones emerging. The concepts remain static but may be subsumed into the new 
larger or smaller themes. This is also a useful perspective. For example, when the 
theme size is enlarged to 60% (see Fig 4), the themes of warming and facts have a more 
significant overlap by encompassing concepts such as ‘scare’, ‘latest’, ‘real’, ‘told’ and 
‘claims’. Additionally, the seas theme disappears and concepts including ‘ice’ and ‘seas’ 
and ‘ABC’ (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) become part of the facts theme. Bolt 
regularly contests the evidence of the melting of polar ice and of sea level rise and 
these are constructed as contestable ‘facts’, ‘scares’ and ‘claims’. The ABC is regularly 
derided by Bolt for its ‘leftist bias’ and in particular its failure to give equal time to 
‘sceptics’ in its reporting, a claim not supported by regular audits of ABC content 
(Bodey, 2014). Bolt’s position here is also illustrative of Boykoff and Boykoff’s (2004, 
p. 125) contention that the norm of ‘journalistic balance’ in media reporting has meant 
equal weight is being given to unequal actors in the climate change debate leading to 
‘a significant divergence of popular discourse from scientific discourse’.
Fig 4: Bolt concept map at 60% theme size
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Finally, being able to map such a sizable sample of texts in ‘distant reading’, allows 
you to note what is absent as much as what is present. In this corpus, a notable 
absence is a concept of ‘environment’. A manual search indicated minimal use of 
the word although its derivatives such as ‘environmentalists’ and ‘environmental’ 
were occasionally present, usually negatively framed (e.g. ‘Green mania to cripple us’ 
15 October, 2010). While ‘planet’ and ‘save’ are present, they are closely situated to 
other concepts connoting doubt such as ‘least’, ‘week’, ‘sure’ and ‘told’. This speaks to 
the strength of Bolt’s political and ideological framing as well as to the absence of a 
broader, more nuanced argument for ‘saving the planet’. His focus is on the supposed 
‘inconsistencies’ in scientific evidence, economic ‘vandalism’ and ‘unnecessary’ 
inconveniences of carbon abatement policies. A notable long running rejoinder of the 
blog posts, for example, is ‘Save the planet: …’, a headline always accompanied by an 
ironic subtitle:
Save the planet! Exterminate the camels (11 June, 2011).
Save the planet! Check termite farts (26 May, 2009).
Save the planet! Pass on your vibrator to a stranger (12 February, 2010).
The tone, much like the labels of ‘warmists’ and ‘eco-fundamentalists’, acts like a form 
of ironic in-joke to knowing readers laughing at the absurd preoccupations of these out 
of touch and self serving ‘elites’. 
Examining the Bolt columns through the ‘sentiment lens’
The ‘sentiment lens’ function of Leximancer measures the relative strength of positive 
(favorable) and negative (unfavorable) sentiment related to concepts and words within 
a data set as measured by a z-score. Table 1 gives a snapshot of the comparative 
sentiment of some important concepts in question with samples of the keywords with 
which they are most frequently related. The count is the raw number of times that 
concepts and words co-occur in the corpus. The related terms indicate the extent of 
their co-occurrence in order of strength with other concepts. It is also possible to drill 
down into the corpus to examine the text generating the output in order to interrogate 
and verify the context of these relationships. While the results of this function should 
be read as more representational than exact, they offer a useful perspective as they 
illustrate the comparative relative sentiment leaning of concepts within their semantic 
context and confirm what may otherwise be intuitions, particularly in a large data set. 
In the case of the Bolt corpus, the sentiment leanings of a number of key concepts, 
shifts according to the manner in which they are rhetorically deployed.
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THEME CONCEPT
SENTIMENT % COUNT (n) RELATED TERMS IN 
DESCENDING ORDER OF 
% CO-OCCURENCEUNFAV FAV UNFAV FAV
warming
warming 27% 22% 169 81
global, cause, faith, IPCC, 
scare, scientists, gases, 
temperature, evidence, 
planet, century, world, data
climate 
change 8% 4% 48 14
change, climate, head, 
scientists, science, sceptics, 
claim
science 3% 3% 20 11
political, evidence, climate, 
rise, climate change, claims, 
change, ABC, IPCC
scientists 8% 5% 48 17
data, including, IPCC, 
climate, sceptics, climate 
change, evidence, man, 
change, 
temperature 3% 3% 16 11
rise, data, century, past, 
IPCC, world, tax, carbon tax, 
emissions
world 11% 9% 71 34
gases, temperature, data, 
emissions, scientists, man, 
century, past, climate, IPCC, 
Australia, 
evidence 2% 2% 13 7
cause, study, claim, claims, 
science, political, scientists, 
man, claimed, month
year
told 4% 3% 23 11
scare, seems, man, report, 
cause, wind, million, Age, 
Government, 
planet 5% 3% 19 1
save, century, man, used, 
data, wind, emissions, use, 
green, claimed
faith 2% 2% 16 13
Abbott, reason, sceptics, 
warming, latest, global 
warming, green, global, 
science, evidence, carbon 
tax, real
scare 4% 3% 15 18
latest, told, IPCC, report, 
global, warming, global 
warming, green, wrong, 
claims, Rudd, Flannery
Table 1: Output of sentiment leanings of key concepts and related words
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As shown in Table 1, while there is a significant difference in the measured sentiment 
leanings of some concepts that speaks for itself (e.g. ‘climate change’, ‘warming’, 
‘scientists’), others are less obvious. In the thematic table snapshot (Fig 5) that more 
specifically lists the relative level of the sentiment for various concepts, ‘warming’ for 
example, is shown to occur 100% of the time with ‘global warming’, meaning that these 
two concepts always travel together. As noted earlier, Bolt uses the terms differently, 
‘warming’ as an ironic rhetorical label to convey shared derision with his knowing 
readers. Additionally, ‘warming’ occurs 57% of the time with ‘faith’ and 52% of the 
time with ‘scare’. ‘Science’ is more strongly negatively related to ‘political’, ‘evidence’, 
‘climate’ and ‘rise’ and so on. 
Fig 5: Screenshot of Sentiment lens thematic table
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In the context of how scepticism and science are framed, one of the dominant 
pejoratives cast at the ‘warmists’, is that they are espousing a ‘faith’. This is a recurring 
motif and one that I will discuss further as it relates to the discursive construction of 
‘facts’ and ‘science’. In the link between ‘Abbott’ and ‘faith’ for example, Bolt uses the 
term ‘faith’ favourably when discussing the personal virtue inherent in Tony Abbott’s 
beliefs, or to chastise opponents who have derided him for his overt Christianity 
(his nickname being ‘the mad monk’). 
This laugh-at-the-Jesus-freak party then raged on over at the websites of 
The Age and SMH, where covens of warming bigots howled at Abbott’s 
claim, convinced by their deepest prejudices that he must be wrong. … 
And why did hundreds of Age and SMH readers, on hearing the truth from 
Abbott, scream that he was blinded by his mad faith? Bigotry is on the 
hoof, I’m afraid, whipped on by a new faith more hostile to truth than is 
Abbott or any other good Christian (‘Warmists toast Abbott on the fires of 
their bigotry’, 12 May, 2010). [emphasis added]
In contrast, ‘faith’ is used pejoratively in the context of what Bolt argues is the 
‘orthodoxy’ of those who accept the science of global warming, the need to implement 
carbon reduction measures, or any need to ‘save the planet’. Abbott’s religious faith 
is cited as evidence of his ‘grounded’ conservative perspectives, in comparison with 
those of the ‘covens of warming bigots’ espousing the ‘warmist faith’ framed in one 
sense as just another fashionable hobbyhorse, and in another as a dangerous ideology 
with totalitarian aspirations. In a blog post that generated a record 311 comments, Bolt 
cites former Catholic Archbishop of Sydney, Cardinal George Pell, on the science of 
global warming. Here, religious faith is a virtue, but ‘faith’ in the authority of climate 
science is a sin, unless it supports the sceptical position. 
Cardinal George Pell can recognise a religious movement when he sees one, 
and being a rationalist can also see where the global warming faith is weak: 
‘The complacent appeal to scientific consensus is simply one more appeal 
to authority, quite inappropriate in science or philosophy.’ (‘Cardinal spots 
the green sins against reason’, 27 Oct 2011).
In the Bolt narrative, ‘sceptics’ are often framed as persecuted dissidents, as martyrs 
to science and reason and akin to Galileo for daring to question the prevailing 
orthodoxy – a curious analogy since Galileo’s views ultimately triumphed because they 
were supported by observation rather than blind belief. Those who question ‘sceptics’ 
are variously described as part of a ‘cargo cult’ and with a ‘green totalitarian itch’, 
guilty of ‘groupthink’ and seeking to unilaterally impose their ‘eco-fundamentalist’, 
‘anti-humanist’ views to restrict personal freedoms – whether these be to drive cars, 
149
to eat meat, to exploit resources or to pursue individual economic advancement. 
The repeated use of religious metaphors is an interesting inversion of the framing 
of science and religion: science is accused of imposing penances for traducing its 
orthodoxies. Those who argue that the science of global warming is settled are ‘bigots’. 
Environmentalism is anti-humanist as it threatens to restrict personal freedoms. 
This argument is further extended to conflate attempts to dismiss the alternate 
view in the light of overwhelming scientific evidence as an attempt to limit of freedom 
of speech, thought and action. Again, this is framed as an ideological position in 
Bolt’s writing.
YET I think we have here an insight into a key failing of so many grand 
schemes of the Left to improve resistant humans or build for them 
someone else’s idea of the perfect society. … What a buzz for the closet 
totalitarian then, to bully other people ‘for their own good’ in this case, to 
‘save the planet’ (‘Norfolk Island green ration is ludicrous’, 3 Nov, 2010).
Like ‘faith’, ‘science’ is treated both favorably and unfavorably depending on the agent 
arguing for its authority to be respected. When citing examples of contrary ‘evidence’, 
usually conveniently cherry-picked and often sourced from other sceptical websites as 
opposed to peer-reviewed journals, science is framed as reliable and evidence-based. 
However, when climate scientists, politicians or journalists promote the cited 97% 
consensus view, science is accused of having been corrupted, its traditional raison 
d’être ‘slimed’. 
But in science, how can anyone be neutral about truth? If 
Peacock concludes GM crops are safe, those who disagree shouldn’t 
say he’s biased, but prove him wrong. Except he’s not, is he? How many 
scientific debates are corrupted like this? Well, the one on man-made global 
warming for a start. Science must be saved from brawls in which dissenters 
are damned, not disproved. We must say no to the green slime (‘No rhyme 
to this kind of slime’, 17 Mar, 2006).
‘Proof’, ‘facts’, ‘evidence’ and ‘faith’ are malleable concepts depending on your 
ideological worldview, science is a matter of right or wrong and uncertainty or 
disagreement among scientists is proof of their fallibility and justification for inaction. 
All views, from experts and non-experts alike, are of equal value and deserve the same 
level of respect without regard to the authority of the sources or the validity of the 
scientific evidence upon which the opinions are based. His favoured ‘experts’ are either 
not scientifically qualified (Christopher Monckton is a journalist and conservative 
politician), do not have specific expertise in climate science (Ian Plimer is a geologist), 
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or are aligned with conservative think tanks because of a professional and ideological 
agenda (see discussion of Bolt favourite Richard Lindzen by Lahsen, 2013). In terms 
of Bolt’s arguments for the ‘authority’ of the views he espouses, expertise in climate 
science should be challenged because:
Climate science … is the science where one plus one can equal three one 
day and six the next – yet never may the layman question the expert … 
This must change, and I believe finally is. The tyranny of the experts is 
now crumbling. The common sense view of the layman is at last being 
restored (Bolt, 2014, p. 274).
Conclusion
The Leximancer analysis of Bolt’s columns illustrates how he uses science and the 
label of ‘sceptic’ as a rhetorical vehicle through which to give authority to his views but 
in ways that are inconsistent with the genuine notion of scientific scepticism. As the 
sentiment lens illustrates, science and scientists are lauded and defiled according to 
their position on climate change as opposed to the strength and rigor of the evidence 
upon which their claims are based. Bolt argues that he is not a ‘denier’ (a label he finds 
offensive as it connotes ‘holocaust deniers’), but when he does reflect on his scepticism, 
the conflation of arguments is indicative of the ideological wellspring of his position – 
one to which he appears deliberately blind, although he happily highlights the impact 
of others’ ideological leanings.
Few sceptics doubt the planet has warmed over the past century,  a century 
in which we’ve actually grown richer and healthier. The argument is 
whether man’s emissions are mostly to blame, whether the warming is 
dangerous and whether the pain of ’stopping’ it is worth the gain (‘If this is 
the best argument for the tax, we’re in strife’, 9 November, 2011). 
Like Tony Abbott who stated that his government would not put the ‘environment 
ahead of the economy’ (AAP, 2015), these are positioned as separate and competing 
arenas, an argument inconsistent with the views of a large number of high profile 
economists including the former head of the Australian Treasury, Dr. Martin 
Parkinson, former head of the Reserve Bank, Bernie Fraser, and most notably the 
UK’s Lord Nicholas Stern and Australia’s Professor Ross Garnaut.
Science has a responsibility to be neutral, objective and non-political and judged 
according to the authority of those agents making the claims and the established rules 
of evaluation such as peer review. Yet according to Bolt and other media sceptics, 
151
all claims, all evidence regardless of its source, methods by which these views are 
obtained or expertise of the agents, should be considered of equal or zero value – one 
of the Leximancer analyses most important features is the ability to generate data 
that exposes the relationality and hence values of politically-based rhetorical calls for 
neutrality and balance. Science is called upon to be rational, neutral and evidence-
based, but no such responsibility is required of those media personalities who opinions 
must also be heeded. 
With regard to his position on climate change Bolt has said:
I know that there is a debate about [humans causing the warming of 
the planet] – that’s all I am prepared to say. I’m not a scientist but when 
someone tells me that all the scientists agree, I say no they don’t. They 
all agree that there’s a tendency for human emissions to heat the planet, 
but whether that’s responsible for all the heating is an open question 
(Hutcheon, 2014).
While he positions himself as ‘an Australian who respects reason and evidence’ 
(‘Join  our global conspiracy, 13 November, 2009), his scepticism is constructed using 
two competing and contradictory discourses – democratic rights to freedom of speech 
versus the authority of expert scientists and the impunity of scientific method and 
rules of evidence. In addition, the labeling of the consensus of climate science as a 
religious ‘faith’ is used rhetorically to diminish its authority as illustrated by the 
sentiment lens analysis, an ironic position from someone for whom the convictions of 
Christian faith are purportedly important. Religious faith and ‘faith’ in peer reviewed 
scientific evidence are not being judged according to the same rules or logic. 
While beyond the scope of this discussion, various studies have investigated the 
role of psychology and ideology in climate change denialism (e.g. Bliuc et al., 2015; 
Leiserowitz et al., 2010; Rossen, Dunlop, & Lawrence, 2015). In the case of climate 
science for example, Jacques (2006, p. 78) describes environmental scepticism as 
‘a project that is skeptical of mainstream environmental claims and values but very 
faithful (i.e. not skeptical) to contemporary conservative values and issues’, including 
unquestioned faith in the efficacy of free markets and the inviolability of unfettered 
economic growth. Environmental protection and human progress are framed as 
antithetical goals. The role of ideology in shaping these views is not acknowledged. 
The various tactics summarised by Farmer and Cook (2013) serve to both muddy the 
waters of media-led debate and to create doubt about the level of consensus that exists, 
a factor identified as pivotal in broad public acceptance of the science and the policy 
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implications (Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2011; van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015).
Finally, many media-based ‘sceptics’ assert that opinion and evidence in the case of 
climate science are of equal value, and opposition to publication of contrary views 
contravenes free speech. Stokes (2012) notes that this argument confuses the right to 
hold and express personal opinions with the claim that all alternative views are equally 
valid, regardless of the evidence. ‘Sceptics’ like Bolt ignore the fact that expert debate 
does occur within science and that the oft-cited consensus position on anthropogenic 
climate change has been repeatedly verified (Cook et al., 2013; Oreskes, 2007). The 
implications of climate science are unpalatable, it has been argued (Hamilton, 2010; 
Manne, 2012; Rossen et al., 2015), because they challenge fundamental premises upon 
which neoliberal capitalism is based: an unrestrained free market and the right to 
mastery over nature for the sole benefit and advantage of humans. Much of the attack 
on the credibility of climate scientists, their public and political supporters, and of 
policies which seek to address one of the most significant challenges of the human 
era, is an objection to the economic and political implications rather a systematic 
evaluation of the methods or critical analysis of the interpretation of the scientific 
studies in question. 
References
AAP. (2015, 11 August). Tony Abbott: government will not ‘put the environment ahead 
of the economy’ The Guardian Australia. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.
com/australia-news/video/2015/aug/11/emissions-reduction-environment-
economy-tony-abbott-video
Angus, D., Rintel, S., & Wiles, J. (2013). Making sense of big text: a visual-first approach 
for analysing text data using Leximancer and Discursis. International Journal of 
Social Research Methodology, 16(3), 261-267. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation. (2006, 30 October). Bolt’s minority view. 
Media Watch, Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/
s1777013.htm
Australian Broadcasting Corporation. (2011, 4 April). It’s elementary, my dear Bolt. 
Media Watch, Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/
s3181944.htm
Australian Broadcasting Corporation. (2013, 24 June). Hot air stoking the climate 
change ‘debate’. Media Watch, Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/
mediawatch/transcripts/s3788649.htm
153
Australian Press Council. (2012). Adjudication No. 1558: Ellett and others/Herald 
Sun (December 2012). http://www.presscouncil.org.au/document-search/adj-
1558/?LocatorGroupID=662&LocatorFormID=677&FromSearch=1
Baba, A., Cook, D. M., McGarity, T. O., & Bero, L. (2005). Legislating ‘sound science’: 
The role of the tobacco industry. American Journal of Public Health, 95(S1), 
S20-S27. 
Bacon, W. (2011). Sceptical Climate Part 1: Media coverage of climate change 
in Australia 2011. Available from http://imlweb04.itd.uts.edu.au/acij-ds/
investigations/detail.cfm?ItemId=29219
Bacon, W. (2013). Sceptical Climate Part 2: Climate science in Australian newspapers. 
Available from http://investigate.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Sceptical-
Climate-Part-2-Climate-Science-in-Australian-Newspapers.pdf
Bliuc, A-M., McGarty, C., Thomas, E. F., Lala, G., Berndsen, M., & Misajon, R. (2015). 
Public division about climate change rooted in conflicting socio-political 
identities. Nature Climate Change, 5(3), 226–229. doi: 10.1038/nclimate2507
Bodey, M. (2014, 12 March). Audits exonerate ABC over bias claims, The Australian. 
Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/audits-
exonerate-abc-over-bias-claims/story-e6frg996-1226852398864
Bolt, A. (2014). False prophets unveiled. In A. Moran (Ed.), Climate change: The facts 
2014 (pp. 274-285). Melbourne, Vic: Institute of Public Affairs.
Bourdieu, P. (1999). The specificity of the scientific field. In M. Biagioli (Ed.), 
The Science Studies Reader (pp. 31-50). New York: Routledge.
Boykoff, M. T. (2011). Who speaks for the climate? Making sense of media reporting on 
climate change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boykoff, M. T. (2013). Public enemy no. 1? Understanding media representations of 
outlier views on climate change. American Behavioral Scientist, 57(6), 796-817. 
Boykoff, M. T., & Boykoff, J. M. (2004). Balance as bias: global warming and the US 
prestige press. Global Environmental Change, 14(2), 125-136. 
Cook, J., Nuccitelli, D., Green, S., Richardson, M., Winkler, B., Painting, R., Way, R., 
Jacobs, P, & Skuce, A. (2013). Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic global 
warming in the scientific literature. Environmental Research Letters, 8(2), 1-8. 
Cox, R. (2010). Environmental Communication and the public sphere (2nd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Cretchley, J., Gallois, C., Chenery, H., & Smith, A. E. (2010). Conversations between 
carers and people with schizophrenia: a qualitative analysis using Leximancer. 
Qualitative Health Research, 20(12), 1611-1628. doi: 10.1177/1049732310378297
Delingpole, J. (2014). Experts as ideologues. In A. Moran (Ed.), Climate change: 
The facts 2014 (pp. 134-145). Melbourne, Vic.: Institute of Public Affairs.
154
Ding, D., Maibach, E., Zhao, X., Roser-Renouf, C., & Leiserowitz, A. (2011). Support 
for climate policy and societal action are linked to perceptions about scientific 
agreement. Nature Climate Change, 1 (December 2011), 462-466. doi: 10.1038/
NCLIMATE1295
Dunlap, R. E., & McCright, A. M. (2015). Challenging climate change: The denial 
countermovement. In R. E. Dulap & R. J. Brulle (Eds.), Climate change and society: 
Sociological perspectives (pp. 300-332). New York: Oxford University Press.
Edmond, G., & Mercer, D. (1998). Trashing ‘junk science’. Stanford Technology Law 
Review, 1998(3). 
Ellerton, P. (2016, 9 October). Post-truth politics and the US election: why the narrative 
trumps the facts. The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.
com/post-truth-politics-and-the-us-election-why-the-narrative-trumps-the-
facts-66480
Elsasser, S., & Dunlap, R. E. (2013). Leading voices in the denier choir: Conservative 
columnists’ dismissal of global warming and denigration of climate science. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 57, 754-776. 
Farmer, G., & Cook, J. (2013). Understanding climate change denial Climate Change 
Science: A Modern Synthesis (Vol. 1 – The Physical Climate, pp. 445-466). 
New York: Springer.
Funtowicz, S. O., & Ravetz, J. R. (1993). Science for a post-normal age. Futures, 
25(September), 739-755. 
Gurney, M. (2013). Whither ‘the moral imperative’? The focus and framing of political 
rhetoric in the climate change debate in Australia. In L. Lester & B. Hutchins 
(Eds.), Environmental conflict and the media (pp. 187-200). New York: Peter Lang.
Gurney, M. (2014). Missing in action? The ‘non’-climate change debate of the 2013 
Australian federal election. Global Media Journal-Australian Edition, 8(2). 
Available from http://www.hca.uws.edu.au/gmjau/?p=1194
Hamilton, C. (2010). Requiem for a species: Why we resist the truth about climate change. 
Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Hansen, A. (2010). Environment, media and communication. New York: Routledge.
Herrick, C. N., & Jamieson, D. (2001). Junk science and environmental policy: 
obscuring public debate with misleading discourse. Philosophy and Public Policy 
Quarterly, 21(2/3), 11-16. 
Hodge, B., & Matthews, I. (2011). New media for old bottles: Linear thinking and the 
2010 Australian election. Communication, Politics & Culture, 44(2), 95-111. 
Hutcheon, J. (2014, 21 February). One plus one: Andrew Bolt. ABC News Retrieved from 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-21/one-plus-one-andrew-bolt/5282174
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2014). Climate Change 2014 
Synthesis Report. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_
SPM.pdf
155
Jacques, P. J. (2006). The rearguard of modernity: Environmental skepticism as a 
struggle of citizenship. Global Environmental Politics, 6(1), 76-101. 
Jacques, P. J., Dunlap, R. E., & Freeman, M. (2008). The organisation of denial: 
Conservative think tanks and environmental scepticism. Environmental Politics, 
17(3), 349-385. 
Keen, A. (2007). The cult of the amateur: How blogs, MySpace, YouTube, and the rest 
of today’s user-generated media are destroying our economy, our culture, and our 
values. New York: Doubleday.
Knott, M. (2011, 20 July). Megaphones no 1: Andrew Bolt. Crikey.com, Retrieved from 
http://www.thepowerindex.com.au/megaphones/andrew-bolt
Kuhn, T. S. (2012). The structure of scientific revolutions (4th ed.).  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Lahsen, M. (2013). Anatomy of dissent: A cultural analysis of climate skepticism. 
American Behavioral Scientist,, 57(6), 732-753. 
Latour, B. (2009). Politics of nature: How to bring the sciences into democracy. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., & Smith, N. (2010).  
Global Warming’s Six Americas. Yale Project on Climate Change.  
http://www.climatechangecommunication.org/images/files/intro_to_6_ams.pdf
Lester, L., & Hutchins, B. (Eds.). (2013). Environmental conflict and the media.  
New York: Peter Lang.
Lewis, G. (2014, 24 September). Where’s the proof in science? There is none. 
The Conversation. Retrieved from http://theconversation.com/wheres-the-proof-
in-science-there-is-none-30570
Leximancer.com. (2014). Available from http://info.leximancer.com
Mann, M., Bradley, R., & Hughes, M. (1998). Global-scale temperature patterns and 
climate forcing over the past six centuries. Nature, 392(6678), 779-787. 
Manne, R. (2012). A dark victory: How vested interests defeated climate science. 
The Monthly, (August 2012), 22-29. http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2012/
august/1344299325/robert-manne/dark-victory
Manne, R. (2011). Bad News: Murdoch’s Australian and the shaping of the nation. 
Quarterly Essay, 43, 1-119. 
Mayne, S. (2015, 20 February). Herald Sun climate travel hypocrisy exposed.  
Crikey.com, Retrieved from http://www.crikey.com.au/2015/02/20/mayne-
herald-sun-climate-travel-hypocrisy-exposed/
McFarlane, T. (2002). Questioning the scientific worldview.  
http://www.integralscience.org/questioning.html
McKewon, E. (2012). Talking points ammo: The use of neoliberal think tank fantasy 
themes to delegitimise scientific knowledge of climate change in Australian 
newspapers. Journalism Studies, 13(2), 277-297.
156
McKnight, D. (2010). A change in the climate? The journalism of opinion at News 
Corporation. Journalism, 11(6), 693-706. 
Merton, R. K. (1973). The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Moretti, F. (2013). Distant reading. London: Verso Books.
Oreskes, N. (2004a). Beyond the ivory tower: The scientific consensus on climate 
change. Science, 306(5702), 1686. 
Oreskes, N. (2004b). Science and public policy: What’s proof got to do with it? 
Environmental Science & Policy, 7(5), 369-383. 
Oreskes, N. (2007). The scientific consensus on climate change: How do we know 
we’re not wrong? In J. DiMento & P. Doughman (Eds.), Climate change: 
What it means for us, your children, and our grandchildren (pp. 65-100). 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Oreskes, N., & Conway, E.M. (2010). Merchants of doubt: How a handful of 
scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming. 
London: Bloomsbury.
Painter, J. (2013). Climate Change in the Media: Reporting risk and uncertainty. 
London: IB Tauris.
Rossen, I., Dunlop, P., & Lawrence, C. (2015). The desire to maintain the social order 
and the right to economic freedom: Two distinct moral pathways to climate 
change scepticism. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 42, 42-47. 
Rudd, K. (2007). Climate Change: Forging a new consensus. Paper presented at the 
National Climate Change Summit Parliament House Canberra. http://parlinfo.
aph.gov.au:80/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/H4OM6/upload_binary/
h4om62.pdf
Rutherford, F. J., & Ahlgren, A. (1991). The Nature of Science Science for All Americans 
Online. USA: Oxford University Press.
Schneider, S. H. (2009). Science as a contact sport: Inside the battle to save Earth’s 
climate. Washington DC: National Geographic Books.
Smith, A. E., & Humphreys, M. S. (2006). Evaluation of unsupervised semantic 
mapping of natural language with Leximancer concept mapping. Behavior 
Research Methods, 38(2), 262-279. 
Stokes, P. (2012, 5 October). No, you’re not entitled to your opinion. The Conversation, 
Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/no-youre-not-entitled-to-your-
opinion-9978
Talberg, A., Hui, S., & Loynes, K. (2013). Australian climate change policy: a chronology. 
Department of Parliamentary Services: Retrieved from http://parlinfo.aph.gov.
au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/2875065/upload_binary/2875065.pdf.
The Skeptics Society. (2014). A Brief Introduction. Available from http://www.skeptic.
com/about_us/
157
van der Linden, S. L., Leiserowitz, A., Feinberg, G., & Maibach, E. (2015). The scientific 
consensus on climate change as a gateway belief: Experimental evidence. PLoS 
ONE, 10(2), 1-8. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0118489
Viner, K. (2016, 12 July). How technology disrupted the truth. The Guardian, Retrieved 
from https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-technology-
disrupted-the-truth
Wahl, E., & Ammann, C. (2007). Robustness of the Mann, Bradley, Hughes 
reconstruction of Northern Hemisphere surface temperatures: Examination of 
criticisms based on the nature and processing of proxy climate evidence. Climatic 
Change, 85(1-2), 33-69. 
Woolgar, S. (1988). Science, the very idea. London: Routledge.
Young, L., Wilkinson, I., & Smith, A. E. (2015). A scientometric analysis of publications 
in the Journal of Business-to-Business Marketing 1993–2014. Journal of Business-
to-business Marketing, 22(1-2), 111-123.
158
APPENDIX 1
28 March 2018 
 
Dear Maria and Bob 
 
In Volume 11 #2 GMJ/AU published, “Andrew Bolt and the discourse of ‘scepticism’ in the 
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Herewith I would like to confirm that my colleague Dr Antonio Castillo and I 
organised the referees for Myra Gurney’s article “Missing in action? The ‘non’-
climate change debate of the 2013 Australian federal election” for Volume 8 Issue 
2014 of the Global Media Journal, Australian edition. Here is the link to that 
edition http://www.hca.westernsydney.edu.au/gmjau/?issues=1055. 
 
As always, it was a very rigorous and habitual procedure for avoiding conflict of 
interest. My recollection is that Dr Castillo secured one referee and I provided the 
second one. Then Dr Castillo did the handling and correspondence with Myra’s 
article referees. At no point of time Mrs Gurney had any contact with or 
knowledge about her referees.  
 
Sincerely yours  
 
 
 
Roumen Dimitrov  
 
 
